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CONFIDENTIAL.

(9548.)

F.O. 424 / 220

F.O.

424

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS

OF

ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9532.]

220

July to September 1909.

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[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9532.]

July to September 1909.

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ERRATUM.

Page 102, No. 87, line 4.—For "concession numbers" read "concession hunters."

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. *November* 1909.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

[In continuation of Confidential Paper No. 9532.]

[24801] No. 1.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 220.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July* 1, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 367 of the 26th June regarding the refugees at Adana, the Grand Vizier has given me a verbal assurance, through Rifaat Pasha, to the effect that the Sultan will in no case give his sanction to a death sentence, even should the court-martial think proper to pass one. The Minister for Foreign Affairs added that there would probably eventually be a general amnesty, in which the refugees would be included. I have therefore instructed Major Doughty Wylie to persuade the accused to give themselves up to the authorities, though he was unable himself to obtain a written guarantee.

[25160] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 490.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June* 24, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 400 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith two despatches as marked in the margin, from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad reporting on the proposed irrigation works in Mesopotamia. It seems somewhat doubtful where the necessary funds for these schemes are to come from.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of the Ambassador),
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Consul-General Ramsay to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Bagdad, May* 24, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to state that, in my opinion, the time has now come when it would be worth the while of a large engineering firm to send a representative out to this country to study the openings which it is likely to afford in the near future.

For the purpose of this letter I presume that a progressive Government will remain in power at Constantinople, but before acting on my suggestion it would be well for any firm to obtain the latest political news from the Foreign Office.

2. I have informed you that Sir William Willcocks has submitted proposals to the Turkish Government for irrigation works on the Euphrates, near Bagdad, costing about £ T. 312,000, and that he is preparing other schemes for dealing with the surplus water

of the Euphrates which will cost about another £ T. 100,000. I believe that he is also studying a project for a large reservoir which will take the excess water of the Euphrates in flood time and supply water in the season of low supply. He, with ten engineers under him, is hard at work, and unless their labour is to be wasted they must create a large demand for contractors.

In addition to irrigation works, which will probably be big enough to attract the largest firms, there are likely to be other works.

One of the conditions on which the British Government agreed to an increase in the Turkish import duties was that the custom-house accommodation at Bagdad should be improved. In consequence of this it has been decided to build a new custom-house, and as soon as the final plans are settled I believe that the Turks would be very glad to find a capable contractor to undertake the work at a reasonable price.

A tramway is proposed running for 4 or 5 miles in each direction from Bagdad, and if this is carried out it is almost certain that there will be a number of houses built along the line of the tramway.

The late vali of Bagdad was particularly anxious to have an iron bridge over the Tigris.

Some private individuals have started boring for artesian water.

If the irrigation works are carried out it is clear that some improved means of transporting the produce will have to be provided, and I, personally, cannot believe that it will be long before a railway is made from Bagdad to Aleppo, or to Bussorah, or in both directions.

3. At the present time there are in Mesopotamia no European engineers, there are not even local native contractors, consequently the field is quite open to the first comer. On the other hand, the local conditions would have to be carefully studied as regards labour, freights, cost of materials, &c., before any large contracts could be accepted at rates which did not leave an enormous margin for risks due to want of local knowledge.

It is probable that any large Government works will be put up to tender in Constantinople, and the reason I suggest that British engineering firms should study the country, is because I think the result of such a study would be that the firm with local knowledge could tender at a figure which would leave them a fair profit, and at the same time offer a price which would be lower than could be offered by a firm which had to provide a greater margin to cover more unknown risks.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 497/51.)

Bagdad, May 19, 1909.

Sir,

IN continuation of my letter No. 43, dated the 24th April, 1909, I have the honour to submit the following report on Sir William Willcocks's latest recommendations to the Turkish Government. The sketches attached will help to make the recommendations intelligible to persons who do not know the geography.*

Shortly after the Euphrates enters the plain is a place named Rumadi, and down to this point the bed of the river is capable of carrying 3,500 cubic metres a second. From the most ancient times there was a large escape at Saklawiya, but some twenty or thirty years ago this was closed, and ever since the Euphrates, when it is in flood, breaks its banks on one side or the other; it must do so, because the bed of the river lower down near the barrage is only capable of carrying 2,500 metres a second.

The existing masonry barrage needs repairs, but the Hilla branch of the Euphrates has silted up so much that, in order to make use of it, a second barrage will have to be built above the existing dam, a new channel will have to be dug, and silt clearing will have to be done in the Hilla branch.

Sir William has represented that the work is very urgent, and has asked that it should be taken in hand at once, on the understanding that, should it be decided later

* Not reproduced.

on to give the work on contract, the contractor should take over the work already done at cost price.

The drawings for all these works are complete, but they have not yet been copied. If I can obtain copies I will send them to the Board of Trade as soon as possible.

Sir William's proposals for dealing with the extra 1,000 cubic metres a second that used to be taken by the Saklawiya Canal, are still being prepared, and it is roughly estimated that they will cost something under £ T. 100,000.

2. I enclose a copy of the estimates for seven works, amounting to £ T. 312,000.

3. The amount of manufactured articles that will be required from Europe are approximately:—

20,000 barrels of cement.
70 tons rolled beams.
80 tons cast-iron grooves.
50 tons wrought-iron lock gates.
3,000*l.* worth of pumps and pumping engines.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

P.S.—I am sending a copy of this letter to the Board of Trade by this post, together with ground plans and drawings of the works proposed. The ground plans and drawing can be shown, confidentially, to firms of established repute, but they should on no account be published, as they are only being sent to the Turkish Government by this post.

J. R.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

List of Estimates in connection with Irrigation Works near Bagdad.

(1.)—ESTIMATION du Coût de la Réparation du Barrage Hindia.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Moellons	29,700 à	0·70	20,790
Maçonnerie en ciment	5,000 à	2·2	11,000
Fermeture de l'ouverture	..		5,000
			36,790
Frais imprévus à 10 pour cent	..		3,679
			40,469
Soit	..		40,500

(2.)—ESTIMATION du Coût de l'Écluse proposée pour le Barrage Hindia.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Terrassement	44,700 à	0·05	2,235
Moellons	4,598 à	0·60	2,759
2—1 maçonnerie en ciment	201 à	2·5	502
4—1 " "	2,435 à	2·00	4,870
Maçonnerie en chaux	3,325 à	1·4	4,655
	Mètres carrés.		
Portes pour écluse	120 à	25·00	3,000
Épuisement de l'eau	..		soit 1,500
Pont mobile	..		300
			19,821
A ajouter 33⅓ pour cent pour machinerie, bâtiments, personnel, et imprévus, &c.	..		6,607
			26,428
Soit	..		26,500

(3.)—Estimation du Coût du nouveau Barrage en amont de l'ancien Barrage à Hindia.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Terrassement	52,510 à	0·07	3,676
Moellons	14,550 à	0·70	10,185
Terre grasse	3,420 à	0·20	684
Béton en cément	6,990 à	2·20	15,378
2—1 maçonnerie en cément	2,180 à	2·50	5,450
4—1 „ „	10,970 à	2·00	21,940
Maçonnerie en chaux	7,586 à	1·40	10,620
	Mètres carrés.		
Appareils pour régulation d'eau	900 à	4·50	4,050
Portes pour écluse	96 à	25·00	2,400
Pont mobile	..		500
Epuisement de l'eau	..		15,000
			89,883
A ajouter 33⅓ pour cent pour machinerie, bâtiments, personnel, et imprévus	..		29,961
			119,844
Soit	..		119,900

(4.)—Estimation du Coût du Terrassement pour Diversion de l'Euphrate.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Terrassement	766,000 à	0·05	38,300
Frais imprévus 10 pour cent	..		3,830
			42,130
Fermeture de l'Euphrate actuel	..		2,500
			44,630
Soit	..		44,500

(5.)—Estimation du Coût du Terrassement de la Branche de Hilla.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Terrassement	240,000 à	0·03	7,200
A ajouter 10 pour cent frais imprévus	..		720
			7,920
Soit	..		8,000

(6.)—Estimation du Coût du Curage immédiat de la Branche de Hilla.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Curage	426,000 à	0·02	8,520
A ajouter 10 pour cent frais imprévus	..		852
			9,372
Soit	..		9,500

(7.)—Estimation du Coût du Curage final de la Branche de Hilla.

	Mètres cubes.	£ T.	£ T.
Curage	1,931,000 à	0·03	57,930
A ajouter frais imprévus 10 pour cent	..		5,793
			63,723
Soit	..		64,000

[25169] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 499.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 29, 1909.*

THE despatches which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana since writing my despatch No. 456 of the 17th instant, while containing little more news of a definite nature, present a picture of the situation there which seems to grow more and more sombre. From a number of conversations that he has had recently with various prominent personages, Major Doughty Wylie seems only to become more deeply impressed with the hopelessness of ever getting Christians and Moslems to live in peace and harmony side by side. He finds the Moslem authorities still convinced of the existence of an Armenian plot, and even men like Zia Bey, the second member of the court-martial, and General Mehemet Ali Bey, anxious as they evidently are to see justice done, seem to be much prejudiced in their views by their suspicions of the Armenians. Zia Bey was altogether pessimistic, and frankly declared that the evidence of Christians and Moslems alike was untrustworthy. He expected that there would be some more executions of prominent Armenians; but said that no sufficient proofs could be brought against the chief Moslem culprits, and in fact Major Doughty Wylie reported on the 21st the release of several notorious Moslem agitators, among them being the Mufti of Bageheh, who was greeted with acclamations by the Moslem crowd. The deputies have, however, demanded the re-arrest of himself and his brother from the Grand Vizier.

Equally pessimistic views were expressed by one of the deputies, Babikian Effendi, who was one of the first members of the Committee of Union and Progress. In his opinion there is no chance of justice from the court-martial at present sitting, and he sees in general little hope for the Christian Ottoman subjects even under the new régime, except in emigration. He was strongly in favour of abolishing the court-martial, as was also the Mutessarif of Mersina, in favour of a civil court. The latter indeed has incurred the enmity of all the Turks in Adana by his open disapproval of the Government policy and by his advocacy of civil instead of military trials, with judges from Salonica.

It would however, as Major Doughty Wylie points out, from the Christian point of view, be most undesirable to offend the soldiers, as it is entirely to their discipline and firmness that the Christians owe their safety. Even the best elements among the Moslem population seem to have become very anti-Christian lately, and Major Doughty Wylie believes that it would only require a fresh incident in the capital to plunge the Adana and Konia districts into new massacres. In the meantime, the town of Adana continues to be thoroughly patrolled, and a number of sentences have been pronounced by the various courts-martial. On the 10th June six Turks were condemned to long terms of imprisonment, while, on the other hand, five Armenian prisoners were released. On the 16th the court at Marash reversed the proportions, sentencing nine Armenians to long terms of prison, and letting a Turk off with six months.

In the surrounding district quiet apparently reigns for the time being; on the 7th June the American consul, returning from a trip, reported on the horrors he had witnessed in four small villages to the east of Adana, where corpses lay still unburied, the crops were ruining in the sun, and he had had evidence of people being burned alive in their houses and many women having been carried off. The numbers of the killed in these villages alone he estimated at 2,000: as regards the origin of the massacres, the Turks mostly told him that they had been ordered from Adana, while others said that they were necessitated by the Armenians' preparations to revolt and declare an independent kingdom. The former statement more or less tallies with the view which the deputies have arrived at, namely, that outside Adana itself there was no organised preparation either on the part of the Christians or of the Moslems, but that the massacre occurred in all cases on receipt of the news of an armed revolt in Adana and of the calling out of the Redifs.

Reports of incendiarism at Marash on the 16th instant prove to have been due to an error on the part of a missionary, who mistook a fire at a small neighbouring village for a general conflagration at Marash. A day or two later a telegram was received from the Armenian vicar there, announcing that the chief Mussulmans of the town were intriguing for the removal of the public prosecutor, who was generally regarded as a just and incorruptible man. These intrigues were unfortunately successful, for although this Embassy and the French Embassy promptly made representations for the retention

of this official in the interests of justice and impartiality, Ferid Pasha declared that he had already been dismissed and his successor appointed; and I did not judge it expedient under the circumstances to press the point.

The system of military discipline has been extended meanwhile from Adana to the district round, and the military authorities show absolute determination to keep order. A battalion of regular troops was sent on the 13th to every centre where a court-martial was to be held, such as Erzin. It was originally intended to establish martial law at Antioch, Alexandretta, Beylan, and Kessab, but I received a telegram last evening from Aleppo stating that courts-martial would only sit at Antioch and Marash. There has, nevertheless, undoubtedly been a court-martial sitting at Hadjin, for on the 9th June I received news from Mr. Lawson Chambers there that twenty Christians had been sent by that body to Erzin for trial, whereas the Moslems who had burnt and plundered during the troubles had received no such treatment. I have also heard that the Vali of Konieh, of whom there has been much complaint, has been removed to Sivas and been replaced at Konieh by the Vali of Sivas.

I had hoped by now to have been able to obtain some reliable information regarding the total number of casualties in Adana and the district during the recent events; the Government calculation here puts the number of killed and wounded at 5,400. Major Doughty Wylie tells me, however, that he can give me no approximate estimate as yet; his French colleague puts the number at 30,000, but he himself suggests some figure between 15,000 and 20,000 as being more probable.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[26063] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 12.)

(No. 501.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 3, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Crow, consul at Bagdad, reporting on a Turkish proposal to increase the number of steamers on the Tigris, and to start a Turkish company for the purpose. These proposals were made before the negotiations had been begun with the Lynch group.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 4.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Bussorah, June* 2, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to enclose an abstract of a letter from the Minister of Commerce and Public Works, which lately appeared in a local newspaper, regarding a proposal emanating from the vilayet of Bagdad for working more steamers on the Tigris.

In his letter the Minister of Commerce recapitulates the reasons for the proposal, as stated in a telegram from the vali of Bagdad, which are to the following effect:—

"Transit trade with Persia viâ Bagdad and exports from Mesopotamia are on the increase, and the Hamidieh steamers and Lynch's three steamers are insufficient to handle it; moreover, the monopoly hitherto held by the above-named steamers has raised freights to a rate which is prejudicial to commerce. For this reason transit trade with Persia is passing to Mohammerah; it is therefore essential to increase the number of steamers on the Tigris, and the proposal to start a Turkish company for the purpose, and also to ply steamers on either side of Bagdad and to convey passengers to Garfara, deserves support."

I am sending a copy of this despatch and enclosure to His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad. As far as the vilayet of Bussorah is concerned, I think the number of steamers now plying on the Tigris is enough to carry the trade. Lynch have three and the Hamidieh administration seven. The river is very low for half the year, and more steamers would, I think, prove an encumbrance and hamper navigation in the

narrow reaches below Amara. In any case some attempt should be made to improve the present defective conditions of navigation before more steamers are put on. I have no information which leads me to suppose that the transit trade with Persia is being deflected to Mohammerah, and I do not believe it. Through river freights to Bagdad are very high: 20*s.* 3*d.* by the British and 28*s.* 6*d.* by the Turkish line per ton weight for general cargo; and for sugar per ton of 1,000 kilog., 27*s.* by the British and 25*s.* 8*d.* by the Turkish line in 1907. Owing to trade depression in 1908, downward cargo was more plentiful than upward cargo. The through cargo rates for 1908 and 1909 are about the same as those for 1907. The rate for local cargo, Bussorah to Bagdad works out at 32*s.* 6*d.* per ton by the British and 55*s.* 6*d.* per ton by the Turkish line. Consignees have some cause to grumble at these very high freight rates.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 4.

Abstract of a Letter from the Minister of Commerce and Public Works to the Vali of Bagdad, dated the 6th March, 1325, *which appeared in the "Bagdad" of the 20th April,* 1325 (*the 12th May,* 1909).

THE letter acknowledges a telegram from the vilayet dated the 1st February, 1324, about an application for working more steamers on the Tigris, and approves the proposals therein contained, and says there is no harm in granting the permission asked for, provided—

1. The steamers sail under the Turkish flag.
2. The petitioners and shareholders are Ottoman subjects.
3. The petitioners give an undertaking, registered before the notary public—
   (*a.*) To submit to present and future laws.
   (*b.*) Not to assign their rights to foreigners.
   (*c.*) Not to start any monopoly or privileged concession.
   (*d.*) Not to interfere with the working of any other project of a similar nature if other applications are subsequently made.

4. The freight and passenger tariff is first submitted to and approved by the administrative council of the vilayet and the Chamber of Commerce.

5. The petitioners guarantee to assign a proportion, approved by the administrative council, of their net yearly profits for municipal purposes.

[25172] No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 503.)
Sir, *Therapia, June* 29, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 475 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna describing the measures taken by the Turkish authorities to restore order at Aivali.

Rifaat Pasha assures me that all requisite steps have been taken to keep things quiet there, and he has promised me that the officer commanding the company to which the assailant of M. Eliopoulos belongs would call at the British vice-consulate at Aivali in person and offer his excuses for the incident. The soldier who committed the assault has already been punished.

I have, &c.
(In the absence of the Ambassador),
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 59.)

Sir, *Smyrna, June 26, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a further despatch which I have received from Mr. Gout describing the measures taken by the authorities to restore order at Aivali.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Mr. Gout to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Aivali, June 25, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my despatch of the 18th instant, that the vali of Broussa, Azmi Bey, as superintending officer of the kaza of Aivali, arrived here on the 18th instant, accompanied by the director of political affairs of his vilayet: so have also Moukarem Bey, formerly mutessarif of Viga (the district of the Dardanelles), Ibrahim Bey, the kaimakam of Adramyti, and Cosma Poursalides, the monavim of Molivo (Mitylene).

The officers of the court-martial, consisting of a lieutenant-colonel, two brevet majors, three majors, a captain, and a civilian secretary, have also arrived here (on Wednesday last). Two Turkish coastguards, a torpedo-boat, and a stationnaire are lying off Aivali.

Since the arrival of the troops, which are now said to be 2,000 strong, the military authorities have issued three proclamations, on the 17th, 18th, and 19th instant respectively.

The first warned the inhabitants to keep within doors in case of disturbances, forbade firing, called in arrears of taxes within three days, and summoned condemned offenders at large to surrender for imprisonment.

The second announced the appointment of Major Aziz Bey to the command of the garrison and the extension of martial law to the island of Mosconisi. It proceeded to call upon those in possession of gunpowder and other explosives to deliver them up within three days; to warn people that none were allowed out of doors after 8·30 P.M., providing, however, for the call of doctors in case of illness; to proclaim the prohibition of assemblies; to warn that soldiers may fire if the order to stop be disobeyed; and that all pictures depicting scenes of the old régime or of the war of the Greek independence be put out of the way.

The third complained that although two days had elapsed since the first proclamation no rifles had as yet been handed up, and warned people that all rifles, fowling-pieces, and revolvers discovered in houses will involve the occupiers in severe penalties; notified the future restitution of fowling-pieces and small revolvers after inspection; and fixed the maximum quantity of gunpowder permissible in a house at 1 oke.

The item that stands out significantly from among others in these proclamations is the one relating to pictures of Hellenic military prowess, and its inclusion therein, considered in the light of recent political events in the Near East, may serve to explain the stringency and promptitude with which the authorities thought proper to visit the insubordinate attitude of the people of Aivali.

These measures have led to the surrender of 1,620 Gras rifles, ten Mauliehers and a large number of revolvers and obsolete arms. They have also brought to light some fifty-five sacks of gunpowder secretly stowed away in a private house in the very centre of the town.

The cordon round the town and its immediate neighbourhood has necessarily restrained the freedom of land traffic, and laid an embargo on the smaller craft plying within the harbour. These restrictions have, of course, brought about a temporary stress to the petty trader but they are likely to be soon relaxed.

Some complaints are occasionally heard of the harshness with which these measures are carried out by the soldiers and of excesses they are said to commit, but, the military commander informs me, three notorious malefactors, one of whom is a former "comitagi" of Macedonia, must be captured and none but extreme measures can ferret them out. On the whole, the conduct of the troops has been marked with moderation and care.

The measure that rankles most in the breasts of the Greek inhabitants is the billeting of troops in schools and private dwelling houses; but even this has hitherto led to no regrettable incident.

Another source of irritation is the search for arms made in churches and, as some allege, the digging up of graves, but the more enlightened and level-headed Greeks readily acknowledge that the authorities had reason to proceed with telling effect.

The authorities are now closely examining the grounds upon which the claims to Greek nationality rest, and will no doubt bring back to the Turkish fold many a spurious Greek who has surreptitiously strayed out of it.

I may mention incidentally that the town of Aivali, besides being a depôt of contraband rifles, also largely employs its activity in the contraband of tobacco the manipulation of which is said to involve an outlay in wages of £T. 8,000.

This trade attracts a large number of workmen who, earning their livelihood under irregular and unlawful conditions, gradually develop into a class of undesirables from among whose ranks the promoters of the recent acts of defiance to the constituted authority may be sought.

Life here, to all appearances, has now resumed its normal aspect and but for the exercise of martial law nothing remains to indicate the perturbation of last week. The trouble is affording the authorities the opportunity of earnestly setting their "Aivali house in order."

I have, &c.

EDGAR GOUT.

[25178] No. 6.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 507.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 30, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Captain Dickson, vice-consul at Van, reporting on a journey to Sulimanieh, for the information of the War Office.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Vice-Consul Dickson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Van, June 15, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose for your Excellency's perusal, some notes and reports on affairs of principal interest met with on my journey through Mosul Sulimania and along the Persian frontier.

The journey has been rather a long one, and in this time of rapid changes in the history of Turkey, and so probably many of the events chronicled may have lost their interest by now.

In an extended journey over such a variety of countries and peoples, it is difficult to give a succinct account in a few words, but one fact which has impressed me everywhere, among wild mountain Kurds, agricultural plain Kurds, nomads, ryahs, Arabs, and townspeople alike, is the unanimous dissatisfaction with the new régime. Some speak openly, others do not, but there is no disguising the fact that the Sherian, and no equality and fraternity is what they want. Although in most of the country I passed through there is practically no Christian question (the Chaldeans between Mosul and Persia are cringing cuss, have no ideas of their own beyond trade and usury, and are content with their lot). The idea of the equality of a Christian is repugnant to them. The only visible change in their lives or habits since the days of Mahommed is the carrying of a rifle instead of a sword, education or liberal ideas are unknown. People introduced to me at Sairt, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Slimania, as the lights of Liberalism and leaders of the local committees of Union and Progress would be looked on as reactionaries anywhere else, and rightly so.

The men who wield influence and power in the country and mountains are the sheikhs and aghas, these exist only by despotism, tyranny, and oppression, and usually gain their power by surrounding themselves with armed criminals, and gradually eating

up their smaller neighbours. In the towns it is the tax farmers and landlords, most of whose riches are obtained by unjust extortion and corruption and other illegal methods. These men have nothing to gain, and everything to lose by an honest and equitable régime. The common people are mere sheep and tools in the hands of their owners or masters, they have no ideas of their own, but a certain respect for what their mollah or agha tells them, and anyone of them with an ounce of spirit generally lets it loose in the wrong direction.

After the mountain sheikhs, the most reactionary are probably the Mosul Arabs, but these seem to be a sneak-thief sort of conspirator, and though they might join in a revolt whose success was already assured, they have neither the pluck nor the initiative to start one themselves.

The impression given me by the Government officials nearly everywhere was that of being Young Turk officially and by order. In a few cases, where some energetic Young Turk military officer happened to be stationed, who might be in communication with Salonica, they might be forced to make a show of zeal for the new régime. It is usually only show. Out in the provinces there is not even this show, and things go on just the same.

Very few of the military officers in out of the way and isolated stations have liberal or any other views, most of them seem to have become stagnant, and pass their time making use of their official position to earn a little extra money in the same way as their civil colleagues.

The agitations of the Armenians, a race detested by all, has been used as an excellent advertisement everywhere by the reactionaries.

In conclusion, I have little hesitation in saying that Kurdistan is not ready for a constitution, and that the reason lies with the Government. The Kurds are easily Governed, but they require strong and honest officials to do it. This commodity is not found in Kurdistan. If the weak, partial, corrupt, indolent and dishonest set of men who at present masquerade in office, in such of the few places where a form of Government does exist, were replaced by a few just competent men to direct affairs, with a stern and relentless hand, and if the Government extended this hand into the various districts, now at the mercy of sheikhs and other brigands, there would be some hope, and I am confident that the Government would be the richer. A certain amount of resolution and energy, the severe punishment of the more corrupt officials, instead of changing them to another vilayet, and a determination to stand no nonsense from the various petty brigands and sheikhs, is what is wanted. This, backed up by a show of force by troops not locally recruited, would suffice to turn what at present is a profitless bear-garden into a paying paradise, and by degrees honesty, thrift, prosperity, and liberal ideas might have some chance of taking root, though I fancy a generation or so will be required. For the moment they are a lot of unruly, untamed children, who should be sent to school, or better still a reformatory. The fault is the teachers, not the children's.

The manner in which various corrupt and incompetent employés have been dismissed from their posts only to be given others a few weeks later, serves as an advertisement for reaction. The few occasions in which troops have been used to pursue notorious and dangerous brigands, they have done so in a half-hearted and listless manner, with no intention to succeed, while the Van authorities, at least, pay far more attention to preaching constitutionalism to the Persians, and occupying Urmiah and Salmas in the process, to be able to spare any time or troops to cleansing their own vilayet. This very aggressive action of the Turks in Persia is probably necessitated by the Russian occupation of Tabreez. From what I personally saw of the Turkish troops around Salmas and Urmiah, leads me to believe that that would not stop short of an encounter with the Russians to prevent the latter coming to Salmas and Urmiah.

I would be glad if your Excellency would forward these reports to the Intelligence Division of the War Office. The maps and sketches made on this tour I will forward later.

I have, &c.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

General Notes on Journey between Van and Mosul.

IN the Kiavash district things seem to have improved, the constitution has given the Armenians confidence, and they are making preparations to sow more fields.

In the Gitsan Dere and Khisan districts, where the Sheikh Ali reigns supreme, there is no change. The Kurds there are very wild and independent, and say the constitution does not refer to them. The sheikh, who has a very bad reputation as a reactionary, has not relaxed any of his oppression, still since the constitution there has not been any raiding or pillaging on a large scale.

At Sairt the Mutessarif had just left for Bitlis to act for the Vali there, who had gone to Mosul. He is a new arrival since the constitution, but has not lost time in gaining a bad reputation for dishonesty and corruption. All the various Kurd brigands and outlaws who have been for so long oppressing this district, including the notorious Bischar Chatto, were brought into Sairt, and, after surrendering a few antiquated flintlocks and a lot of baksheesh, were granted free pardons and firmans, &c., and given a warning as to their future behaviour. The effects of this warning seem to be wearing off now. Everyone here is discontented both with the Government and with the new régime. There is no Young Turk party and everyone is reactionary in spirit. The Mutessarif has been accused of receiving presents from and protecting various thieves. In one case the house of the employé of the public debt was broken into at night and £ T. 500 stolen. It appears that the thieves are well known, and on the Nazir wishing to have them prosecuted the Mutessarif brought up some charges of immorality against the Nazir, who, on appeal to Constantinople, has been called there to have the affair investigated.

Various sheikhs from Bitlis have been promenading this district preaching reaction, and are reported to have had considerable success among the nomad Kurds, especially the Batoan and Shernakli. Their main policy appears to consist of pretending that the Armenian Tashnakists are sending emissaries among the local Assyrians inciting them to do as they are doing at Van, *i.e.*, make the Kurds give up the land to the Christians. They have also been making the Assyrians sign by force "massbattus" asking for a return of the old régime and the Sheriat. It is true that at the commencement of the constitution the Kurds were much impressed, and the death of Ibrahim Pasha, of the Milli, and the imprisonment of Abdul Kerim Pasha, of the Miran, had a sobering effect, but the worst of them are getting over that now, mainly owing, I am told, to the evil influence of the Mutessarif.

A bright spot in this dark outlook is the work of the kaimakam of Deh, who seems to have done a lot of benefit to that turbulent district, and many of the worst characters have been imprisoned and punished. No steps have been taken as yet, however, to bring back the inhabitants of the numerous deserted Christian villages between Sairt and Jezireh, vacated owing to the continued oppression and depredations of the nomad Kurds, mostly the Batoan of Meh. Musty, and the Tyars of Reschid Agha. This latter has been in trouble lately. He and his people are notorious brigands. Some five years ago he was imprisoned at Diarbekir, but managed to escape. Lately he has been creating disturbances and inciting the other Kurds to do the same. The Jezireh Government decided to arrest him, and on the 10th April sent some fifty soldiers and some zaptiehs to affect it. Reschid was in camp at Zarakawa, two hours from Jezireh, and on the arrival of the soldiers fired on them, killing a captain and two soldiers; the Kurds then escaped and are now in hiding in the Batoan country between Deh and Shernakh. The Government has sent warnings to the Shernakli and Batoan not to receive them, and when I passed Jezireh on the 12th April two companies of infantry were leaving in pursuit of them.

Jezireh.—On the whole, things have decidedly improved here since I last passed through. The government is decidedly stronger, at least in the town. The powerful Miran Asshiret having had their claws cut, their chief, Abdul Kerim, being in prison. These Miran, with the Batoan and the Shernakli, are the principal black sheep in this country. The Aghas of the two latter went to Sairt and received from the Mutessarif a warning, but this has not had much effect and they are showing signs of unrest. Several cases of raiding and pillage have passed unheeded lately, and the two Shernakli Aghas, Abdur Rahman, and the Agha Isor, who are still on bad terms, have been venting their fury in the manner usual in this country, *i.e.*, burning the Christian villages in each other's preserves. Two villages, Wasta and Telkutin, have been thus treated, and three Nestorians were recently killed in Hassana by Shernakli.

The reactionary element in Jezireh, led by some sheikhs, recently created some excitement by circulating the same rumours about Armenian fedai intriguing. The kaimakam having interrogated the Chaldean bishop, who denied *in toto*, the sheikhs were admonished.

Between Jezireh and Zakkho on the plain are many villages of Silopi Kurds and one or two Assyrian and many more deserted ones. The plain is rich and fertile and in securer times should hold a large population. The Silopi are a branch of the Haji Bairam and with the Goyan are under Abdur Rahman of the Shemakli. They are sedentary and have a good reputation in the locality.

Hidden in the valleys and gorges of the foot-hills between Zakko and Judi Dagh is a large number of flourishing Kurd villages.

Zakko is a Kurd centre of some importance, and the seat of a kaimakam. The most important person in this district is Reschid Agha, chief of the large Sliwani Asshiret, who have some thirty villages on the slopes of Jebel Beheri, and can muster some 1,000 armed men. They are a sedentary tribe and quiet.

Between Zakko and Amadia is a long transverse crack in the limestone formation running east and west between the Zab and the Tigris. In this is the rich valley of the Supna, while later on the Khabour, after working its way through a tangled mass of prodigious peaks and crags, eventually cleaves its way through the northern wall of this crack, and turning sharp to the west, joined by the Supna, flows quietly past Zakko to the Tigris near Feish Khabour. This valley, with its walls of limestone north and south, fairly open, with low undulating sandstone hills, broken here and there by sandstone mullahs and limestone outcrops, is well wooded with oak on its southern slopes, except where cleared for cultivation. For some hours from Zakko the villages are inhabited by Lehvi Kurds, ryahs, and excellent cultivators, whose terraced vineyards and fruit-groves are so neatly laid out as to remind one of Italy or parts of Switzerland. This is a rare occurrence in Kurdistan. The picturesqueness is increased by the saw-like series of limestone crags, which act as a background, and the numerous grassy groves, shaded by huge old wallnuts and other trees, and shelter ziarets and sanctuaries. The two-storied stone-built houses are also a feature in the landscape.

After the Lehvi come the Doshki, or Dostiki Kurds. Although inhabiting the same soil as the Lehvi, they do not seem either as prosperous or as industrious as the latter. Their villages are poor and squalid, and in fact they are Kurds. They pretend that this want of industry is due to their ancient feud with the Hartoshi nomads of Haji Bey, who, passing the winter on the plain between them and Mosul, cut them off from their market. Haji Agha is now in prison, and his tribe are going very slow at present. They have to pass through the middle of the Dostiki country by the Berjina Gedik to get to their summer yailas, and this is always a trying time. The Dostiki, a large tribe, are scattered about a good deal between here and Rowanduz. There are two sections of them in the Supna, Hombai, under M. Yassin Agha, at Zeyva, and Cheai, under Hassan Ismail, of Germavi. They do not think much of the new régime, which can hardly be said to have reached them. It did not prevent them having to turn out against their will at the demand of the Sheikh of Bamarni to attack the Nestorians in the Lizan valley, and it has done little to enable them to get back their sheep, raided last November by the Gulli and Seindi from north of the Khabour. While I was at Zakko, Abdy Agha, chief of the Gulli, and Reschid Agha, of the Seindi, were there interviewing the kaimakam. It appears that their men had petitioned the Government to allow them to pay their taxes direct to the Government, and not through their Aghas. The Aghas had protested, and the kaimakam seemed to be supporting them. North of the Supna, and separated from it by a high limestone wall, is a similar and parallel valley inhabited by the upper Berwari Kurds. Their chief is the notorious Reschid Bey, hereditary Nim of Berwari. He is a remnant of the old feudal boys, and though at one time in bad odour with the Government, and in fact was dismissed on the representations of the late Lord Currie, he has since regained his influence, and is now absolute ruler of the district, only paying a small tribute to the Government. He is protected at Mosul by the notorious Haji M. Sabonji Pasha, and also until lately by the French Chaldeans, from whom he was reputed to receive a salary of £T. 8 per month. This is with a view to furthering their interests in the Nestorian villages of his district and the Supna, of which there are some few. One of the most influential men in these parts, and perhaps its most evil genius, is the Sheikh of Bamarni, in the Supna valley. A benign old man in appearance; his looks belie him; he is fanatic, rapacious, despotic, and oppressive. It was he who sent round the bloodstained clothes and the order for

the Jehad to the Kurds last year, and by threats and other means amassed the army of some 3,000 Kurds, who raided the Lizan valley. He is the virtual government in the Supna, though there is a mudir and four zaptiehs at Dowadia, who confine themselves to collecting taxes from the Chaldean villages.

East of the Supna and towards the Zab is the Amadia valley and district. This consists of some twenty ryah Kurd villages and some few Chaldean. There is an acting kaimakam at Amadia, a Kurd, but he has no power or authority, the place being run by a certain Haji Abdul Aziz Agha, who owns most of the villages and farms the taxes of the remainder. He is very influential, and, being on bad terms with the Sheikh of Bamarni, prevented his Kurds from joining in the Lizan raid last year.

Between the Supna and Amadia Rift or valley and the Mosul Plain, is a tangle of sawlike limestone ridges running in parallel rows east and west like the furrows in a ploughed field. The highest and most northerly, the Ghara and Beheri Daghs, runs without interruption from the Tigris to the Zab. Three other ridges gradually descend in height, the last the Aeri D, and Cha Reheheri dominating like a wall over the Mosul Plain. The country covered by these ridges is rather intricate being for the most part deep rocky crags and gorges and here and there forest-covered slopes and Kurd villages nestling on the steep slopes. It is a wild country and the inhabitants are in keeping. Various torrents drain the southern slopes of these ridges, run east or west for a short distance in the valley, then plunge through a rift in the next southern ridge, turn sharply east or west in its valley for a short distance, plunge again through the next ridge, eventually uniting to form the Hazer Su, which, emerging into the plain, joins the Zab. The successive ridges and valleys from the main Ghara D. to the plain resemble a staircase where the top stair is high and narrow and descends until the last is low and broad. The valleys near the Ghara are gorges, those near the plain open and fertile. These are the districts of Lower Berwari, Lower Missouri Bulur, and Nakkila. At one time they were densely populated, especially the Nakkla which shows traces of a high civilisation, broad stone causeways, ruins of large masonry bridges, chateaux, and fortresses. Even in recent times the Nakkla, one of the fairest valleys I have seen in Turkey, was supposed to have contained 100 villages. At present only some fifteen remain and nomad Kurds are pasturing on the fallow. The whole district is an object lesson on the criminal negligence of the Turkish Government. Up to now the Government has had no existence in these districts. They are inhabited by Kurds of Missouri Berwari and Zeebar Asshirets with a sprinkling of Assyrians. Formerly there were many Assyrian villages; now there are some five in all, and wretchedly poor ones at that, all except Maisi which is large and flourishes, owing to the fact that it is vacouf and the property of the Sheikh of Abd-el-Kadir at Bagdad, and therefore left alone by the Kurds. In Maisi many of the Assyrians from the local deserted villages have taken sanctuary. The hundreds of deserted villages in these picturesque valleys are by no means all Christian. The cause of the blight would appear to be found in the number of petty Aghas each with five or six villages, perpetually at war with each other, and following the usual Kurdish custom, attacking and raiding each other's weakest villages. Everyone suffers and only the Agha, secure in his castle, grows fat. This perpetual harrying and pillaging sickened the villagers to such an extent that Moslem and Christian alike have left. Within the last few years a reformer has arisen among them, the Sheikh of Barzan. He has got together men of the Zeebar Girdi, Oramar, and Shirwan Asshirets and has led a campaign against each of the petty Aghas in succession. He has had a huge success and has crushed them one by one until at the present moment but one remains, this is Osman Agha of Gundik near Aceia, and he has probably been crushed by now, as when I passed Gundik, he was anxiously awaiting the attack of the sheikh's men and had all his forces posted. The sheikh now commands some 1,500 guns, and his plan has been to crush the power of the Aghas and benefit the simple Kurds, in ensuring them security and peace. He has burned the castles of the various Aghas, looted their possessions, taken their guns, and releasing their villages from their rule, he takes the proper taxes himself and pays a tribute to the Government. So far he has been successful and has played the game. Everyone, Kurd and Assyrian, seems content with the arrangement and only the Aghas are discomfited. I had the pleasure of passing the night in the lately burned château of one of the worst of them, Kan Avdal Agha of Seiani. He is a notorious brigand who had for long gone unscathed until last autumn when the sheikh and his men paid him a visit and cleared him out.

A few days before I arrived at Aceia, the sheikh had been sending round word inviting the inhabitants of the various deserted villages to return to their homes, and promising them security and protection for the future. From what I gathered it is

probable that some few will return soon and many more in the autumn after the harvest has been gleaned in their present domicile. As the Turks have never had any control in these districts, and the sheikh pays them a tribute, he is officially recognised as their representative. There is an acting kaimakam at Zebar but he serves as a mollah to the sheikh. At present all seems *couleur de rose* for Kurds and Christians, but I don't know how long it is going to go on; if the sheikh one day finds himself strong enough to change his roll of deliverer to that of oppressor. Although he has an armed bodyguard, the majority of his 1,500 followers are distributed about the villages on both sides of the Zab and their only reward for their services, barring any loot that may be taken in these punishing raids, is their security from oppression and immunity from raids and nomad pillage.

The most troublesome of the nomad tribes about here are the Heriki, who winter on the plains south-west of Aceri and summer on the Persian frontier. They have to cross the Zab in their transit, and the sheikh and his people holding the crossings the Heriki are forced to keep on good terms with him. These nomad Heriki number some 1,500 guns and their chief is Piro or Piroto Agha. It was he who was made responsible for the sacking of Hawana, was imprisoned and subsequently pardoned for same by Yaver Pasha. Since that escapade there has been some discord in the tribe and a certain number of them have selected Haji Agha as their chief. Haji and Piro have since been enemies until three weeks before I passed when a battalion of infantry was sent to Aceri from Mosul with the idea of collecting the sheep tax from the Kurds. This caused Haji and Piro to settle their differences. The Government estimate their flocks at 27,000 and request £ T. 1,000. This, the Heriki were preparing to pay, when affairs at Mosul necessitated the return of the battalion, the Heriki thereon refused to pay on more than 3,000 sheep, that being their own estimate. Negotiations were still going on when I passed through.

It is the same story everywhere, whenever the Government shows the slightest force or determination, the Kurds at once acquiesce in all that is asked and become good citizens. The constitution made them take up an attitude of watch and wait, but the recent events at Mosul have had a bad effect in showing the weakness of the Government. The entire immunity of the Sheikh of Bamarni and Reschid Bey for the Lizan raid has also encouraged them. Recently some fifty Heriki raided Ashitha, a large Nestorian village above Lizan, but they were driven off after a skirmish. The Heriki and other nomads do not usually raid the villages of their immediate neighbours, they pasture their flocks on the fields and vineyards of these, and annoy them in many ways, but for raids they go farther afield into other districts. No district escapes, however, all being visited by some one or other, but it would seem as if the Sheikh of Barzan intended making raiding in these districts his own monopoly.

Among other Kurds there are some forty villages of the Lower Berwari Asshiret, under Hassain Agha, of Beeash. One hundred villages of Missouri with many small Aghas, the most influential of whom are Sheikh Nouri, of Barifka, Mirza Agha, of Miraiba, and Hassan Arab Agha. Of the nomads, there are some 100 tents of Zediki under Hassan Jehengir who winter in lower Missouri and summer in the Sipna and the yailas above. Seventy tents of Govi who frequent the Baudiman.

Aceri is the official centre of government of all this district, that is to say there is a kaimakam and forty zaptiehs there. It is situated picturesquely on the wall of mountain overlooking the Mosul plain. The plain between here and Mosul is fairly thickly covered with large and prosperous villages of ryah Kurds, Yezidis, and Chaldeans. Many of these villages are the private property of the late Sultan and having many privileges flourish exceedingly. They are a great contrast to the ordinary village one is accustomed to see about in Kurdistan. In the plain villages the Aceri Government has some authority, but north of the Aceri Dagh it does not extend. The actual kaimakam at Aceri is a Sulimanli Kurd with a bad reputation for corruption and incapacity and he is altogether a feeble individual who is run by a few local notables. He has received his dismissal and is now awaiting the arrival of his successor from Stamboul.

The Yezidis have been allowed to return to Sheikh Adi, where they are rebuilding their shrines, &c., and intend to make it once more a centre of their faith.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.E.A.*

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Report on the Turco-Persian Frontier.

FROM an inspection on the field of the disputed district between the head of the lesser Zab and Sulimania I am more than ever decided that the frontier question concerns tactical necessities more than political or religious claims.

Roughly, the configuration of the country in question may be described as a long, high valley, offering easy communications, running north and south from Salmas to Sulimania. From Salmas to Wazna the range of hills on the east side is low, and has the Persian plains beyond, while on the west the range is high, with a series of tangled chains beyond. South of Wazna the reverse is the case. On the east the hills become higher, with the Persian mountains beyond, while on the north the chain of Kurdestan crags gives place to a series of hills, low on their eastern slopes, dropping suddenly and precipitously to the Mosul and Mesopotamian plains on the west. Barring this sudden drop from the high valley at some 4,800 feet to the plains at some 2,000 feet a gap in the western chain at Wazna, where it changes from mountains to hills, gives the opportunity for a road from the Black Sea littoral to Mesopotamia. This gap is actually on the frontier, and the ground on the Turkish side, descending suddenly to the plains, gives the Turks no chance for a defensive position, or there is no available position which might be defended by a small force until reinforcements could be brought up. This to the Turks, with their slow mobilisation, movement, and want of transport would be a necessity. On the other hand, north and east of Wazna there is nothing to stop rapid advance and movement of troops. The country being more or less open right up to Tabreez and Julfa. On the other hand, an excellent position on the Geugai Dagh and Kulesepan, south of Pesvey, and the Lahjan plain guards the only two roads to Wazna from the north, *i.e.*, that by the Lahjan, and that by Karakhidar. This position could easily be held by a small against a much larger force, and would give the necessary delay. The country between there and the Russian frontier is open and favourable to cavalry, and no doubt the Turks imagine that their Kurd irregulars would be useful there.

To sum up, previous to the occupation of the disputed districts the Turkish frontier consisted of an indefensible pass, which could be reached by an easy road from Russia, while if the pass was once taken nothing but plain country lay before the invading force. By the occupation the Turks have secured a tract of country offering a series of easily defensible positions in the front of the pass and the opportunity of mobilising forces in peace time in a position whence they can menace the Russian flank at Julfa.

Road between Sulimania and Urumia.

Leaving Sulimania the road crosses the Worga Dagh, a range of steep, grassy slopes which offers no great difficulties, then descending a wide, open basin broken by wooded nullahs, grassy glades, and here and there the fields of some Kurd village. This is the Sharbazar valley and kaza, with its centre at Seetah. The valley is watered by the Karachokan Su, the road crossing it by an easy gravel ford at its junction with the Harrik Chai and near a ruined masonry bridge. From here it crosses by easy gradient a wooded limestone ridge with several villages on it, and descends into the Siwell valley, crossing the Siwell Su by a ford which would probably be difficult in most seasons near Kenaru. Up to here the road is an excellent track, and could be easily used for wheel transport. From the Siwell Su to the Lesser Zab basin and the Bana Su the road has to make a steep ascent of some 3,000 feet across a rough wooded, stony spur, broken by many small valleys and gullies, and then descending very rapidly to the Bana Su gorge at Merwa. The track, though rough, could be easily made serviceable for wheels, and easy gradients could be found. The Bana Su is here forded in a deep rocky gorge, and the track becomes very difficult and dangerous for anything but mules. Climbing over a rocky crag it slides down the other side into the Zab gorge at its bend near the picturesque village of Alot perched on a terrace of rocks projecting from the long precipitous wall which here separates the Bana and Zab. The road zigzags down to the river and passes it by a good wicker bridge, passable for animals. It then winds high up to cross a rocky spur, later descending and following the deep rocky scarped gorge of the river to Risgir, after which it ascends to the higher slopes above the gorge, at Sheltuash. This portion from Merwa to Sheltuash, some 14 miles, of deep ravines, precipices, and gorges would offer considerable obstacles to road or rail

construction. It would probably be more costly than difficult, as washouts and avalanches might be expected frequently. From Shelmash to Wazna through Serdesht the road lies across high, undulating, wooded country, with a succession of rocky peaks to the west, and broken up to the east by numerous small valleys, which rapidly become deep as they near the Zab. No serious difficulty would be experienced here in making a road, gentle gradients could always be found.

Serdesht and Bana are now occupied by the Turkish troops, who administer the country in an arbitrary fashion. Certain Kurd Aghas have been appointed as mudirs and kaïmakams, but these are merely the tools of the officers who run them. Thus Karani Agha, the chief of the Pisdu Asshiret, is kaïmakam at Serdesht, is a mere puppet in the hands of the orderly-room clerk of the commandant at Serdesht. The Turks have constructed barracks for one battalion at Serdesht and for one battery and one battalion at Bana, and these units are quartered there. Besides these there is one battalion at Sulimania, one at Tekrit, one at Kalediz, one at Chemchemal, one at Pesvey, one distributed along the roads between Pesvey and Rowanduz. These are all of the VIth Army Corps. At Ushnu is a battalion of IVth Army Corps and another at Keukey, on the edge of the Urumia Plain.

About Serdesht the Turks seem to have more power, and are detested by the inhabitants, whom they bully unmercifully. Neither officers nor men seem to have suffered pecuniarily by their stay in this district. These Serdesht and Bana troops are victualled from Kirkuk by the road through Kalediza, that being the easiest one. The Kurds about this district belong to the Pisdir Asshiret, with its numerous divisions, Pisdu, Alan Harz Alan, Malakari, Bashi Kolossa, &c.; they are all well armed and mounted, and have the reputation of being warlike, though the occupation of their territory by the Turks in the last few years seems to have damped their ardour, and they are pretty cowed now in this district. This is not the case with the Hangor and Mamash sections of the Billass Asshiret further north in Wazna and Lahjan. These have by no means submitted quietly to the Turks, and their presence there is rather precarious and more or less on sufferance, the Turks flattering their chiefs with decorations and titles, and humouring them by allowing them to raid the Persian towns of Sujbulak and the Urumia Plain from time to time as it suits their politics. The Turks take no liberties with these Billass, and I hear that during their occupation there they have lost some hundreds of men in attempts to subdue the Billass. At the present moment things are quiet. Bais Agha, their chief, was made a Pasha recently by the Turks.

Wazna is a district of high valleys, or grassy basins, some 5,000 feet high, surrounded by rocky mountains. These basins drain indiscriminately east or west to the Zab or Wazna Sas. Those going to the Zab descend rapidly, but regularly, through thickly wooded valleys dropping some 2,000 feet in some 5 miles. Those going to the Wazna Su have a more rapid fall in a shorter distance, as they pass through the Mafinosa Dagh gorge to the Pisdir Plain, dropping some 3,000 feet in 1 or 5 miles.

From Wazna down the spurs of Kandil and Koteril Daghs into the Lahjan, and so on through Ushnu to Urumia, the road is easy, and presents no difficulty either for road making or railways, easy gradients can be got round all spurs, a few small streams and mountain torrents could easily be forded or bridged, and the only rivers of any importance, the Zab, can be easily bridged, while the Ushnu River and Barandus Chai are wide, partly dry, watercourses in open plains.

The question of the best trace for a railway between Urumia and Kirkuk seems to resolve itself into which is the better trace, following the Zab valley in its bend or mounting the Wazna Pass. As I have mentioned above, the Zab valley is by no means impossible, but difficult and costly. Without actually going over the road, which, I believe, has been done by my predecessors, but seeing the ground from the pass and the hills above, it seemed to me that the easier trace would be found down to the Pisdir Plain from Wazna by winding round the valley of the Wazna Chai, which, though similar to the Zab in its gorge and rapid descent, does not take such a large sweeping detour among high hills, and would thus necessitate a shorter length of difficult construction, and, being on the western slope of the frontier range, would have less liability for washouts.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

June 10, 1909.

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Report on Affairs in Suleimania.

SINCE the commencement of this year the state of affairs in and around Suleimania has been in a deplorable state. Up to the granting of the constitution affairs in Suleimania were completely in the hands of a local celebrity Sheikh Seyid and his family and faction. He appears to have been a most evil old man with every vice under the sun, extortion, robbery, brigandage, black mail, seduction, &c., being but a few of them. His sons and family it seems are even worse than he. Some years ago he was called to Stamboul to answer for his conduct, there he said some prayer when one of the Sultan's children was ill, by good luck the child recovered, and the sheikh got the credit of it for his intercession. He was loaded with honours and presents, given a cypher, sent back to Suleimania and ever since ruled supreme there. The Sultan used to wire for his prayers and intercessions with Allah on occasions, and in return the sheikh used to get honours and decorations for his family and friends and pardons for their shortcomings. With such a powerful protector it is small wonder that the sheikh's faction increased in power, crime, and iniquity. It was useless for the local government officials or anyone else to try to check them, when a wire from the sheikh to the Sultan sufficed to cause the dismissal of any of them, even up to the Vali. Thus things became insupportable. The townspeople of Suleimania were the principal sufferers. They are a commercial people, mostly Turks and Kurds with a few Arabs and Chaldeans. These, some of them wealthy men, were the chief butts of the sheikh's depotism and brigandage. He was ably aided in his pillage and brigandage by the notorious tribe of Hamawand Kurds who occupy the grassy plains between Suleimania and Kirkuk. These are a tribe of irreconcilables—divided into five sections and can, according to their own computations, muster some 1,600 mounted men all well armed. A good number of their Aghas are outlaws. I am told that they are a class by themselves among the other Kurds for bravery, courage, and daring. It is their boast that they live only for brigandage, care only for horses and guns, have never been subdued, though often punished and some of their Aghas exiled. They certainly seem to act up to their boast, and barring horses and guns and cartridges, they do not appear to possess much else. I stayed with two of their principal Aghas: Emin Agha, chief of the Ramawan section, and Mohammed Emin, chief of the Begzade section. I have never had worse accommodation, there was nothing to eat, in one case, a village, the houses were ruined hovels with no carpets or other Oriental makeshifts for necessities; in the other case, a camp, the tents were small and rotten and unworthy of the servants of an ordinary nomad Agha. However, they are rich in pride and boasts about their courage and contempt for governments, Sultans, taxes, soldiers, gardens, cultivation, civilisation, new or old régimes, riches, sheep, and in fact everything, with the exception of mares, guns, and prismatic field-glasses. With such henchmen as these Hamawand at his call it is not surprising that Sheikh Seyid made things difficult for the Suleimania townspeople. Suleimania is the centre of a big Kurdish district and is an important market; large caravans trade between it and Kirkuk and Bagdad principally exporting tobacco, oak galls, &c.

These caravans were perpetually being pillaged by the Hamawand and the culprits instead of being brought to justice were by the sheikh's kind offices pardoned and in many cases given grades, decorations, and posts; as for instance Mahmoud Agha, and Emin Agha, two notorious characters who are now commandants of gendarmerie at Mosul and Chemchemal. After the granting of the constitution the faction of townspeople and Government employees in Suleimania with the aid of the Mutessarif and the Talour Agassi succeeded in getting the sheikh called to Mosul to answer for some of his malpractices. He went there with his family and a train of thirty retainers and occupied a large house where they carried on disgracefully. The result was the *émeute* which ended in the murder and massacre of most of them: Sheikh Mahmoud, a son, and the principal offender escaped and was sent to Kirkuk. The Mutessarif of Suleimanie told me that the sheikh's death was engineered by his Suleimanian enemies, but this is not the opinion in well-informed circles at Mosul, who think it due to the Mosul reactionaries who took advantage of a chance *émeute* to make a disturbance which would embarrass an unpopular government.

The survivor Sheikh Mahmoud and his friends at Kirkuk now occupied themselves in seeking revenge. At Kirkuk they managed to arouse popular feeling and indignation against Mosul on account of ancient jealousies between the two towns; the Kurd

Kirkuk having formerly been the seat of government before it went to the Arab Mosul. However, barring indignation, nothing serious was done at Kirkuk, which is a steady going, rich, commercial, and military centre, and not easily led into adventures for the *beaux yeux* of Kurd brigands.

Sheikh Mahmoud and his people had better success with the turbulent Hamawand, always delighted to have an excuse for a row. These were easily induced to take up the sheikh's case, and, pretending he was a very holy and great man and had been badly treated by the Suleimanian town faction and the Government, they commenced to avenge his murder. I could get nothing but vague particulars about the actual form this vengeance took, but it seems that all caravan and road traffic was stopped, Suleimania town was invested by a huge crowd of Hamawand; bands of twenty and thirty entered the town at night, burning and robbing houses and murdering individuals: in fact, a state of anarchy prevailed.

The Vali of Mosul was deposed, and his successor, Reschid Pasha, on his arrival at Mosul from Bitlis, immediately set out for Kirkuk and Suleimania to settle things. The sheikh's party are very rich, and he met them at Kirkuk, and I have it on the authority of the present Mutessarif of Suleimania that when the Vali arrived at Suleimania it was in support of the sheikh's party that he came. From Kirkuk and the country round he brought with him all the sheikh's faction and the Hamawand outlaws and brigands, some thousand armed men, and tried to get the townspeople to make a reconciliation with them. The townspeople had suffered too much and had too many claims against the sheikh's faction and would not accept an unconditional reconciliation. The sheikh's faction also did not wish for reconciliation, but for vengeance. The Vali tried all means, even force and trickery; several important members of the town faction fled to Bagdad, among them Haji Sayid; the official seals of the Belladia Reissi were taken from him because he refused to sign the reconciliation. Eventually the Vali found his efforts were useless, and he left Suleimania in a hurry with a large escort of 200 cavalry, which, I am told, alone saved him from being treated ignominiously by the Hamawand. This attempt of his which failed only made things worse, as he left the thousand odd brigands behind him at Suleimania. For the next few days after his departure these seem to have had a good time, as, besides various minor affairs, they successfully raided two large caravans, one from Bagdad and one from Kirkuk, looting some 1,000 loads, valued at some 4,000*l*. Both these caravans were escorted by troops—in one case 100, and in the other 20 soldiers. These were attacked; five soldiers were killed and several muleteers and merchants and many others wounded. Since then, and up to the time I passed through, the roads were completely shut, and no one dared to leave Suleimania. I was accorded a safe conduct from Kirkuk to Suleimania by the Hamawand themselves, Emin Agha and a crowd of his Rawawan cutthroats escorting me himself.

It may be interesting to note that these Aghas boast of how wicked they have been, but say they will be worse—"Inshallah!" They don't care if soldiers are sent to punish them, they can well take care of themselves, and the soldiers can't do them much harm. Besides, fighting is what they live for. This is so far true, as, when troops are sent to punish them they mount their horses and go off to the hills, leaving their women and children to look after themselves. They have no goods are chattels to lose. *En passant*, I may mention that in times of peace these Hamawand direct their pillaging energies over the border into Persia, which, according to their own accounts, seems to be a happy hunting ground.

At Suleimania it is thought that although the vali failed in his mission there that he returned to Mosul favouring the sheikh's faction. From what I hear of his actions since, it would confirm this impression. The Mutessarif and Tabour Agassi of Suleimania were changed, but this might have been done merely to calm affairs. Although the sheikh's faction no longer enjoy the power of protection they enjoyed under Abdul Hamid, the Hamawand have not realised this yet, and fancy that the immunity from punishment which they have been enjoying for so many years is due to their own brave selves and will continue.

The new Mutessarif, Zia Pasha, gave me the impression of being a capable active man with liberal ideas; in his case these may be honest, as his son Fuad Bey, a staff officer at Erzingan, I am told, is an influential Young Turk. Zia Pasha expounded to me a series of reforms he intended introducing, and for which he had obtained the sanction of Constantinople. Among others was the formation of a corps of 600 mule gendarmerie, the dismissal of all the old corrupt officials, and the replacement by good men from outside. I have doubts about the success of the latter part, as this seems to be a reform going on in every vilayet and the actual result is merely a change round of the old corrupt men.

He told me that the Mosul vali did not play the game here, and that it was with difficulty he was getting things gradually straightened. He intimated that he would not be able to do so were it not for the fact that he communicated direct to the Ministry and Parliament and not through the vali. By this means he has obtained sanction for four battalions of Anatolian infantry to be sent to Suleimania to punish the Hamawand (the VIth Army Corps being locally recruited and quite untrustworthy for this business). The disturbances at Bagdad and Mosul had caused the arrival of these troops to be postponed, but he expected them soon. He had many schemes for improving the trade, cultivation, production, &c., of his sanjak and quite appreciates the idea that the first essential is peace, security, and good roads. The trade of this district has decreased in the last forty years to one-fifth of its former chiffre.

At the time I passed through Suleimania, although all trade and commerce was at a standstill and no one left the town, there was a lull in the anarchy which I had been led to believe existed. I was told that this was the effect of the news of Abdul Hamid's deposition which had just arrived.

The other Kurds in the locality, the large tribe of Jaff and Mamash, to the north and east have not been led into joining the Hamawand, but I am told that the Shuan, Biban, and Sheikhabizani, north of Kirkuk and around Altin Keupri have made up their various quarrels with the Hamawand and might help them.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

June 10, 1909.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Report on Frontier Question round Urumia and Salmas.

WITHIN the last few months the Turks seem to have recommenced their intrigues in the Urumia and Salmas districts. They have no properly appointed consular representative at Urumia but, a certain Peter Ello, a man wanted for fraud by the police of British Columbia, has had himself appointed Tajir Bashi, and is now recognised in some sort of way by the Van authorities, sufficiently to enable them to use him as their agent when it suits them, and to repudiate him when necessary. During the various panics that have taken place from time to time lately in Azerbaijan, the Turks have seized the opportunity to send detachments of troops to various posts in Persia to protect the interests of their own and other foreign subjects. Under this guise, they sent a detachment of twelve soldiers as guard to the acting vice-consul at Urumia. This guard has lately been increased by an officer and thirty men, since the Russian occupation of Tabreez. With these twelve men Peter Ello has been able to exert an unheard of influence in the affairs of Urumia, and I am told was mainly instrumental in restoring order and protecting Persians from the blackmail levied by the "fedai." The awe inspired in the Persian mind at the sight of a Turkish soldier is quite extraordinary and, needless to say, very overrated. The majority of the inhabitants of Urumia are quite indifferent as to what form the Government takes, and only desire peace and quiet. The "fedai" that have dealt with them have been mere blackmailing brigands. Up to early in this spring Mukhtesham-es-Sultanah had been in charge of the Government at Urumia. Though nominally governing in the name of the Shah, he was a clever man and managed to balance both parties, and was fairly satisfactory. Then the Salmas enjimans, who are run by a Caucasian band, thought they would extend their power to Urumia and get a larger recruiting ground. They were aided in their design by the fact that Mukhtesham's guard of Persian Cossacks with which he had been keeping order in Urumia, was at this time taken from him to reinforce the Shah's forces round Tabreez. The result was that, after a small skirmish, the Salmas "fedai," under a certain Said-ul-Mamelik ousted Mukhtesham and seized the Government. Then commenced a reign of extortion and corruption which disgusted everyone and alienated all from the Nationalist cause, and set them to seek for means to protect themselves and their property.

This gave the Turks their opportunity, which Peter Ello and the various officers in charge of the military posts round, were not slow to seize. By one means or another, promises of protection from "fedai" blackmail or Kurd raiders, relief from paying rents and taxes to their Persian landlords and feudal chiefs, &c. They have managed to induce, I am informed, some 50 per cent. of the Urumia population, all the Sunni villages and a large proportion of the Christian villages in the plain to ask for and receive dakhilat from the Turks.

This dakhilat means that the Persian is given a paper by the Tajir Pashi, saying that so and so has on this day given dakhilat (or asked for and been accorded protection) by Turkey, and must not be molested. The peasants believe and insist that they have become Turkish subjects, and refuse to pay their rents, taxes, debts and arrears. In this they are backed up and encouraged by the Turks unofficially. The peasants pay for this dakhilat sums varying according to their position, from 5 piastres to £ T. 5. Turkish flags are also sold them. When this dakhilat has been given the people are left in peace, the various posts of Turkish soldiers which swarm round and over the plain, officially or unofficially, in uniform or in mufti, but always armed, ensure that. Those villages that have not asked for dakhilat are threatened by the Turkish agents with raids from the Turkish Kurds. It is rumoured that this is all a swindle got up by officers and the Tajir Bashi, for their own benefit, as are also the false rumours about large bodies of troops waiting over the Turkish frontier. The presence of the Russian troops at Tabreez has had a reassuring effect in Urumiah, so much so that the arrival of thirty Turkish soldiers to reinforce the consular guard at Urumiah, had not the effect it would have had previously. The Turks are creeping very close to Urumiah, on the 20th May they occupied Gootchi and the pass above, and now completely cut off Urumiah from the north. On the 27th May, the day I left Urumiah, it was reported that Peter Ello, with a Turkish officer and a detachment of troops with a flag, had gone down to the lake shore to plant it there. I mention this with reserve. In any case they seem to be quietly annexing the country in a bloodless fashion. No one in Urumiah can make any resistance, as there is no government or troops. The actual governor appointed by the Shah is Mukhteshem-es-Sultaneh. He is at Tabreez and has nominated a local man Wali as his gerant. This Wali complains to the Turks, and asks them why they are there, but they ignore him or only give frivolous and unofficial replies. At times the Turks pretend that they are there only to pacify the country and to protect foreigners and their protégés from the blackmail of the "fedai." But, on the other hand, by their action they plainly intimate that they have annexed it. They collect taxes, caution villagers not to pay rents, &c., to the Persians, have established customs posts in the plain and generally speaking taken charge. I was frequently stopped in the plain and cross-questioned by Turkish soldiers, and in one case by a customs official. I chaffed him as to what he was doing in Persia, and he said that the district was now Turkish, as their troops had occupied for two years and the Persians had not objected. Actually Wali is merely the representative of a phantom government. He has asked for instructions from Tehran, but, as the Turks have cut all communications, the chance of a quick reply is small.

It would seem as if the Turks intend to occupy Salmas and Urmia so long as the Russians remain at Tabreez, and thus give the Russians no excuse to come to these districts to protect foreigners. The Turks would no doubt like to possess Urmia, although I do not think it was in their original scheme, as Tahir Pasha's commission only claimed the ground included in Dervish Pasha's line, and not the plain country, and up to quite recently they had not been pursuing an aggressive policy there. It is only since the Russian occupation of Tabreez that this policy of "dakhilat" and occupation has been pushed. These districts can never be of use to Turkey except from the tactical point of view (see my No. 7 of the 15th March, 1908), as from the configuration of the country they must be either Persian or Russian economically.

On the entry of the Russian troops to Tabreez it appears that strict orders were sent to Saïd-ul-Mamalik, the "fedai" leader at Urmia, that on no account was he to allow any bloodshed or disturbances to occur which might give the Russians an occasion to come to Urmia. The local Urmia constitutionalist party, under their leader, Meshted Begir, seized this opportunity to turn out Saïd-ul-Mamalik and his Salmas "fedai," who departed, without a fight, at night with an escort of Turkish troops. He wished for the Cossacks of the Russian consulate, and would have got them if he had agreed to hand over the archives of the frontier commission to be kept under seal in the Russian consulate. This he would not do, and so went off to Salmas under Turkish protection, taking the archives with him.

At the present moment things are quite quiet at Urmia. There are practically no "fedai," or none of any importance; the only interest is the Turkish occupation. All communications have been cut off by the Turks, and Peter Ello and the Turkish troops seem to be masters of the situation, while the Russian consul is grinding his teeth with vexation at not being able to get any word through to his embassy.

Affairs at Salmas and Young Turk Revolutionary Band.

In my No. 4 of the 31st March, 1909, I gave an account of the revolutionary organisations at Salmas and of the intentions of Halil Bey, the Young Turk leader, and his band. It appears that on his return to Salmas they were badly received by the Caucasians and their leader, Haider Khan Emi Ogli. I am told that the Caucasians accused the Turks of being interested intriguers, and these responded by calling the Caucasians blackmailing brigands; some scuffle occurred and the Turks returned to Turkey vowing vengeance. This took the form of setting on the Shekak Kurds of Kotur and Somai to attack Salmas. This occurred about the 12th and 14th April, and fifteen villages in Khoi and Salmas were pillaged, some twenty villagers killed, and the "fedai" and Caucasians badly beaten. They were obliged to sue for peace and help from Halil Bey, who imposed the following conditions: an apology from the Caucasians; Mukhteshem-es-Sultaneh to be handed over to the Turks; the "fedai" governors of Khoi, Salmas, and Urmia to be replaced by Simco (the notorious Shekak brigand of Kotur), Ibrahim Bey, and Meshteb Begir respectively. Negotiations seem to have been going on when the Russian occupation of Tabreez altered everything. At present I understand that the "fedais" are being disbanded at Salmas. Halil and his band are at Van, though to-day there is a rumour that the Turkish consulate at Khoi has been bombarded by the "fedai," and two extra companies of Turkish infantry are being dispatched there from Serai and Chuiray.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.F.A.*

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

Report on the Assyrian Villages and Lizan Raid.

THE position of the few Christian villages remaining in the Supna Berwari and Baldinan valleys is rather precarious and recent events have not improved them. The intrigues of the French protected Chaldeans in their endeavours to proselytise the Nestorians has made matters worse. They make friends with Kurds like Reshid Bey, of Bewari, and get him to persecute neighbouring Nestorian villages until they turn Chaldean. From what I can gather this is more the policy of the native Chaldean clergy and of Mar Emanuel, the Patriarch of Babylon, but is winked at by their French instructors. Among the simple Assyrian villagers there is no such fanaticism for Rome, and the majority have become Chaldean merely from policy and would prefer to return to Mar Shimun, but like all orientals they wish to be paid for their change of faith, and in this case they are asking for British to replace the French protection. If such protection were promised them, I have little doubt but that there would be a general return to Nestorianism.

With regard to the Lizan raid I have little to add to the actual facts which I gave in my No. 25 of the 14th August, 1908. Though it appears that the reason for the failure of the meeting between Mar Shimun and Reshid Bey to arrange affairs in June last year, which was the cause of the commencement of hostilities, was probably due to the intrigues of the Chaldeans. These objected to the kudos which Mar Shimun would have gained if he had patched up this long-standing quarrel between Assyrian and Kurd. They therefore brought their influence to bear on the Mira of Berwari to prevent the meeting. In this they were successful with the result that the Lizan Valley was raided. Though the Chaldean villages did not suffer in this raid, in fact special orders were given to leave them alone, the Chaldeans now realise that they had set light to a train that they cannot control or extinguish and from which they are now suffering themselves. From inquiries I made in various places it seems pretty clear that certain Mosul authorities were implicated in the affair. The Tabour Aggasi, who was sent up, was the creature of Reshid Bey while the Vali was under the influence of Saleem Pasha who is the paid protector of the Mira. The troops sent were posted so as to defend the Kurds from a Tiari attack, and in no way hampered or interfered with the plans of the Kurds. The enquiry made by the Mosul authorities I am informed was a farce, and found the Tiarians guilty. There is a good deal of truth in this, as it was they who commenced the attack, but all the other and more important evidence which helps the Nestorian case was left out. The state of affairs at present is precarious, as the Mira has closed the road from the mountains to the plains, the Nestorians have

no corn in the mountains and no means to bring it from the plains without making a long and arduous detour, crossing several chains of mountains. A large proportion of these Assyrians are in the habit of coming down to the plains to work, and these are now prevented. The economic situation is bad and there is little prospect of improvement, in fact the impunity and success with which these Kurds were able to bring off the raid last year has made them more ostentatious and insupportable than ever, and the corruption and connivance of the local authorities, supported at Mosul as they are by Sabonji Pasha, makes me fear that some other blow is pending for the Nestorians. The Kurds who last autumn were in a state of fear and trembling for what they had done are now taking heart and these latter events at Mosul will undoubtedly have an evil influence. Of course many fears and threats are expressed by Kurds and Assyrians and these may have no grounds, though I cannot but think that affairs are in a bad state, and it is a thousand pities that the Government does not make any effort and send some strong reliable man with a few soldiers to govern these districts and so give some chance of peace and security. The Kurds are arrant cowards and very easy to govern and keep quiet, and there would be a clear gain to the Government in the taxes they would pay. I believe the large majority of Kurds would welcome a strong honest form of government as there are cultivators who have everything to gain by peace and security as witness the cases of the Culi Seindi and the Sheikh Barzan quoted above.

The Government also loses actually by the continuance of the present state of anarchy, as the Christian villages are being steadily ruined, and their taxes lost to the State.

B. DICKSON, *Captain, R.E.A.*

[25133] No. 7.

Mr. G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 5.)

(No. 116.)

Sir, *Gulahek, June 4, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of the note in which I informed the Persian Government that you had approved my action in accepting Saad-ed-Dowleh's note of the 12th January in regard to the ill-treatment of a Bahreini at Lingah last year in the place of the objectionable note addressed by Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Mr. Marling on the 9th April last year.

You were good enough to leave the wording of this communication to my discretion, and you will see that I made a slight change in the text previously suggested by you, omitting the words "His Majesty's Government cannot consider this arrangement as final." These words, I thought, might provoke a reply, and, therefore, as the moment is inopportune for pressing the Bahrein question to an issue, it seemed to me better to omit them.

I have, &c.,
G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Sir G. Barclay to Saad-ed-Dowleh.

Your Excellency, *Tehran, May 13, 1909.*

I FORWARDED to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a copy of the note which I had the honour to receive from your Excellency, dated the 12th January, on the subject of the ill-treatment of a Bahreini by the deputy-governor of Lingah. At the same time I reported the action taken by me which led to the substitution of the note in question for the communication addressed by Mushir-ed-Dowleh to Mr. Marling on the 9th April, 1908.

The Secretary of State has now expressed his approval of my action, and has instructed me to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government maintain, as regards the status of the Bahreinis in Persia, the attitude explained in Mr. Marling's note of the 30th March, 1908, and that they will be guided entirely by their own views of the position, should any action of the Persian authorities make representations necessary.

I avail, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[22807] No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce.

(No. 176.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 6, 1909.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of two letters from the India Office relative to the opening of a dispensary by American missionaries at Mutra against the wishes and in spite of the express prohibition of the Sultan of Muscat, in whose territory that place is situated.*

His Majesty's Government have long exercised a preponderant influence in the affairs of Muscat, the nature of which is well shown in the accompanying paper (which I enclose for your confidential information), viz., a statement of case for opinion submitted on the 8th March, 1899, by the Secretary of State for India to the Law Officers of the Crown,† who, as your Excellency will perceive from their reply, held that the exercise of this influence was justified.

This influence does not, however, amount to the direct control of the foreign relations of Muscat, which, as regards the United States, are regulated by the treaty of the 21st September, 1833, between the two countries. A copy of this instrument is enclosed for your Excellency's information,‡ and you will observe that it does not appear to confer on American citizens in Muscat the right to take such action as forms the subject of the Sultan's present complaint.

The Sultan objects to the establishment of the dispensary on five separate and specific grounds of an administrative nature. These grounds, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, as in that of the Government of India, are reasonable and valid; moreover, His Majesty's Government feel themselves bound, for more general reasons, to support the Sultan's authority in his own dominions and to second his action in so far as they can properly do so.

Your Excellency should therefore bring to the notice of the United States Government, unofficially, the facts set forth in the enclosed correspondence, and should inform them that the Sultan of Muscat has asked His Majesty's Government to use their friendly offices with a view to the suppression of the dispensary and to the recall by the Arabian mission of Dr. J. Thoms, who is responsible for the action of which the Sultan complains.

In making this communication, your Excellency should lay particular stress on the fact brought out in Major Cox's telegram No. 346 of the 14th April last to the Government of India, that the Sultan, with the assistance of His Majesty's Government, is already taking steps to establish an efficient hospital at Muscat, so that the existence of a dispensary at Mutra, which is conterminous with Muscat, cannot be shown to be necessary on medical grounds.

The telegram referred to forms the last item of the correspondence enclosed in the India Office letter of the 17th ultimo.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[25672] No. 9.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 7.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 6th July, 1909, regarding Abu Musa oxide.

India Office, July 7, 1909.

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* India Office, June 17; ditto, June 18, 1909. † Statement of case for opinion.
‡ United States-Muscat Treaty of September 21, 1833.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 6, 1909.

ABU MUSA: see your telegram dated the 1st instant. Following telegram received from resident, Persian Gulf:—

"On the 15th June the steam-ship 'Gulistan' arrived at Abu Musa; she left on the 19th June, after shipping about 428 tons of specially mined sample of oxide, which was as much as residency agent had been able to transport to the beach. These are still lying at the pit-head, where they will remain, about 170 tons of the same lot."

On receipt of report from residency agent that shipment had been successfully concluded, instructions were sent to him that operations should be ceased, transport animals disposed of, and final account submitted. No doubt steps have been taken by him in accordance with these instructions.

On the 16th June Haji Ali Germani and the German representative of Messrs. Wönckhaus were brought over in a dhow to the island by Abdulla-bin-Hassan, one of the ex-concessionaires. An attempt was made by them on landing to provoke an altercation with sheikh's man and residency agent. Eventually, however, they returned to their dhow, where they remained until they sailed for Lingah on the 19th June on the completion of the loading.

[25489] No. 10.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 7*, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 20th ultimo, relative to the dispute concerning the mining of red oxide at Abu Musa, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the information of Viscount Morley, copy of a despatch which he has addressed to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Berlin,[1] recording a conversation on this subject with the German Ambassador on the 28th ultimo.

Lord Morley is already aware that mining operations at Abu Musa were not suspended as a consequence of the representations of the German Government, but because the amount of red oxide wanted as a sample had already been obtained. To have stopped its shipment would have been equivalent to the admission that the German representations were justified, and that there had been a breach of an agreement on our part not to mine pending a settlement, whereas no such an undertaking was ever given, and our offer was expressly confined to allowing Wönckhaus sufficient oxide to fulfil his contracts—an offer to which during nine months the German Government took no exception.

Count Metternich, however, ignores this point, and expresses the hope that His Majesty's Government will give an undertaking not to mine any more red oxide pending a settlement of the question.

Sir E. Grey had hoped that with the stoppage of the mining operations the matter would have been dropped, and that it would have been possible to avoid giving a direct undertaking not to mine further pending a settlement, although in practice no further mining would be undertaken, as our position and rights had been sufficiently asserted and safeguarded by the operation for the mining of the samples, but it is now necessary to decide what answer should be returned to Count Metternich's enquiry.

In these circumstances, I am to request that Lord Morley will favour Sir E. Grey with his opinion as to whether, in the event of arbitration, the case for the Government of India would be prejudiced or weakened by giving the undertaking for which the German Government asks.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[1] To Count de Salis, No. 171, June 28, 1909.

[25702] No. 11.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July* 7, 1909.

ADANA refugees.

The refugees gave themselves up last night to the authorities. The affair passed off quite quietly.

I expect good results from this action, and have received the thanks of the military authorities.

[26070] No. 12.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 517.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 5, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 505, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, giving an account of the state of affairs at Mitylene.

I have been able to convince myself by a recent visit to the island that the population are in a state of great nervousness, and that the Greeks are merely engaged in a contraband trade in arms, as they have been for a long time past, for profit, and not in introducing arms for revolutionary purposes.

This illicit trade has, like so many other irregularities, increased since the re-establishment of the constitution, and the authorities have evidently found it necessary, and very rightly, to suppress it with a firm hand. The firmness is perhaps accompanied with rather too much brutality, and calls forth complaining from the Greek element.

It seems clear it is the aim of the Government to make out that the Greeks are worse behaved than is really the case, and in this they receive the full support of the Turkish press.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 58.)
Sir, *Smyrna, June* 21, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Hadkinson, reporting that the Grand Vizier having been informed from unknown sources that the people of Mitylene were about to take up arms, had decided to send troops to suppress the movement, but that the metessarif had succeeded in convincing the Grand Vizier that the information was false, and everything was quiet.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

Vice-Consul Hadkinson to Consul-General Barnham.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Mitylene, June* 19, 1909.

LAST Monday evening, the 14th instant, the vali, Ekrem Bey, who is temporarily in Mitylene, received a telegram from the Grand Vizier, stating that, on information received telegraphically by the Government that both Aivali and Mitylene were on the eve of taking up arms, the Grand Vizier, together with all the Ministers, had decided to send the fleet and large reinforcements of soldiers, with instructions to bombard both places on the slightest resistance being offered.

The vali spent all Monday night at the telegraph office in communication with Constantinople, and induced the Government to rescind its orders for Mitylene, but ordered the two stationnaires to proceed with soldiers with the above instructions to bombard Aivali at the first show of resistance.

These torpedo-boats started for Aivali on Monday night. On Tuesday morning the vali invited the town council, the bishop, the government officials, and the chief citizens to inform them of the steps that the Government intended to take, but that he had saved the situation. The citizens immediately protested against these extraordinary measures, in view of the absence of any political movement, and of the noted peaceable behaviour of the inhabitants. Yesterday, two boat loads of refugees arrived from Aivali, having fled from there owing to the lawless behaviour of the troops, who, they say, enter the houses and rob them of everything.

It is worthy of notice that in the telegrams sent by the vizier it is stated that they acted on information received through the telegraph, not on information sent by the responsible heads of the Government here; and the vali ended by counselling every one to keep perfectly quiet, else on the slightest disturbance all would be punished. To this also the citizens took exception, and said that the correct thing was to punish only the disturbers of the peace.

I have, &c.
F. HAWKINSON.

[26072] No. 13.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 510.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 6, 1909.*

NO events of any interest have occurred in European Turkey during the past week in connection with the recent unrest throughout the Empire, while in Asia I have only to report continued activity on the part of the military authorities in the suppression of all signs of reaction. A number of political prisoners (see list enclosed) arrived at Rhodes on the 22nd, condemned by the court-martial at Constantinople to detention in the fortress there. The other courts-martial are continuing their enquiries, and a certain number of arrests are being made in various parts of the country.

Reports from the more distant provinces recently received show that on the whole the determined attitude of the Central Government has had the effect of calming and keeping down the reactionary and obstructive elements in those unruly districts. The fears which were generally entertained in the Van district during the month of May of massacres of Armenians by Kurds were not realised, and His Majesty's consul at Van attributes the quietness of the Kurds largely to the fact that they realised that the Government would countenance no disorders. Both parties have been levelling charges and counter-charges against each other, partly, no doubt, to justify their own defensive measures; but Yaver Pasha declared that the Kurds had made no preparations to attack the Armenians during the last two months, and that the only evidence to that effect which the Armenian prelate could produce was contained in letters of members of his own congregation written only a few weeks ago. The committee of Union and Progress of Van, and the "Tashnakist" club, have been indulging in a violent quarrel over an ill-advised effort on the part of the latter party to organise a workman's meeting on May Day; but the quarrel appears to have left the people quite cold, and everything is reported to be quiet in the district. The commission formed at Van for the discovery of the instigators of the movement of the 23rd April have already caused two officers and one army Imam to be arrested, and Seyyed Pasha, the commandant of the Hamidies, has, in answer to many complaints on the part of the committee of Union and Progress of his conduct, at last left for Constantinople to answer various charges there. When the commission have completed their evidence at Van they will send it to Constantinople and await orders from there as to the punishment of the reactionaries in the district.

The country round Khinis, Moush, and Bitlis, is enjoying a degree of security that has not been known for fifteen years past. The Armenians declare themselves perfectly happy and satisfied with the new régime, and only pray for the continuance of the present tranquillity and peace. It is a new experience for them to be able to leave their live-stock grazing on the mountains without any fear of robbery. In all these districts, nevertheless, it was for a moment very doubtful at the time of the military revolt here how things would turn out, and it was only the prompt action of

Mahmoud Shevket in marching on the capital and dethroning the Sultan that kept the reactionaries in these parts from rising and proclaiming the Sheriat and restoring the old régime. At Moush in particular the Yildiz emissaries were very busy, and the Mutessarifs of Khinish and Bitlis were both men of the old régime. The latter has since been removed and succeeded by Majdid Bey, an enlightened and liberal-minded man, while Khinish is to be turned into a kaza with a kaimakam as governor.

In the Bitlis district the Kurds are more obstructive still than elsewhere, several outrages on Armenians have been committed lately in Khizan and Bulanek, and among the worst of the marauders is Sheikh Seyyed Ali, who recognises no authority and goes unpunished on his own way. At the time of the revolt here the powerful Kurdish club of Bitlis actually compelled the Young Turkish officers, who found their soldiers all ready to fire on them and to proclaim the Sheriat, to sign a telegram demanding the restoration of the Sheriat from the Tewfik Ministry. But a few days later news of the reaction came, all the leaders of the old régime melted away, and the Kurdish club was fused with the club of the committee of Union and Progress.

At Kharput matters are much in the same state as at Diarbekir, and not very satisfactory from the Government's point of view. The Mutessarif, Nusret Pasha, while professing to be a liberal and to have the cause of the Christian population much at heart, does not lose any opportunity, apparently, of throwing them into prison, particularly on the pretext of their refusal to pay the non-military tax, though the question of the military service of Christians is not yet settled at head-quarters. In a special instance, reported by Mr. Rawlins, the kaimakam of Kharput came forward in support of the eighteen imprisoned Armenians and ordered their release.

The vali appears to be a weak man, who is in the hands of the "Mohammedia" club, whose members are chiefly a number of obscure reactionaries who are remarkable chiefly for their fanaticism. The officers' club on the other hand has little influence, and although the commandant of the IVth Army Corps has telegraphed ordering the release and dispatch to Constantinople of the leading notables, his orders have been disregarded, and they still rule supreme in Kharput and Mezereh. The district is quiet, including even Dersim however; though Mr. Rawlins does not anticipate much progress so long as the present vali remains backed up by his fanatical Moslem clique.

At Aleppo on the 18th June there were some 7,000 refugees requiring food and shelter, who had fled from Kessab during the troubles there. The Mutessarif did excellent work in feeding and reassuring them, and finally took them back himself to Kessab. The number of houses destroyed by fire at this place is said to be 515, besides 60 shops. About 124 Armenians were killed in the town and 23 in the neighbourhood, and relief was being administered to about 5,400 daily.

The Druzes of the Hauran have been completely brought round by the news of the Government's intention to send the 34th and 35th regiments of the 9th division, now in Roumelia, to enforce the new régime in the district. They are showing remarkable loyalty and obedience to the Government in consequence, and perfect tranquillity reigns in the district. Moussa Kassim Bey, the Mutessarif of the Hauran, has been removed and replaced by the Mutessarif of Taiz in the Yemen.

Deputations were sent from Damascus and Aleppo in June to Constantinople to congratulate the Sultan on his accession, and to assure him of the loyalty of the province.

From Jaffa His Majesty's consul reports the dismissal of the kaimakam, Abderrahman Bey, a weak man, lacking in energy and initiative, who had only been eight months at this post. His successor, the former kaimakam of Adana, though rough and unpolished, is reported at least to be more vigorous and active.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Smyrna, June 28, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report the arrival at Rhodes on the 22nd instant of the Mahsoussé steamer "Chark," having on board the following political prisoners condemned by the Constantinople court-martial to detention in the fortress:—

Hussein Hasib Bey, ex-Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.
Moustapha Pasha, Superintendent of Military Transport Corps.

Sheikh Ahmed Effendi, ex-President of the Council of Ulema.
Hassan Tahsin, Accountant Persian Bureau.
Hassan Sabri,
Osman-bin-Hamid,
Hafiz Shakir-bin-Ismail,
} Softas.
Mehmed Kassim Effendi, Controller at the Custom-house, Constantinople.
Aghiah Bey, Colonel, Naval Engineer.
Dr. Hussein Remzi, Superintendent of Verghi Office.
Kurd Ali Haidar.

Lieutenant-General Refik Pasha, also condemned by the court-martial, and sent in the first instance to Damascus, has now been transferred to Rhodes.

I have, &c.
H. D. BARNHAM.

[26077] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July 12.*)

(No. 524.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 6, 1909.*

THERE is but little information to report to you this week with regard to events at Adana and in the district round, where for the moment complete order and quiet reign. It is apparently at present chiefly among the authorities that there exists a lack of harmony. Major Doughty-Wylie reports considerable friction between the deputies and the military powers at Adana, occasioned mainly by the attempts made by the former to remove the court-martial and replace it by a civil tribunal, and by their success in obtaining the arrest of the Binbashi of Deurtyol, who was in command at the time of the troubles there. The deputies themselves, too, are not on the best of terms, and Youssuf Kemal Bey has dissociated himself entirely from his colleagues, refusing to admit that there was any organised preparation for massacre on the part of the Moslems; he is, on the other hand, talking much of intrigues to hasten decentralisation, and suspects the Armenians of having supported Subaheddin as against both Abd-ul-Hamid and the Committee of Union and Progress. Babikian Effendi continues to show great dissatisfaction with the court-martial and present Government policy, and he promised Major Doughty-Wylie that on his return to Constantinople he would have the present vali removed and replaced by a really energetic and liberal-minded man, probably a soldier.

The members of the court-martial are still openly hostile to the Armenians, though they have now dropped their original idea of an armed revolt among these people, substituting in place thereof an almost wilder theory to the effect that they obtained and distributed arms in order to murder Moslems, and so advertise themselves to Europe. Kenan Pasha informed Major Doughty-Wylie on the 30th ultimo that there would probably be no more than five more executions of Christians; the court-martial had still no convincing proofs against the Moslem leaders, whom they would probably have to end by exiling. In the meanwhile, they have condemned Bishop Museeh, in his absence, to death.

Despite the severity shown and strict military rule which prevails, very little loot has been restored so far, about 5 per cent. of the goods taken and 15 per cent. of the cattle.

Major Doughty-Wylie has latterly been sounding the various parties in Adana as to the possibilities of coming to some definite agreement, and finding the Turks ready to receive any overtures, he approached the Armenian chiefs of the town suggesting that they should arrive at some working arrangement with their Turkish compatriots and the authorities. If not for their own sake, in the interest of the peasants, who could not emigrate at will, it was essential to arrive at some understanding. At first his efforts were entirely unavailing. The Armenians, sunk in misery and despondency, replied that all Turks, young and old, were all alike—liars, thieves, and assassins—and would have nothing to do with them. Ultimately, however, the chief Armenians did draw up and present to the vali a sort of declaration of loyalty to the Government, in which they offered their assistance in the maintenance of peace and order. The Turks apparently accepted the declaration in a conciliatory spirit, realising on their side the need of the Armenian element among them for the welfare of the country. In spite of

[25556] No. 14*.

Sir Edward Grey to the Marquis di San Giuliano.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 12, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 3rd instant respecting the alleged intention of the Cretan agitator Manos to organize a band in Crete for operations in Macedonia. I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Minister at Athens and His Majesty's consul-general in Crete have already been instructed by telegraph to report on these allegations, and if the rumours should prove to be well founded, His Majesty's Government would readily join the other protecting Powers in taking action in the matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

this favourable turn, there still lingers a strong fear of further massacres at no distant date among the lower classes, and the recent rumours of Turco-Greek hostilities breaking out over Crete have put the Greek population in the Adana district into a perfect fever of panic and apprehension.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[21185] No. 15.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 199.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 12, 1909.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 396 of the 28th May respecting the status of Koweit and the question of the Sheikh of Koweit being required to describe himself as an Ottoman subject.

In my despatch No. 130 of the 3rd May the choice of a time for making a declaration to the Porte on these subjects was left to your discretion, and if you consider the present moment unfavourable, the matter may be allowed to drop for the time being.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[26482] No. 16.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 13.)

(No. 236.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July* 13, 1909.

I HAVE been pressing for the trial of persons responsible for the Adana massacres, including the ex-vali and commandant. The theories that the cause for the massacres was to be found in a plot for setting up an Armenian principality or in the designs of the ex-Sultan were exploded after consideration of the report submitted by the Armenian deputy of the Chamber who was sent to Adana. A number of prominent Moslems are to be tried by court-martial as being responsible for the massacres. They include the ex-vali, commandant, Abdul Kader Bagdadi, and two editors of the local organ of the Committee of Union and Progress.

The present vali of Adana is to be dismissed. The deputy, Ismail Hakki, who is now in London, is his son.

[25672] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

SIR EDWARD GREY presents his compliments to the German Ambassador, and, with reference to the conversation which took place between Herr von Kühlmann and Mr. Mallet on the 21st ultimo on the subject of the mines of red oxide on Abu Musa Island, has the honour to inform his Excellency that the shipment under discussion was completed on the 19th June, and amounted to about 428 tons of the mineral.

Foreign Office, July 13, 1909.

[25133] No. 18.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 14, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 12th March last respecting the protection of Bahreinis in Persia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you to be laid before the Secretary of State for India copy of a despatch from His Majesty's

Minister at Tehran,* enclosing the text of a note which he has addressed to the Persian Government on this question.

I am to state that, subject to Lord Morley's concurrence, Sir Edward Grey proposes to approve the terms of Sir E. Barclay's note to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[26707] No. 19.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 15.)

Sir, *India Office, July 14, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 29th ultimo and 7th instant, as to the representations made by the German Government regarding the supply of certain oxide from Abu Musa to Messrs. Strick.

As regards your letter of the 29th ultimo, it will have been seen from the Viceroy's telegram of the 6th July that the shipment for Messrs. Strick has been concluded, and that no further operations are contemplated.

In reply to your letter of the 7th instant regarding the request of the German Government for a direct undertaking that there shall be no further mining on Abu Musa pending the settlement of the whole question, I am to say that, on a consideration of all the circumstances, and in view of the fact that the German reply to the memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, may be expected immediately, Viscount Morley agrees that the controversy has reached a stage at which, in practice, no further operations could be sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. Lord Morley sees no objection to meeting, as a matter of courtesy, the wish expressed by the German Government, which presumably could be done with a reaffirmation of the position taken in our memorandum of the 10th July, so as not to prejudice our case in the event of an arbitration. It might also be made a condition of any pledge given by us that the German Government should not support any application by Messrs. Wönckhaus or others for a further supply of oxide.

Copy of a telegram to the Viceroy on the subject is enclosed.

I have, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Viscount Morley to the Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July 13, 1909.*

ABU MUSA oxide. Please see your telegram dated the 6th July. Undertaking is now asked for by German Government that, pending settlement of case with them, no further mining shall take place. We are considering the question of giving a pledge, but in any case a stage has been reached in the controversy at which we cannot, in practice, permit further operations. Instructions to this effect should be issued to resident, Persian Gulf.

[26908] No. 20.

Consul Stevens to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Batoum, July 9, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Matheos II, the new Catholicos of all the Armenians, left Tiflis by special train on the 7th July for his see at Etchmiadzin. He was accompanied to the station by a large crowd of his co-religionists and by leading members of the municipal body and Armenian Society of that city.

Elaborate preparations have been made at Etchmiadzin for the reception of

* Sir C. Barclay, No. 116, June 1, 1909.

Matheos II, and for the first time since their existence the buildings forming the monastery at Etchmiadzin are to be lighted by electricity.

The Constantinople delegates, Minas Tcheraz and Archbishop Balgian, are accompanying the Catholicos as far as Etchmiadzin.

I have, &c.
P. STEVENS.

[27076] No. 21.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 528.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, consul-general at Bagdad, upon the Mesopotamia irrigation scheme, submitting a copy of further estimates, prepared by Sir William Willcocks, relating to works for the prevention of damage by inundation from the Euphrates.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 21.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Bagdad, June 5, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch dated the 19th May, 1909, I have the honour to enclose a copy of the estimates prepared by Sir William Willcocks, amounting to £T. 199,300. The works to which these estimates relate will provide an escape for the excess water of the Euphrates in time of high flood, and, in his report to the Ministry of Public Works, Sir William has said that if these escapes are provided there will never again be any danger of damage caused by inundations from the Euphrates.

2. If I can obtain a copy of the drawings of the works I will send them to the Board of Trade.

I have, &c.
J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 21.

ESTIMATE of Cost of the Safera Regulator on the Sakhlawai Branch.

			£T.	£T.
Soft rock excavation	4,660 c.m. at	0·10	=	466
Earthwork	10,000 c.m. „	0·03		300
4—1 cement masonry	3,160 c.m. „	2·00		6,320
2—1 „ „	690 c.m. „	2·50		1,725
Lime „ „	4,000 c.m. „	1·40		5,600
Regulating apparatus	280 c.m. „	4·50		1,260
Pitching	650 c.m. „	0·70		455
Total				16,126
Contingencies at 20 per cent.				3,225
Grand Total				19,351
Say				19,400

ESTIMATE of the Safera Embankment.

			£T.	£T.
Earthwork	399,000 c.m. at	0·02	=	7,980
Contingencies at 10 per cent.				798
Say				8,778
				8,800
Repairing and renewing Kamaniah dykes				5,000

Résumé, Sakhlawia Branch Works.

	£T.
Regulator	21,500
Banks	8,800
Kaunanih dykes	5,000
Total	35,300

Habbania Escape.

			Estimate of Cost.
		£T.	£T.
Head regulator—			
Excavation	19,900 c.m. at	0·03 =	597
4—1 cement masonry	4,000 c.m. „	2·00	8,000
2—1 „ „	690 c.m. „	2·5	1,725
Lime „ „	5,292 c.m. „	1·4	7,409
Regulating apparatus	380 c.m. „	4·5	1,710
Pitching	5,900 c.m. „	0·70	4,130
Metalling	220 c.m. „	0·50	110
			23,681
Contingencies at 20 per cent.			4,736
Total			28,417
Say			28,500
		£T.	
Bank earthwork	98,000 c.m. at	0·02	1,960
Contingencies at 10 per cent.			196
			2,156
Say			2,200
		£T.	
Desert cutting	2,332,000 c.m. at	0·05	116,600
Contingencies at 10 per cent.			11,660
			128,260
Say			128,300
Training river through head			5,000

Résumé, Habbania Escape Water.

	£T.
Head regulator	28,500
Banks	2,200
Desert cutting	128,300
Training river	5,000
Grand Total	164,000

Estimates of Cost.

	£T.
Sakhlawiya branch works	35,300
Habbania escape works	164,000
Grand Total	199,300

[27081] No. 22.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 533.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 10, 1909.*

BEING aware that a British syndicate was endeavouring to obtain a concession for the construction of the Samsoon–Sivas and tributary railway lines, I took occasion yesterday to ask the Grand Vizier whether the Ottoman Government intended to give any concessions of this nature, and, if so, how they proposed to get over the difficulties of the Russian preferential rights which, as you are aware, exist. The subject was dealt with at length in my despatch No. 57, Confidential, of the 26th January last.

His Highness replied that an American syndicate had asked for a concession in that direction, which would include some oil-fields, but his Highness did not think the Government would grant any. The conditions agreed to by Russia in return for these preferential rights had been that she would prevent the Armenians from returning to Asia Minor, but, as, since the constitution, the Armenians had a right to go where they wished, the agreement with Russia might be considered as *ipso facto* concluded. Nevertheless the Ottoman Government did not think the moment opportune for negotiating with Russia on the subject.

As a matter of fact, I believe the Porte has approached the Russian Government with a view to a dissolution of the agreement, but met with an unfavourable reply.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[27083] No. 23.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 535.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 10, 1909.*

THE Grand Vizier yesterday in conversation touched on the subject of the Bagdad Railway, and declared that neither he nor any other Grand Vizier, of no matter what party, could ever allow the Bagdad Railway to be terminated on the lines of the present convention. It was, in his opinion, essential that Great Britain should participate in the work. He was aware that when the suggestion had previously been made the Germans had demanded the control, but this should be got over. He did not desire to go at length into the subject with me, as, before his departure, he had fully exposed his views to Tewfik Pasha, and had instructed his Highness to take an early opportunity of laying them before you.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[27100] No. 24.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 553.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 14, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Major Doughty-Wylie, containing an interesting account furnished by him to the local authorities of Adana of the events connected with the recent massacres there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, July 6, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 30th June, I have the honour to report that I have received your Excellency's telegrams about the refugees, in which you mentioned a promise of the Grand Vizier's to the effect that even if the court martial broke their promise to me the Sultan would not confirm a death sentence. Under these circumstances, and with some hope of a general amnesty on constitution day, you considered that it would be safe to urge the prisoners to go under the terms already arranged. I waited a few days, partly to see if there would be any more threats or loose talk, and partly to give time for the parliamentary commission to arrive in Constantinople, where, with the exception of Yussouf Kemal Bey, they now are.

Yesterday I visited the court-martial and arranged that the refugees should throw themselves on the mercy of the court this evening. Zia Bey himself will come to fetch them.

As another court-martial has arrived in Adana, I asked Kenan Pasha and Zia Bey for a promise that they, and not the other court, would try the refugees under the

conditions agreed upon between us. They gave the promise and repeated the conditions, namely, that there should not in any case be a death sentence, that there should be no punishment awarded greater than five years' imprisonment, or, if necessary, perpetual exile.

I think that they will keep their word, and give as light a sentence as their somewhat prejudiced views will allow them.

I will telegraph to you Excellency what the sentences are as soon as I know them, in case you should wish to obtain any mitigation of punishment.

It did not appear to me safe to wait any longer, for if there is to be an amnesty on the 23rd July it is better that the men be tried first.

The court-martial and also Yussouf Kenal Bey have asked me for an account of what I saw of the massacres. They also urged me to give my views on the causes and the general politics of the affair. I have given them an account (of which a copy is attached) in which I have tried as far as possible to eliminate anything which might cause a controversy. It appears to me to be far more important to bring about, if possible, a better feeling between the two races than to uselessly dispute over who fired the first shot; what may have been said in the Armenian clubs before the massacre; or that most thorny point of all, for the court-martial, what part the hodjas played in the affair.

The reconciliation manifesto which I suggested, and with the most valuable help from Mr. Chambers prevailed upon the heads of the Churches to send in, has had a very good effect; Zia Bey, who a fortnight ago told me that not more than five more Christians would be executed, now says not more than one.

Talking of the manifesto, he said that the court-martial had returned no answer in words to it, but that their real reply was the liberating of a few Armenians every day. He speaks no longer of the good lesson the Armenians have had, but of the necessity of solidarity among the Ottomans, of the usefulness of the Armenians, and of the political necessity in a country such as this of having had to execute a few Christians in order to punish the Moslems without embittering them too greatly for a prospect of future peace.

The effect of the apparently voluntary surrender of my refugees will, I hope, prove to be a still greater stride forward to peace and fair treatment. In leaving my house, they dispose of the last idea of foreign interference. The departure of the English ships has also helped this, that is to say, the fact that there has been no ship at Mersina for some time. Their absence now has had as good an effect as their presence formerly. They are not now wanted unless there should be fresh troubles on the outbreak of a Greek war or some other untoward event.

Further, the voluntary surrender appeals to the normal sentiment of both Turk and Arab. It is their tradition to protect those who throw themselves on their generosity. It makes them greater men in their own eyes, with the greater obligations.

If they give these men a light sentence, others who are now in Cyprus or Egypt will be encouraged to return, to the advantage of the country.

The great difficulty for the court-martial is the lack of reliable evidence. There are still secret threats, or at least fears of threats, against the Armenians, either for giving evidence or for not giving it in a certain way. Some Turks are even trying to destroy their private enemies of their own religion by ordering terrified Armenian women to accuse them of murder. A friend of mine, a Turk, who had tried on the massacre day to turn the crowd (I had seen him) and who had saved alive all Armenians who had taken refuge in his farm, was accused by an Armenian woman of having killed her husband. I was able to prove that he could not have been in the place named at the time, and got him released. It then turned out that the real accuser was his neighbour Moslem, who had killed every man in his village and resented the attitude of my friend.

Some of the women are made to sign petitions and some are made to deny having signed them. In the case of a notorious murderer at Hamidieh, Armenian women were found to petition for his release on the ground that he had saved their lives. They omitted to mention that he had previously killed their husbands.

Baghdadi was sent for by the court-martial, but took to his bed and sent a doctor's certificate instead. His son is, I hear, named for arrest, and also the sons of a certain Mistili, who generously sacrificed one of his magazines of cotton in order to have the pleasure of burning alive the Christians who had taken refuge in it. But the evidence will be the difficulty. I doubt if anybody will dare to come forward against these men. Fortunately there remains at least the old punishment of exile.

A new delegation from the Patriarchate has arrived. They seem, at least the lay members, to be more or less reasonable people. They started badly, however, by taking up again and bringing forward a canard dead some time ago. They should be very useful in relief work if they can tear themselves away from politics long enough to attend to it. I ventured to suggest to them that they might bring perhaps influence to bear on the crew of disreputable Armenian witnesses who make a scandalous living by giving false evidence against their own people.

The Armenian Red Cross delegation has left. The Turkish Red Crescent has had a financial crisis and is now living precariously on loans from us. Neither institution is any very serious loss, except that the Red Cross kept up a serviceable pharmacy.

Among the new delegates from the Patriarchate has arrived a lady, who is, they tell me, to take charge of their orphanages. They hope to found three orphanages, and have already money enough to support 100 children for twelve years. There are, I am afraid, in one place or another at least 2,000 orphans, that is to say, children who have lost their breadwinners.

Plans for the reconstruction of Adana are being discussed.

On being asked, I brought forward as a possibility a municipal loan guaranteed by the Government to expropriate land required for roads, &c., such loan to be repaid by the future sale or letting of sites. The population to be housed temporarily in shelters, the construction of which should be at once begun. The money paid for the ground in the burnt areas, on a valuation, would enormously help the homeless people to start again, while in the future the rise in values, which it is reasonable to expect in this rich province, considering the arrival of the Bagdad Railway, would in the end amply recoup the municipality.

July 7, 1909.—The refugees surrendered themselves last night and were thanked by Zia Bey for showing this confidence in their own nation. They were removed without any incident. I keep for the time the wives and children of two of them as they have nowhere else to go to, their houses being burnt.

I afterwards went for a drive in the town with Zia Bey to show that there had been no ill-feeling over the affair, and to-day General Mehemet Ali Bey paid me a visit to thank me for the happy ending of the question. The soldiers are all extremely pleased, as they now can crow over the civil Government and to some extent over the deputies also. The general result will, I hope, be good for the prisoners, and for the reconciliation which I have been very anxious to assist in any way I could. The accused will be tried as soon as possible, and I am to be informed of the result. The wounded man has been sent to hospital, and the others are not in chains or in the common prison.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

Report on the Massacres at Adana.

Mercredi, le 14 avril.—Je suis arrivé par le train à Adana vers 5 heures de l'après-midi. Du train même à la distance d'environ deux stations d'Adana j'ai aperçu un cadavre, et un peu plus loin quelques fuyards qui se précipitaient vers le train. Tous les passagers dans le wagon de seconde classe ont abordé celui de première, en disant qu'il y avait des hommes dans le train qui voulaient les tuer. En traversant le wagon de seconde classe avec mon cavass j'ai vu que deux Turcs armés menaçaient les fuyards qui couraient à côté du train. En m'apercevant ils ont entassé leurs pistolets et sont restés tranquilles. A mesure que nous nous approchions d'Adana le nombre des cadavres s'augmentait, et tandis que je conduisais ma femme à la maison de Mr. Trypani, qui est située près de la gare, deux ou trois hommes furent tués à quelques pas même du corps de garde arabe qui se trouve à mi-chemin entre la maison Trypani et la gare. Ayant mis mon uniforme, je me suis adressé au corps de garde d'où j'ai pris avec moi une escorte de quatre soldats ainsi que Mr. Edwards, de la Banque ottomane, qui m'a demandé la protection. Nous sommes allés à pied au conak. En route j'ai vu tuer plusieurs hommes, et la ville était pleine d'une canaille qui se livrait en hurlant à piller les magasins. On tirait de tous côtés. En arrivant au conak j'ai trouvé tout en désordre. Le vali et le férik étaient allés tous les deux à la municipalité. J'ai demandé encore des soldats pour aller à la Mission américaine et en d'autres endroits où se trouvaient des sujets britanniques. On a à peine consenti à m'accorder un petit nombre

de soldats, en disant qu'on ne serait aucunement responsable de ma vie. On ne m'a pas donné un officier, et il n'y avait pas le temps de se disputer. Plus tard j'ai pu constater, d'après les dépositions des témoins américains et anglais, Mr. Gibbons, de Tarsous, et Mr. Lawson Chambers, qu'un peu de temps avant mon arrivée là deux hommes avaient été tués dans ce bureau même presque devant les yeux du vali, ils n'en étaient séparés que par une grille, qui était tellement effrayé qu'il n'osait ni les protéger ni punir leurs meurtriers.

Je suis allé dans l'obscurité de la nuit à la Mission américaine, qui est située dans le quartier arménien. On tirait tout autour. Ayant constaté que tout y allait bien, j'ai posté des gardes aux deux écoles. Quelques jours après j'ai appris qu'une de ces sentinelles a bien rempli son devoir tandis que l'autre est disparu.

J'ai conduit Mr. Edwards à la Banque ottomane, où j'ai laissé encore des soldats. Ensuite je me suis mis à la recherche de Mr. Cokinakis et sa femme, sujets britanniques, de l'autre côté de la ville. Je les ai enfin découverts à l'abri d'une ferme à la distance d'environ une mille de leur fabrique. Le propriétaire, un Arabe nommé Biblan Oghlou, qui était de leurs amis, m'a juré qu'il serait responsable de leur vie. En effet il les a bien protégés.

Ensuite je suis retourné au conak. J'ai constaté que le vali et le férik n'avaient absolument rien fait. Je leur ai averti que je reviendrais le lendemain et que j'aurais besoin de cinquante hommes avec un officier supérieur et un cheval. J'étais en train de chercher un américain et un anglais qui manquaient de la mission. J'ai constaté qu'ils se trouvaient depuis quelques heures au conak, où ils avaient été témoins des meurtres dont mention a été faite.

Après avoir passé encore une fois à la Mission américaine je suis rentré par voie de la ville chez Mr. Trypani.

Pendant toutes ces entrefaites la ville était plongée dans un état de confusion indescriptible.

Aux approches du quartier arménien on se battait acharnement et partout se produisaient des meutres et des incendies. Mes quatre soldats m'ont suivi fidèlement à travers tout.

Jeudi, le 15 avril.—Le matin je suis allé de nouveau au conak. En route j'ai remarqué quelques soldats isolés et sans officiers qui prenaient part aux meutres. Dans le conak même, à la porte du bureau du vali, les rédifs qui venaient d'arriver avaient tué leur "arabadji" arménien.

Après quelque difficulté j'ai obtenu une cinquantaine d'hommes du conak (où je crois qu'il y avait environ 400 soldats de Nizamié) et le commandant de gendarmerie (Ahi Boy) pour m'accompagner. Aucun officier d'un grade militaire supérieur n'a consenti à quitter le conak.

J'ai parcouru ainsi la ville en faisant sonner les clairons ; le férik m'avait prêté un cheval et je disposais de trois ou quatre hommes montés. Partout à notre passage on a cessé de tirer d'un côté et l'autre, exception faite de quelques coups égarés. J'ai passé aux écoles américaines et françaises. J'ai fait annoncer partout que tout le monde devait se rendre chez lui. La ville est grande et il est difficile de tranquilliser beaucoup de ses petits passages et ruelles à la fois.

Il paraît que dès que je suis passé le combat s'est renouvelé. Je suis retourné à la gare, où j'ai chassé une grande foule de villageois qui accouraient dans la ville pour piller et tuer.

En arrivant encore au quartier arménien, j'ai appris que deux missionnaires américains avaient été tués. Ils travaillaient vaillamment depuis une heure à éteindre un incendie qui menaçait leur école et furent tués de tout près par cinq Turcs qui avaient promis de ne pas les toucher. Le troisième missionnaire, Mr. Trowbridge, qui était avec eux, trouva moyen d'échapper. Je les ai fait apporter moi-même à l'école. Ils respiraient encore. Tandis que nous les apportions on a tiré sur nous de tout près du haut d'un minaret. Nous nous y sommes dirigés mais tout le monde s'en est sauvé.

Assez tard dans l'après-midi j'ai reçu un appel au secours de la Régie des Tabacs, où habitait Mr. Abbott, sujet britannique. Je m'y suis rendu avec les troupes et je lui ai donné une garde. Tandis que j'y étais on m'a dit qu'il y avait pas loin de là parmis des ruines brûlantes des soldats turcs blessés. Nous sommes allés à leur recherche et tout en cherchant dans un petit jardin où gisaient huit à dix cadavres d'Arméniens d'hommes et de femmes, et d'un soldat turc, un Arménien a tiré sur moi de tout près de derrière une fenêtre et m'a fracassé le bras. Nous n'avons pas trouvé de blessé.

On m'a demandé après si ce n'était pas vrai qu'on a brûlé un soldat après qu'il

avait été blessé. Il est vrai qu'une partie de son vêtement a été écorchée, mais je crois que le feu l'a atteint de la maison en face qui éclatait en flammes. J'ai trouvé une femme arménienne brûlée ; peut-être qu'elle est échappée aussi de la maison.

Quant aux troupes, les Nizamiés, avec peu d'exception, se sont conduits assez bien dans les cas où ils étaient sous la commande d'officiers, surtout quand nous commencions à maitriser la situation. Le férik avait fait appelés les réservistes, qui, munis d'armes des casernes, se sont précipités sans uniforme dans les rues. Ils sont venus des villages environnants et de Tarsous et ont fait infiniment de mal. Il y avait quelques exceptions même parmi eux.

Les hodjas étaient divisés. J'en ai remarqué un qui tâchait de calmer la foule, tandis qu'un ou deux autres ont combattu eux-mêmes fusil à la main.

Il y avait aussi une canaille qui, armée de fusils, de couteaux, de barres en fer, de gourdins, &c., se livraient au pillage, &c.

Causes du Massacre.

Selon l'avis des Turcs, les Arméniens étaient à blâmer dès le commencement jusqu'à la fin ; ils prétendent qu'ils s'étaient armés et que certains prédicateurs, tels que l'évêque grégorien, avaient invoqué le peuple ouvertement à se battre contre les Turcs et à se constituer une principauté ; que les Arméniens avaient tué deux Turcs à Adana ; qu'ils avaient fixé un certain jour pour se révolter contre les Turcs et qu'ils s'étaient tous armés et préparés dans ce but. Il est du reste vrai qu'un Arménien a tué deux Turcs à coups de fusil (on n'a pas constaté si cela a été pour se défendre ou non) et, en effet, les Arméniens ont donné beaucoup de provocation par leurs discours vains et alarmants.

Mais tout cela ne peut aucunement justifier un massacre général dans un pays bien gouverné.

Parmi les meilleurs des Turcs il existait une méfiance unanime des Arméniens. Tout en déplorant le massacre, ils semblaient croire à l'idée d'une révolution arménienne et d'une punition nécessaire.

On avait disséminé partout l'idée de fédaïs qui seraient prêts à attaquer et tuer les fonctionnaires, les soldats, et les mussulmans en général. Ce bruit fantastique suffisait à enflamer la rage et le fanatisme des religieux et du peuple, et a même trouvé quelque croyance au conak. Je n'ai rien vu de ces fédaïs et je ne crois point à un tel complot d'assassinat général. On admet maintenant que cette idée était entièrement fautive, mais ceux qui l'ont inventée ne sont pas à trouver. Les Arméniens disent qu'ils n'étaient armés que pour se défendre et qu'ils n'ont fait aucune démarche que dans ce but.

En parcourant la ville je n'ai vu aucune attaque qui provint du côté arménien. Les combats se produisaient tous aux approches du quartier arménien, où l'on tiraient des maisons pour repousser les attaques. J'ai toute raison à croire que c'était les Turcs qui attaquaient.

Dans les villages et aux banlieux il s'agissait de meurtres de gens sans armes et tout à fait innocents. On les a abattus comme des moutons et a commis des atrocités indicibles.

Le second Massacre.

Dimanche, le 25 avril.—Vers la tombée de la nuit des coups de fusil se sont fait entendre. Une panique s'est immédiatement produite. Des centaines de personnes se sont précipitées dans cette maison. On a tiré quelques coups et un homme a été blessé. Des soldats ont été immédiatement envoyés de la ville, et ici le calme de la nuit n'a été rompu que par quelques coups de fusil. Mais la ville même était la scène de combats et d'incendies formidables.

Lundi, le 26 avril.—Je suis sorti accompagné de quatre soldats. Nous sommes allés d'abord à l'école américaine, et ensuite chez Mr. Chambers. Sa maison, qui était pleine de réfugiés, avait été atteinte par plusieurs balles. De là je suis allé au conak. On tirait un peu dans les rues.

Tant que j'ai pu remarquer, les gardes fournis pas les régiments roumélïotes étaient bien disciplinés et achevaient bien leur devoir. Au conak régnait la confusion habituelle. J'ai invité le vali à envoyer immédiatement des gardes à la Mission américaine.

Du conak je suis allé à l'école jésuite française, accompagné de cinquante hommes, et d'un officier de l'état-major du férik.

En arrivant j'ai trouvé les incendies au voisinage si menaçantes que j'ai jugé nécessaire d'en retirer les gens, dont il y avait plus de 2,000. Le retrait s'est achevé peu à peu sous la surveillance de moi-même et de Mr. Lawson Chambers, aidés par les prêtres français et par deux officiers de l'armée roumélIote. Avec les premiers 200 réfugiés l'officier de l'état-major et tous les soldats de l'escorte sauf quatre, sont rentrés au conak, et personne n'en est plus sortie.

Cependant des groupes détachées de soldats avec les dits deux officiers m'ont ouvert un chemin, et nous avons complètement vidé l'école française de tous ceux qui s'y abritaient, hommes, femmes et enfants, dont huit à dix blessés. J'ai conduit tous ces réfugiés au jardin du conak, mais le vali les a renvoyés quelques heures plus tard aux fabriques près de la gare. L'école a été brûlée complètement dans très peu de temps.

Une visite à l'école des religieuses françaises m'a montré qu'elle était en état de sûreté et hors de menace par les incendies. Je leur ai promis une garde, que j'ai prise ensuite au conak.

Un officier d'état-major arrivé dernièrement avec les troupes roumélIotes m'a invité à l'accompagner à la recherche d'armes cachées dans les églises. Je lui ai répondu que j'irai volontiers si cela pourrait avoir un effet pacifiste, et j'ai prié le vali de m'y inviter personnellement, ce qu'il a fait.

Nous sommes allés ensuite à l'église grégorienne. En route les troupes ont balayé les rues flambantes et pleines de pilleurs. Aidés par les prêtres arméniens nous avons longuement cherché l'église. Nous n'avons rien trouvé, à l'exception de dix à douze armes anciennes, que nous avons remportées. Aucun mal n'a été fait; les troupes étaient bien disciplinées et pleine considération a été montrée à l'égard des prêtres.

Les rues pullulaient de milliers de fuyards, mais les troupes roumélIotes achevaient bien leur devoir.

Il m'a paru évident qu'une moitié de la ville d'Adana serait brûlée. On essayait de faire quelque chose avec des pompes, mais celles-là étaient trop anciennes et trop faibles et l'incendie était trop étendu.

Causes du second Massacre.

Je ne connais pas l'origine du second massacre; mais j'ai toujours refusé à croire qu'elle fût causée par les nouvelles troupes. Je suis convaincu que les quelques-uns qui y ont pris parti ont été trompés dès le début (ils étaient arrivés le jour même). Je crois que des gens qui s'étaient déjà rendus coupables en causant le premier massacre, qui en redoutaient les conséquences, et qui voulaient se livrer de nouveau à tuer et surtout à piller, ont voulu les tromper de parti pris. Je ne crois à aucune révolution arménienne faite afin d'établir un royaume séparé à la faveur de l'intervention étrangère. S'ils avaient avisé un tel but ils se seraient retirés en masse dans les montagnes, où ils auraient mieux su se défendre. Ils n'auraient jamais laissé autant de milliers de moissonneurs, dont beaucoup étaient les frères et les parents de ceux d'Adana, épars sans armes dans la campagne.

Aussi est-il ridicule de supposer que même les Arméniens, armés de presque rien que des revolvers et des fusils de chasse, se pussent croire capables de faire face à la magnifique armée turque.

Quant à l'intervention étrangère, la plus mince connaissance de la politique leur aurait démontré l'absurdité d'une telle idée.

Quant aux Turcs, je suis d'avis que la grande majorité d'eux croyaient réellement que leur Empire, leur vie, et leur religion étaient menacés. Ils étaient trop ignorants pour reconnaître l'impossibilité d'un tel état de choses. On avait provoqué beaucoup d'entre eux par des discours insolents prononcés par les Arméniens, qu'on a sans doute beaucoup exagérés en les répétant. En outre, l'occasion de piller a attiré tous les vauriens de la province.

C'est le Gouvernement qui aurait certainement pu prévoir une émeute, et l'aurait bien pu empêcher dès le début, qui est réellement à blâmer. On aurait pu arrêter ceux qui prononçaient des discours dangereux, et supprimer militairement les premiers indices de désordre.

C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Adana [*non daté*].

Inclosure 3 in No. 24.

Declarations of the Christians of Adana.

THE Christians of the district and city of Adana desire to express their deep regret concerning the great misfortune which has befallen them, and the false imputation raised against them. They desire to make declaration as to their real position.

We, the Christians of Adana and adjacent districts, have been faithful to the constitution from the time of its proclamation, and we earnestly desire its continuance and success. As true Ottoman subjects, our desire and effort has been to protect the constitution and to be found on the side of those who love and serve it. We emphatically protest against all imputations of rebellion made against us. We have never rebelled, and the idea of rebellion has never entered our minds. We, although loyal subjects, have suffered and been persecuted, and we have been sacrificed to the envy and malevolence of bigoted and evil-minded persons. We are the victims of machinations and schemes which caused heaven and earth to weep and wonder. Our loyalty to the Government is proved by the fact that in the very beginning of the troubles we appealed for Government protection, and later, on the first possible opportunity, we renewed the appeal.

We again declare our loyalty to the constitution. We are ready and eager to make any sacrifice for the true welfare of our beloved land, and we declare also that we cherish no spirit of revenge, notwithstanding the sufferings which we have endured. Our earnest plea to our Moslem fellow-countrymen is that they should work in harmony with the various other communities which compose the Ottoman Empire. May the good-will and fellowship which appeared at the time of the proclamation of the constitution appear again! With malice toward none, and charity and justice toward all, and with the hope of healing the grievous wounds in the vitals of our country, let us unite in securing the present and future prosperity of our land. In one word, let unity, fraternity, equality, and justice prevail.

As sincere Ottoman subjects we desire the welfare and prosperity of our beloved native land. We would express our affection for His August Majesty the King, who has devoted himself to the realisation of this desire, and also for our brethren, members of the Young Turkish party, the Committee of Union and Progress, the noble and victorious army, and all true Ottoman subjects who are loyal to constitutional government, and we declare ourselves to be in sympathy and harmony with all such.

Adana, June 30, 1909.

Signed by the representatives of the Christian communities—Gregorian, Armenian, Protestant, Catholic Armenian, Syrian, Greek Catholic, and Chaldæan. Presented to the various departments of the Government.

[27249] No. 25.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 19.)

Sir, *Admiralty, July* 13, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward herewith for information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of a letter from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, dated 4th June, enclosing reports on recent disturbances in Asia Minor.

I am to state, with reference to your letter of the 21st ultimo, that the commander-in-chief and the officers and men under his command have been informed of Sir Edward Grey's appreciation of their action throughout the crisis.

I am, &c.

C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe to Admiralty.

SUBMITTED for the information of their Lordships in continuation of my No. 607/1400 H.

I beg to call special attention to sub-enclosure No. 6 on the good services rendered by Mr. J. Catoni, the British vice-consul at Alexandretta.

Captains C. F. Thursby, W. C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O., D.St. A. Wake, and T. W. Kemp, C.I.E., have carried out their duties most satisfactorily; and I would submit again for favourable consideration that the Foreign Office might be informed of the admirable work done by Major Doughty-Wylie, His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, and by Mrs. Doughty-Wylie.

A. G. CURZON-HOWE, *Admiral,*
Commander-in-chief.

June 4, 1909.

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

Captain Thursby to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, "*Swiftsure,*" *at Sea, May* 29, 1909.

ON being relieved as senior naval officer in the Eastern Levant, I have the honour to bring to your notice the names of officers and men in His Majesty's ships under my command who have done good work during the recent disturbances in Asia Minor.

2. In my former letter of proceedings, of the 29th April, I enclosed a list of foreign war-vessels and their commanding officers at Mersina during this period; and I should like to express my appreciation of the harmonious way in which they all worked together, and with me. I particularly wish to mention Captain de Lajarte of the "Victor Hugo" and Captain von Mann of the "Hamburg," who either worked in conjunction with me, or, if working separately, kept me informed of what they were doing, so as to ensure uniformity in our procedure to the common end, viz., the protection of the lives and property of European subjects in the disturbed area. I have already mentioned my appreciation of the good services of Captain Pakenham of His Majesty's ship "Triumph" and Captain Kemp of His Majesty's ship "Diana," through whose efforts and personal influence much bloodshed was prevented.

3. The officers and men of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" were more actively employed, as they had to maintain and run, some 42 miles away from the ship, a large hospital containing nearly 300 patients, and a refugee camp of 15,000 people. Also their presence at Adana, although unarmed (at a time when the British vice-consul was asking for a large armed guard), undoubtedly gave a feeling of security to the European inhabitants; and on at least one occasion prevented the burning of the American and French Missions. They were frequently in danger from stray shots, &c., one man getting a bullet through his trouser leg.

4. I enclose herewith the British vice-consul's letters to me thanking His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" for services rendered, and also a report by Surgeon Connell of this ship on the hospital work carried out, which it is submitted may be forwarded to the medical director-general when noted.

5. Commander Carver did exceptionally good work, being at Adana during the most disturbed time, including the second massacre. He and Bombardier Hawes slept in the American Mission when it was threatened, and it was largely due to his efforts that the French Missions were not completely burnt down.

6. Lieutenant Phillips did satisfactory work in charge of the camp when Commander Carver returned to the ship.

7. The excellent work done by Surgeon Connell speaks for itself. He was, during the first period, the only doctor at the hospital, and had to organise and arrange everything. Mrs. Doughty-Wylie organised the nursing staff, which consisted entirely of men from this ship, and worked herself untiringly.

8. Mr. Enson, my clerk, went to Adana on the arrival of the ship at Mersina, and relieved the consul of his clerical work; and later on all the consul's despatches were sent to the ship to be typed and corrected, and forwarded by him to the Ambassador. I submit that he should be allowed extra pay during the time I have been senior officer

in these waters, as he has had a considerable amount of extra work, which he has done extremely well.

9. With regard to the men, a list of whom is attached, I cannot speak too highly of their general conduct and work. They are a credit to their country and the service to which they belong. I fully endorse what the consul says in his letter about them, more particularly Sick-berth Steward Shenton, Bombardier Hawes, and Second Writer Trussler. I hope their Lordships will be pleased to reward them.

I have, &c.
CECIL F. THURSBY.

Inclosure 3 in No. 25.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Captain Thursby.

Sir, *Adana, May* 15, 1909.

BEFORE the "Swiftsure" leaves this station I have the honour and pleasure to thank you for the invaluable assistance rendered by her officers and men, both to the English and other European communities of Adana and to the Adana Relief Committee. The services of the "Swiftsure" have been and will be very highly appreciated by all concerned.

I should like to particularly mention Commander Carver, who under great difficulty successfully organised the Yeni Mahalla camp, which contained 14,000 people.

Before this they were crowded together in Mr. Trypany's factory, and it was difficult to induce them to leave; they were successfully placed in convenient divisions on the camping ground and fed. Those who have seen something of camps and great crowds will understand the difficulties of handling these terrified people. In all this Commander Carver has been most ably assisted by Bombardier Hawes, Royal Marine Artillery.

I feel that this non-commissioned officer has most richly deserved any advancement that may be given him.

Since Commander Carver's departure the camp has been managed by Lieutenant Phillips.

In the medical work, which employed eleven marines, there have been difficulties and discomforts. Everybody has worked with the greatest good-will and most efficiently. Sick-berth Steward Shenton particularly deserves the highest praise. Doctors, nurses, and patients alike say that he is quite invaluable.

Second Writer Trussler has written all my letters for me; the work has been very hard and has been most promptly and punctually performed. I recommend him strongly to your notice and shall be very glad to hear of his promotion.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE, *Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 25.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Captain Thursby.

Sir, *Adana, May* 19, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 15th May, I have the honour to report that all the "Swiftsures" leave to-day, to my great regret on personal and public grounds.

Lieutenant Phillips is a most efficient worker. A great deal of extra work has been thrown upon him by changes in the camps, the illness of Bombardier Hawes, and our new plan of rationing people some days in advance.

I shall be very sorry to lose him.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE, *Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 25.

Surgeon Connell to Captain Thursby.

Sir, "*Swiftsure*," *at Ayas Bay, May* 19, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that on Saturday, the 17th April, at 8·30 P.M., His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" received orders to proceed to Mersina next morning at 6 o'clock. There was no time to draw extra stores, but fortunately we had filled up with stores at Portsmouth, one month previously. Staff-surgeon Reid was sick in Malta hospital.

2. While at sea I had splints made and dressings prepared. We packed extra dressings in the field service haversack, and got some of the most useful drugs ready. I also had instruments and stores prepared separately, in case I should go myself.

3. His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure" arrived at Mersina on the morning of the 21st April. This was about seven days after the massacre had started at Adana. It was estimated that there were 5,000 killed at Adana, and nearly 20,000 in the surrounding districts. Probably this estimate is not much exaggerated, as this district is (or was) populous. Soon after arriving Commander Carver went up to Adana, taking Shenton, S.B.S., and three marines to act as nurses.

Next day I was sent up with Pink, S.B.A., and three more marines. I took dressings and instruments. There was no case of serious sickness on board, and Captain Thursby had arranged that the surgeons of the French and German war-ships should attend our sick if necessity arose.

On arriving at Adana I visited the various centres where the wounded were stowed, and where such treatment as was possible was given. These were the American Mission, French nun's school, the French Jesuits' school, the Armenian church, and a temporary hospital organised by Mrs. Doughty-Wylie, wife of the British vice-consul.

None of these places were proper hospitals, but there was a dispensary in connection with the American Mission. We estimated that on that date, 22nd April, there were 300 Armenian wounded under treatment in Adana, also a few Turks. The wounded were of all ages and of both sexes. There was an average of about four wounds to each person. Many, though severely wounded, walked or were carried from their homes to hospital for treatment as out-patients. There were a few Greek and Armenian doctors, but they had few instruments, some having only the clothes they wore. Most of these doctors worked spasmodically, and the Armenians soon ceased work through fear.

We arranged with Mr. Chambers of the American Mission that he should send his worst cases to Mrs. Doughty-Wylie's hospital, to which I attached myself.

Wounds.—The brutality and savagery of the massacre are impossible to describe. We treated all ages and both sexes. Nearly all the children suffered from bullet wounds fired from above at close quarters. I hear that it was a favourite practice of the soldiers to throw the babies up and catch them on their bayonets.

The vitality and recuperative power of the people are very great, as most of our wounds did extremely well.

The wounds were caused by—

(*a.*) Martini bullets.
(*b.*) Swords and other sharp instruments.
(*c.*) Clubs and sharp sticks.
(*d.*) Mauser and revolver bullets.
(*e.*) Bayonets.

This was their order of frequency as I observed them. The wounds of most patients came under more than one of these headings. Martini bullet wounds were by far the most numerous. I cannot give an exact percentage, but I should say the following proportions are approximately correct:—

Martini bullet wounds	50 to 60 per cent.
Sword and hatchet wounds	15 to 20 "
Clubs and sticks	15 per cent.
Mauser bullet wounds	10 to 15 per cent.
Bayonet wounds	5 per cent.
Revolver and shot-gun wounds	3 to 6 per cent.

It must be remembered that we only saw those who survived. I had no opportunity of examining the killed in any number. Among the dead I should say that the

percentage of wounds by swords or sharp implements, causing fracture of the skull, was much greater than I have given.

Progress of the Work.—At first we worked all day, and got our meals when we could. The arrangements for food were in chaos at the temporary vice-consulate, owing to the presence of some 200 refugees. Food was almost unobtainable in the town. Our men had brought rations with them, so they were not so badly off. We had water sent up from the ship.

After a few days the work became more steady, the town seemed quieter, and refugees began to return to their homes. Things were just settling down at our hospital, when another massacre started on the 25th April, and the whole Armenian quarter was burnt, including the Armenian church, with some 2,000 refugees and wounded, and next night the French Jesuit school. The German factory now started a hospital. Mrs. Wylie's hospital and the German factory were at this time, I think, the only places treating wounded. We got the loan of two sheds at the railway station, and put extra patients there. We dug a new latrine for them. At our hospital we were now treating 200 cases a-day. We had sixty-five in-patients and some 150 out-patients. The surgeon of the S.M.S. "Hamburg" worked at the German factory after the second massacre. I am told that it was a better house than ours, and more fitted for operating. The Armenian doctors had all fled. I was told that our cases were better dressed, and doing better than those dressed elsewhere. This is probably true, because, firstly, new patients kept on coming from other places; secondly, our men were very painstaking in cleansing the wounds; thirdly, ours was the only place where the work proceeded continuously. Other places had not a fixed staff of workers, and the attendance of doctors was not always regular. When he could be spared, Shenton, S.B.S., went to the German factory to give assistance, and one day he told me that the cases had not been attended to at all that morning.

About the 2nd May two Turkish army doctors began to come in the mornings. They brought no stores or dressing instruments, and did not come regularly, but they wrote out elaborate prescriptions for the sick, which we had not drugs to make up. Stores and dressings were now beginning to arrive from outside. About this time also a Turkish army doctor of high rank arrived. He said he would have a proper operating room prepared in a neighbouring house, also that another room would be made into a dispensary, with a doctor in charge who knew the language. He came for half-an-hour for three or four days, but while I was at Adana he did nothing else at our hospital, and meanwhile the work had to be done. It was he who said our cases were doing so well. There was more need for dressers than operators at that time.

On the 4th May, an American doctor and nurse, together with an Assyrian doctor and four students arrived from Beirout Medical School. As these intended to work regularly, I was able to rejoin the "Swiftsure" next morning. I believe these people brought also practically no operating instruments. During the time I was at Adana I had paid frequent visits to the ship, and Blackman, S.B.S., sent me reports on the days I was absent.

The Austrian dragoman at Adana has recently presented his house as a hospital, and operations can now be performed with comparative comfort. There is now abundance of help and plenty of stores, and the general conditions of work have considerably improved.

After the 5th May, Captain Thursby began to withdraw "Swiftsure's" men gradually. The last returned to the ship on the 18th, being relieved by men from the "Minerva." All men were disinfected, with their clothing, on their return on board.

I have, &c.
RICHARD CONNELL, M.B., B.A.,
Surgeon R.N.

Inclosure 6 in No. 25.

Captain Thursby to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir; "*Swiftsure*," *at Sea, May* 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a diary of the movements of ships of the detached squadron in the Levant, and exercises, &c., carried out by them since my letter of the 13th May.

2. On the 14th May, the British vice-consul at Adana reported that the Commission of Inquiry had arrived there, and were doing good work. They were helping to clear

the concentration camp, which was one of the points I particularly impressed on the commission when I called on them.

3. The American cruiser "North Carolina" sent a doctor and four trained orderlies to assist in the hospital work.

4. While at Ayas we heard that all the Armenians there, numbering about sixty-five had been massacred. The custom-house and warehouses had been looted, and some of the buildings destroyed. All was quiet during our stay, and I gave the usual leave to officers.

5. On arrival at Mersina on Tuesday, the 25th May, I called on Rear-Admiral Pivet, in the "Jules Ferry."

6. On Wednesday morning, the 26th, I proceeded to Adana. Things had changed much for the better there. The camp at Yeni Mahalla then contained only about 3,000 refugees, and they were all provided with tents. The hospitals were well manned, a new hospital had been opened by the French sisters, and tents had been provided for the patients in the measles and dysentery camps.

7. I visited the French consul-general, who had travelled overland from Aleppo to Adana. He had seen much distress on his way through the country. With the co-operation of the French admiral, he was sending a large caravan of provisions to alleviate the distress in the country through which he had passed.

8. I also visited the vali, whose manner, both to myself and to the consul who accompanied me, was more cordial than on previous occasions, and Mehemet Ali Bey, the general in command of the troops. I gave them both the messages you sent by the captain of the "Medea," and they appeared much gratified.

9. I called also on Kamal Pasha and the Commission of Enquiry. They informed me that things were progressing slowly. They appeared to think that they had a most difficult task before them, in which I thoroughly agreed.

10. On arrival on board in the evening I found your telegram ordering "Minerva" to return to Malta, to which I replied. I also transmitted your orders to "Minerva" by wireless telegraphy before sailing.

11. With regard to the general situation, the whole province is very reactionary. I feel convinced that another outbreak would occur if there were not sufficient reliable troops left to cope with the situation. How long it will last it is impossible to say. From what I can gather, after previous massacres, in a few weeks things have gone on much as before; the Turk showing no ill-feeling towards the survivors, and the Armenians being in too dependent a position to show any resentment themselves. However, on this occasion things are different; in many cases the Armenians defended themselves, and a good many Turks were killed. Such an unusual occurrence has engendered a most bitter feeling against the Armenians, which will take some time to allay. This bad feeling will be added to should the Commission of Enquiry decide to execute any prominent Turks. Indeed they will have to be in great strength to punish them at all. I spoke of this to Mehemet Ali Bey. He told me he thought they were strong enough, from a military point of view, to deal with any contingency that might arise.

12. The vali himself is, in my opinion, a reactionary, and much opposed to foreigners. The good order in the country is entirely dependent on the military authorities, whose head-quarters are at Adana.

13. The following reports from other ships of detached squadron are enclosed herewith:

"Triumph," reports dated the 8th and 24th May.
"Diana," report dated the 23rd April.
"Medea," report dated the 25th May.
"Minerva," report dated the 17th May.

I have, &c.
CECIL F. THURSBY.

Inclosure 7 in No. 25.

Captain Pakenham to Captain Thursby.

"*Triumph*," *at Swadiyeh, May* 8, 1909.

Sir,

EVIDENCE is not wanting that the recent massacre of Armenians had its origin in very high, if not in the highest, quarters. The fanaticism which always exists where religious differences furnish the only mental excitement has undoubtedly been aroused and stimulated from above, and, in the mass of the Moslem people, has at once let loose and excused their lust, malice, envy, and cupidity. It seems, however, as though neither a desire to rescue the souls of those living in mortal error, nor race hatred, nor baser incentive, would have been sufficient by itself either to start the movement or to maintain it; and that it is to the action of both, the higher motive and the lower, that should be attributed the extraordinary contrast of kindness and barbarity, of proselytising and plundering, that everywhere appears in this most remarkable phase of twentieth century government. In the scramble for his soul and property the Armenian has suffered dreadfully. Relative wealth and phenomenal cowardice have made him a tempting and usually an easy prey. Whatever part religion has played, on this occasion at least his enemies have not been urged on by a frenzy that has made them careless of life, as in the one or two places where the Armenian has set his back to the wall he has been treated with considerable respect. His successful defence of Dortiol has been recounted already. It was generally believed that resistance had been obstinate at Kassab also, and that, although several thousand of the inhabitants had eventually been massacred, they had not been overcome until an honourable page had been added to Armenian history.

A visit to Kassab thus promised to be of interest; but as the ride from Swadiyeh would have been tedious, and the anchorage of the "Triumph" was only 8 miles distant from the small bay forming the entrance to the winding valley, near whose head lies Kassab, it was thought that this valley afforded the best means of approach. Only contradictory reports as to the state of the country were available. Some said it was dangerous; others that it was a desert.

Landing (4th May) with Mr. Joseph Catoni, the acting British vice-consul, who had kindly come from Alexandretta, the first object seen on the beach was a 6-months-old baby, its little body blackened by the sun, and with pebbles still clutched in its tiny hands. Apparently in the wild rush for safety it had been either lost or forgotten by its mother. A little higher lay the distended body of a man with arms outstretched.

The few houses seemed uninhabited. Then living men were seen whose flight was with difficulty arrested. One was impressed as guide. To the left, the hills rose to an altitude of 5,100 feet; on the right, to 3,400 feet.

Commencing almost as a rift in the mountain barrier that forms the sea front, the valley sometimes opened to a width of perhaps 2 miles. Houses became more frequent; occasionally other human bodies were seen, but not many. A cleft fez stood on a stone, and near by lay the former wearer. In a wheat field dogs were devouring another body. The always steeply-mounting path led through the scattered hamlet of Kaladuran, from which the valley takes its name. Here and there a house had been burned. All had been gutted, not of valuables only, but of every movable thing, whether food, clothing, utensil, or woodwork. The owner of one of these ruins said this was nothing. His irreparable loss was his son, a lad of 15 or 16, whom the mountaineers had taken, and whom he should never see again. At this moment a tall, good-looking youth came down the path, striding lustily. It was the boy himself. His story was that a Turk had rescued him, and had kept him in his house until opportunity had offered to send him home in charge of a zaptieh.

People became more numerous. Groups of from six to ten—men, women, and children—sat by the roadside, seemingly lost to everything. Crops and fruit trees were standing. In the brilliant greens of the closely cultivated fields might be seen promise for the future; but in the present there was nothing, absolutely nothing. The problem was how should the people live until the harvest had matured.

From the upper end of the valley, at a height of perhaps 3,000 feet, an extensive panorama was opened of receding mountain ranges intersected by fertile valleys. Along the slopes were tracks studded with weary figures loaded with children or bundles, and plodding northward. These were refugees returning, chiefly from Latakia, but with no pleasing prospect for their home coming. To the north, and on another hill, according to Admiralty chart No. 2692, Kassab should have stood. Instead could be seen a few military tents, round which were gathered crowds, for the most part seated. In this country everything is expected of England, so as soon as it was known that British officers were approaching, from painful despondency the scene changed to one of exuberant exhilaration. It was assumed that every grief, every pang would be alleviated immediately; and it was with sorrow that the two dusty and weary visitors submitted to the demonstrations of welcome, which they knew could only end in disappointment.

It was thought that the soldiers might hinder further advance; but they were

indifferent. On no hill-top within view could be seen any rocky stronghold suggestive of the determined resistance exultingly attributed to the inhabitants of Kassab by other Armenians; but, several hundred feet below, and at the junction of hills whose steep sides almost formed a gorge, were gathered the flat earthen roofs of a large village, named by an eager throng as the village sought. The illusion as to situation was, however, not the greatest that this visit was destined to dispel. Defence? There had been none. Massacre? None either; flight having been both prompt and swift. In the whole Kassab district a couple of hundred men might have perished, and a few women and children might have been kidnapped. But the Armenian had been true to himself. However, if slaughter had not attained to anything like the numbers named, yet the state of misery to which the people had been reduced was real enough.

In Kassab there had been about 1,000 houses, of which only some 200 had escaped burning. Thousands of people were being hastily reconcentrated by order of a Government which had made no provision for feeding them. After a march of several days, these poor creatures had arrived only to find themselves face to face with famine. Hunger had obliterated almost every other feeling. Men cried and shook their loose waist-belts. Everywhere were weakness and dejection without prospect of relief. Some said the smell of the putrifying corpses within made it impossible to enter their houses. But beside hunger all other emotions appeared trivial. Property destroyed, relations missing or murdered—all were swallowed up in a universal cry of food.

On the following day the "Jules Michelet" approached from the southward. She had landed a pasha, a military escort, a French consul, and other officials who proposed making a progress towards Kassab. But she had done better than that. She had transported to Bezeit 200 bags of flour, and as the first instalment should be in Kassab by this time, it is possible to hope that many suffering human beings are receiving invaluable relief. Even if the Armenian town-dweller is a crafty parasite, with whose misfortunes it is difficult to sympathise, it would be impossible to witness the desolating havoc that has flowed over the timid, frugal, industrious agriculturists of the Kassab valley without feeling that, whoever was the instigator of the outrage, he has been guilty of a most atrocious crime.

I have, &c.
W. C. PAKENHAM.

Inclosure 8 in No. 25.

Captain Pakenham to Captain Thursby.

Sir, *"Triumph," at Ayas Bay, May* 24, 1909.

NOW that the "Triumph" is leaving Eastern waters, I beg to bring to your notice the very valuable services rendered during the recent unrest by Mr. Joseph Catoni, acting British vice-consul at Alexandretta. I have no hesitation in saying that whatever of pacification was done by men-of-war was done by the British, but that the presence of ships would have been of much less effect had it not been for this gentleman's courage, character, and ability both as intermediary and as adviser.

On the 21st April, when the "Triumph" arrived at Alexandretta, a state of very great tension and alarm prevailed. The consulates and every European establishment were packed with refugees from outside, and with the Armenian residents of the town, who had all abandoned their own homes. There were few soldiers, no pretence of law and order, murders were frequent, and the civil governor was believed to advocate massacre, while the military governor was hesitating which side to take.

From Alexandretta houses and hamlets on the surrounding hills could be seen in flames. Ten miles away Dortiol and Beylan were heavily besieged; but although every hour brought fresh alarms, it could still be said that throughout the Aleppo Vilayet no general attack of Turk upon Armenian had yet been begun. At Adana the blow had fallen. At Alexandretta it was impending, and the difficulty would be to avert it.

The "Diana" had reached Alexandretta on the 20th April, and I am everywhere informed that the night of the 20th had been fixed for beginning a massacre. On approach of the "Diana," Mr. Joseph Catoni had persuaded the military governor to invite her assistance in the maintenance of order; and as Captain Kemp had promptly acceded, and had at once landed men for the protection of the British consulate, the Turks had become undecided, and a very critical moment had thus passed. I am told

that news of the disembarkation was telegraphed to several towns—such as Diarbekir—far inland, and was there equally effective in arresting outbreak.

Alexandretta being thus controlled, and Beylan being defended by soldiers, the next most threatening point seemed to be Dortiol, as Alexandretta would certainly be involved in its fall. The arrival of the "Diana" had also enabled Mr. Catoni to urge the military governor to attempt something for the relief of Dortiol, and Captain Kemp had readily agreed to transport a small party of Turkish soldiers to the point on the coast nearest to it. These were eventually taken in the "Triumph," but the many hesitations of the military governor, who commanded the expedition, would certainly never have been overcome if Mr. Catoni had not accompanied him, and by advice, persuasion, and example compelled the Turks to adhere to their promise. Other consuls expostulated with Mr. Catoni for going. They said running into danger might be proper for military men, but that it was not the business of consuls, and that if Mr. Catoni did such things they should be expected to do the same. Neither its dangers nor the degree of success attendant upon this expedition can be exactly assessed. Those who best understand Turks thought the enterprise hazardous, but it may perhaps be credited with having caused a relaxation in the attack such as gave time to organise the relief effected later.

The siege was finally raised by Turkish troops from Macedonia. Entirely as a result of a promise extracted from the military governor by Mr. Catoni very late one night, these were sent to Dortiol instead of being landed at Alexandretta. As the latter place was still very unsafe, and Mr. Catoni's house, family, and commercial interests lay there, his conduct in preferring the safety of Dortiol showed much spirit.

When representations were again made from Dortiol that the attitude of the troops was very threatening and that the village was still without food or water, Mr. Catoni again went there and removed existing difficulties.

Though unfortunately too late to prevent the Antioch massacre, the settlement of the Alexandretta neighbourhood enabled the "Triumph" to undertake that of the Orontes valley. Although not in his consular district, Mr. Catoni consented to come there, and was of the greatest assistance. From here he visited Kassab almost alone, but when the French afterwards went they thought the company of Turkish officials and an escort necessary.

The foregoing are particular incidents; but I may sum up by saying that throughout a very anxious time Mr. Joseph Catoni was the pillar upon whom all in Alexandretta leaned, and that his activity, skill, and resolution in very critical circumstances reflected much credit upon his flag.

I have, &c.
W. C. PAKENHAM.

Inclosure 9 in No. 25.

Captain Wake to Admiral Sir A. Curzon-Howe.

Sir, *"Minerva," at Malta, June* 1, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on conclusion of heavy gun-buyers' test, I reported myself to Captain Thursby, of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure," and received your orders from him to take over senior officer of the Levant. I directed "Medea" to remain at Ayas Bay while I proceeded to Alexandretta, where the British vice-consul came off and brought me fresh sailing orders by telegram from you, to which I sent an acknowledgment. The following morning I proceeded to Ayas Bay, and turned over all orders to Commander Thompson, of His Majesty's ship "Medea," and left the same day for Mersina, where I arrived at 11·30 P.M. on the 27th May. I had previously wired to His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul at Adana to say I should have to take my men away, and accordingly they arrived on the evening of the 28th May, and I left the same day at 7·0 P.M. for Malta.

While at Alexandretta the vice-consul requested me to detail a ship for that port. He stated that all the Mahommedans in that district and the coast of Syria were ready for fresh disturbances. He said that they were all anxiously watching the proceedings of the commission at Adana, and he feared that if any of the leading men were executed there would be an insurrection and a fresh massacre, there being no regular troops in the district under a competent leader as at Adana. Accordingly I directed "Medea" to proceed to Alexandretta till the 31st May, when she was to leave for Mersina to meet "Barham" on her arrival on the 1st June. I attach a copy of the orders I gave her.

I informed Major Wylie, His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, of what I had done, and the expected arrival of "Barham" and "Medea."

I beg to attach letters to me from Lieutenant Kerr and Surgeon Goble of this ship, who were landed at Mersina, also a letter from Major Doughty-Wylie, His Britannic Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, also two papers, "copies of his daily letters" to the Ambassador at Constantinople, also two telegrams from Colonel Mehemet Ali and Kenan Pasha, président de la cour martiale d'Adana, which arrived on the 28th May.

Two of the officers landed at Adana have suffered since their return to the ship, one from malaria and one from dysentery, but the remainder of the party are well, though there was a lot of malaria about in the place.

I have, &c.
D. St. A. WAKE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 25.

Lieutenant Kerr to Captain Wake.

Sir, *"Minerva," at Sea, May* 30, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that I left the ship at Mersina on the morning of the 17th instant, with a party consisting of Surgeon Goble, five marines, one sick-berth steward, and boy writer. We arrived at Adana at 10·45, and at once proceeded to the consulate and reported to the consul.

The marines were detailed for hospital work, with the exception of one who worked under me at Yeni Mahalla camp issuing provisions.

I proceeded with Lieutenant Phillips of the "Swiftsure" to go round the camp, dispensaries, hospitals, and distributing centre. Lieutenant Phillips and party left by the afternoon train.

The estimated number fed from camp was 13,000, and from the town 3,000. The provisions were kept in Mr. Trypani's factory, and drawn from there as necessary.

On the 18th the depots in camp and town were filled up, 130 sacks of flour, 55 of rice being used: one week's provisions arrived for our ratings.

On the 19th Mr. Bevan, clerk, joined, the boy writer returning to ship. The Turkish officials were moving people out of camp, and sending such as had houses in the town back to them, and others out to the vineyards. The Government supplied carts and guards. A good deal of unnecessary violence went on, which ceased at once when I was present.

The number fed in camp was 10,226. Provisions were issued as follows: to those in camp and in the town near the consulate, every two days; to those going to the vineyards, every four days. The daily allowance being $\frac{1}{4}$ oke of flour, $\frac{1}{16}$th oke of rice, 2 drams of butter, and a little salt.

On the 20th the depots were again replenished, 180 sacks of flour, 30 of rice, 3 barrels of butter, and 2 sacks of salt being used.

On the 22nd L. Weber, sick-berth steward, returned to the ship, being relieved by A. Clevely, sick-berth attendant.

21st: one day's food was issued to 9,600.

Rev. Mr. Chambers, of the American Mission, took charge of the issue from the distributing centre in the town, and issued provisions daily. He found the number increasing so rapidly that he opened a second centre on this day.

On the 22nd the camp store was replenished and 9,475 were fed. Up to this time I had carried on the same manner of issuing as my predecessor, viz., the camp was divided into sections, each under a head man. This man drew provisions for his section and served it out. I did not think this very satisfactory, as although many people left the camp, the number of rations issued did not (? lessen) very appreciably. I therefore instituted a system of tickets. Each ticket gave the number of people in the section, or vineyard, the amount of food they were entitled to, and for how many days. The ticket was dated and signed and had to be produced when more food was issued, when the date was altered. I found that by doing this I made a difference on the first day of about 800 rations.

On the 23rd I went to some of the vineyards with a Turkish officer to see if it was possible to issue provisions at the vineyards themselves, and so avoid the people coming back to the camp. They appeared to be settling down quietly. The Government are supplying shelters to those that had their houses destroyed.

On the 24th Mr. Chambers's depots were replenished with 100 sacks of flour, 30 of rice. I got a list of the numbers in six vineyards—in fact, the only ones to which people would return. There were two others, but the Armenians did not dare to go to them, as they told me they had been threatened. I reported this, and I believe troops were sent to investigate. The number fed from camp was 8,590.

25th: Yeni Mahalla camp was replenished, 85 sacks of flour, 20 rice, 2 barrels of butter.

26th: Mr. Chambers's centres were replenished, 73 sacks of flour. The captain of the "Swiftsure" came up and walked round the camp. He expressed himself pleased with the general appearance and order. On this day a very large reduction in number of rations issued took place. The number fed from camp was 4,973, distributed as follows: in camp, 2,438; Chaldeans, 1,247; in vineyards, 1,288. This was a reduction of about 3,600 on the last issued.

27th: Yeni Mahalla camp was replenished, 85 sacks of flour, 20 rice, 1½ salt, 2 barrels of butter. I received your orders to bring my party to the ship.

28th: I turned over the charge of the camp to Mr. Chafy, of the consulate, before doing so I replenished Mr. Chambers's centre with 80 sacks of flour, 15 rice, 1 salt, and 1 barrel of butter. I left Adana with the party at 3 P.M., arriving at Mersina at 6.15, returning on board immediately.

The sanitary arrangements of the camp were, I consider, good, but required constant supervision, as the refugees, unless driven, were not inclined to be cleanly. Trenches were dug and fresh soil put in them daily.

As a matter of interest, I would like to point out that the American sick-berth attendants messed with our men at the consulate, and although supplied with a far greater variety of food than ours, were practically helpless for want of knowledge of cookery. All the meals were prepared by one of our men. Their stores contained a large quantity of tinned fruits, American corn, tinned peas, &c., but they were almost entirely dependent upon us for solid food.

The undermentioned were the party landed on the 17th May:—

Lieutenant Andrew W. Kerr.
Surgeon Frederick G. Goble.
J. J. Bevan, clerk (joined on the 19th).
L. Weber, S.B.S. (left on the 22nd).
A. Clevely, S.B.A. (joined on the 22nd).
L. Lower, boy writer (left on the 19th).
J. Parker, J. B. Aston, T. Chambers, J. S. Lamb, W. Prager, } Privates, Royal Marine Light Infantry.

I have, &c.
ANDREW KERR.

Inclosure 11 in No. 25.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Captain Wake.

Sir, *Adana, May* 28, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to request that I be allowed in the name of the relief committee, and in my own as British consul, to place on record our great gratitude for the most efficient help afforded us by the officers and men of the "Minerva." Lieutenant Kerr has had entire charge of the big refugee camp, and has fed from 10,000 to 4,000 people daily. Surgeon Goble has had charge of the surgical hospital, where he has performed many operations and done much good. Your clerk, Mr. Bevan, has been of great use to me. The sick-berth attendants and men have all done excellently, especially Private Parker.

In thanking you for these services, may I say it has been a great pleasure to work with them, and that we are most sorry to lose them.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE, *Vice Consul.*

[27354] No. 26.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 555.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 15, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 236 of the 13th July, reporting the decision to try by court-martial Jevad Bey, the ex-vali of Adana, Mustafa Remzi Pasha, the ex-commandant, Asaf Bey, the mutessarif of Jebel Berekeh, Abd-ul-Kadir Baghdadi, and other Moslem notables of Adana, as also the editors of the "Itidal," the Adana organ of the Committee of Union and Progress. It has farther been decided to change the present vali, Mustafa Zihni Pasha (father of Ismail Hakki Bey, the prominent committee deputy for Bagdad now on a visit to London), whom Major Doughty Wylie and others found far from satisfactory, and to send general of division Ismail Pasha, a Cretan, as president of the court-martial.

These decisions constitute a volte-face in the attitude of governing circles in the matter of the Adana massacres. As will be remembered, the Committee at first spread the theory that the events at Adana were the work of the ex-Sultan, with the result that the European press and others were inclined to take a lenient view of the whole matter. Shortly afterwards the Government and the Committee of Union and Progress started the contention that the Armenians were solely to blame, inasmuch as it was alleged they had engineered a revolt with the idea of forming an independent principality in the Adana region, which, being close to the sea, could in a way receive foreign protection, presumably from the British Navy and Cyprus. The court-martial there has consequently taken the line of punishing individual perpetrators, while allowing the ex-vali, and others who were responsible for the maintenance of order, to go scot free. I have repeatedly pointed out to the Porte, and indirectly to some prominent committee deputies, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and military authorities here, that this process was calculated to create an irritating instead of an appeasing effect, and that it would be more consonant with the spirit of justice and political expediency to hold the ex-vali, ex-commandant, &c., responsible for the massacre. This course would not have a permanently irritating effect on the Turkish and Armenian elements, and would be more conducive to a restoration of harmonious relations between the two creeds, and tend gradually to dissipate the ill-feeling which had been engendered between Turks and Armenians all over Asia Minor as a result of the dissemination of exaggerated and contradictory versions as to the origin and nature of the Adana massacres.

Babikian, an Armenian, who is deputy for Rodosto on the Marmara, and a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, has just returned from Adana, where he went on a Commission of Enquiry. He has fearlessly reported to the committee and the Grand Vizier that some 15,000 to 20,000 Armenians were brutally massacred, the accounts in the European press being, if anything, an underestimate of what had taken place, and has produced proofs of the criminal negligence or culpability of the individuals who are now to be tried by court-martial. The evidence appears to be such as to ensure their condemnation to death, and it is at present intended to proceed with their trial with all dispatch.

The decision is no doubt a wise one, and the severe punishment of the responsible Government officials will be the best deterrent to Moslems in other parts of the interior who may be inclined to repeat the horrors of the Adana massacres. They will certainly be less inclined to listen to the incitements of those who give out that the authorities desire or will connive at the perpetration of such wanton cruelties. This will greatly tend to facilitate the task of gradually restoring brotherly relations between Moslems and Armenians, the latter of whom may, not unnaturally, begin to leave the country, having determined to emigrate *en masse* if the new Government fails to show evidence of an ability and determination to assure the safety of their lives.

The Committee of Union and Progress have further sent to me to express their regrets that England's name should have been mixed up with the Adana massacres, as, for instance, in the ridiculous story that British artillery uniforms were discovered in Armenian houses, as reported in Major Doughty Wylie's despatch of the 4th June, forwarded with my No. 454.

The extent of the economic losses resulting from the Adana massacres may be gauged from the fact that, while the province was some months ago expected to bring in this year a revenue of some £T. 2,000,000, it is now feared that this amount will be reduced to £T. 500,000.

I should add that the editors of the "Itidal," the Committee of Union and Progress' organ at Adana, are to be tried on account of some inflammatory articles written before and during the massacres.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[27390] No. 27.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 20.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 13th July, relative to the Abu Musa oxide question.

India Office, July 19, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 27.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic). P. *India Office, July* 13, 1909.

ABU MUSA oxide: Please see your telegram dated the 6th July.

Undertaking is now asked for by German Government that, pending settlement of case with them, no further mining shall take place. We are considering the question of giving a pledge, but in any case a stage has been reached in the controversy at which we cannot, in practice, permit further operations. Instructions to this effect should be issued to resident, Persian Gulf.

[27355] No. 28.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, with reference to Foreign Office letter of the 21st March, 1909, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th June, 1909, relative to the presentation of saluting guns and ammunition to the Sheikh of Koweit.

India Office, July 20, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

Major Cox to the Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, May* 23, 1909.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department telegram dated the 22nd April, 1909, intimating that Government had been pleased to approve of the presentation of two guns to the Sheikh of Koweit, I have the honour to forward a communication from the political agent, Koweit, in which he expresses Sheikh Mubarek's thanks, and suggests that the question of the supply of shell ammunition should be dropped altogether, unless the sheikh prefers a fresh request. In this view I concur.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Major*,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28.

Captain Shakespear to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Koweit, May* 11, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 2nd May, 1909, regarding the supply of saluting cannon for the Sheikh of Koweit.

2. I conveyed to Sheikh Mubarek the intimation that arrangements were being made for the dispatch of two guns, with 100 rounds of blank ammunition for each gun, and, in reply, he desired me to express his thanks to the British Government for their compliance with his request.

3. In explaining to the sheikh the views of Government as to the inadvisability of including any shell ammunition at present on the score of arousing the suspicions of the Turkish authorities, Sheikh Mubarek at once replied that he did not require shell ammunition at all, and that his only object in asking for the guns and ammunition was to provide himself with suitable weapons for saluting purposes and for firing the usual daily signals during the month of Ramzan.

4. In the circumstances I would suggest that the supply of shell ammunition might now be dropped altogether—at least, until the sheikh himself again prefers a request.

I have, &c.
W. H. I. SHAKESPEAR, *Captain,*
Political Agent, Koweit.

[27678] No. 29.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 22.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of inclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 10th June, 1909, relative to disturbances in the neighbourhood of Bussorah.

India Office, July 21, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Bushire, May* 23, 1909.

IN continuation of my letter dated the 9th instant, I have the honour to enclose copies of the two communications, furnished to me by Mr. McDouall, on the subject of the recent disturbances at and above Bussorah.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Major,*
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

Sir G. Barclay to Consul McDouall.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Tehran, April* 17, 1909.

FOREIGN Office send following message for you regarding disturbances which are taking place near Bussorah, and which have necessitated the dispatch of a man-of-war to that place for protection of foreigners only.

It appears from what Mr. Crow says that the sheikh of Mohammerah can influence the tribes near Bussorah and can restrain or foment disturbances.

If advisable, you should inform him that we have been caused much anxiety for conduct of Arabs and have had to send a man-of-war.

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Inclosure 3 in No. 29.

Consul McDouall to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Sir, *April* 24, 1909.

WITH reference to your telegram, dated the 17th April, 1909, regarding disturbances in the Bussorah neighbourhood, I have the honour to inform you that I was at first unable to understand how the sheikh of Mohammerah could influence the particular tribes engaged. On enquiring from His Majesty's consul, Bussorah, he explained that he had reported that the sheikh of Mohammerah had influenced Fahad in opposing Ghazban. The facts are that Ghazban sheikh of the Beni Lam while professing friendship with the Sardar Arfa will do nothing to restrain his tribesmen from raiding in Persian territory in spite of many representations. A cousin of Ghazban, named Fahad, has leased land formerly leased to Ghazban by the Turkish authorities in which he has secret financial support from the Sardar Arfa. As a result of the lease being given to Fahad, Ghazban has gone into alliance with another sheikh whose lease had also been refused renewal.

As Mr. Crow informs me that there is danger of the Montifik tribes rising if the present revolt continues I have conveyed the message to the Sardar Arfa, who, however, is of opinion that there is no fear of the Montifik rising.

I have, &c.
[Unsigned.]

[27788] No. 30.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received July* 23.)

Sir, *India Office, July* 21, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 14th instant, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in Sir E. Grey's proposal to approve the terms of the note addressed by His Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the 13th May to the Persian Government regarding the protection of Bahreinis in Persia.

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

[28030] No. 31.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 26.)

(No. 567.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah respecting events on the Euphrates, and the measures taken by the Turks for the correction of Hamud-el-Jabir, ex-sheikh of the Medina Arabs, who has disobeyed a summons to go to Bussorah.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 38.)

Sir, *Bussorah, June* 25, 1909.

THE following information has reached me respecting events on the Euphrates:—

On the 23rd May Munsid-el-Wadi was made sheikh of the Medina Arabs, the Sumer and Madin, in place of his cousin Hamoud-el-Jabir, who had refused the vali's invitation to come to Bussorah. The steam-ship "Kazimi" reached Medina the same day, and fired three rounds. The Kilid-el-Bahr also arrived and fired sixty rounds at sheikh Hamoud's dwelling. There were no casualties. Hamoud complained of this treatment to the vilayet, and officials were sent to Kurna to hold an enquiry. Hamoud

subsequently returned to Bussorah with them, and has now been placed in prison on a charge of murder and other crimes. I reported previously that he was said to be implicated in the disturbances on the Tigris, and was accused of receiving the property of the insurgents for safe keeping during the outbreak. It is also alleged that he assisted the insurgent Arabs in getting up ammunition from the coast.

The vali of Bussorah has requested Sheikh Mubarek, as caïmakam of Koweit, to come to Bussorah, probably in connection with this matter. Sheikh Mubarek is said to have promised to come.

The vali has asked the mutessarifs of Montifik and Amara for information as to the bribes received by Hassan Bey, the ex-vali of Bussorah.

Abdul Kerim Bey, the son of Fâlih Pasha, has arrived from Nasriye at the vali's invitation, but his brother Abdullah Bey stayed behind.

On the 19th June the Redif battalion of Deltawa, 330 strong, reached Kurna from Amara, and at once proceeded by lighter to Nasriye. Yousuf Pasha has telegraphed from Amara to the vali to "go slow" with the Montifik Arabs until the Amara business is settled. The vali is trying to collect arrears of taxes from the Montifiks. Mezid Pasha has arrived from Montifik, but Sadun Pasha, who was also summoned, has not responded to the invitation.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[28031] No. 32.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 568.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 21, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul reporting an attack of Arabs on a Turkish military caravan on the way from Ojeir to Hassa.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Bussorah, June 25, 1909.*

THE following information has reached me respecting events in Hassa:—

On the 14th May the Arabs near Hassa (Hofuf) attacked a Turkish caravan on the way from Ojeir to Hassa, consisting of 150 soldiers and 100 natives. The caravan was plundered, 30 soldiers and 5 officers, including a bin bashi, and 95 mules were killed, and 150 rifles captured. It appears that the salaries of the sheikhs of Ajman, Al Murrah, and Beni Hajer had been stopped by the mutessarif.

The vali is said to have asked the assistance of the sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit to reduce the Arabs of Hassa to order, and a telegram was dispatched to the commander of the 6th Army Corps at Bagdad asking for the dispatch of cavalry to Hassa.

As reported in my telegram No. 52, the vilayet has been informed that the Turkish military posts in Kassim have been suppressed.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[28034] No. 33.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 571.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 21, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 395 of the 1st June, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting the

unsatisfactory measures adopted by the Turks at Amara for the restoration of order among the Arab tribes on the Tigris.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 33.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Bussorah, June 26, 1909.*

THE vali of Bussorah has issued a notification to the Arabs of Amara to the effect that Ghadban and his brother Belassim and Falih, together with the sons of Seyhood, having revolted and attacked the river steamers and caused much loss of life and interrupted commerce and navigation, are deprived of their positions as sheikhs of the Beni Lam and Al Bu Mohammed respectively, that the leases of the Muqata'as in their names are hereby cancelled, their property is sequestered and they are declared outlaws and are deprived of all civil rights.

It is not said what steps are being taken to effect the sequester of the property of these predatory nomads and I should think the Turks would have some difficulty in getting hold of it. The loss of civil rights means very little to them as long as they are at liberty. They do not want to sit in Parliament and, if they have grievances, appeal to arms rather than to law to settle them. If judgments are given against them in the courts they do not execute them and the Turks are powerless to enforce execution. This consulate has been trying for the last sixteen years to recover money from a wealthy Arab farmer, which he was condemned to pay in the Amara court in 1893, to a Greek subject, whose lighterful of cargo he had robbed in the river.

The more important question, that of disarming the tribes, has been left untouched. I am informed that the telegraph plant between Ali Gharbi and Ezra's tomb has entirely disappeared, and there is no post or wire to be seen. The telegraph department were asked by the vilayet to repair the line, but declined to do so until guarantees were given that the Arabs would not break it down again.

In spite of instructions from Constantinople to split up the Muqata'as and distribute them among the petty Arab farmers, the vilayet has again leased them *en bloc* as usual to the big sheikhs. As an instance of this I may mention the case of Mejer Kebir, which consists of six farms and has been given to Khalifa-el-Wadi, Seyhood's nephew and a boy of 13. This youth and his brother Areybi have also got the Muqata'as of Ejhaleh at 35,000 liras, of El Behachta at 8,500 liras, and of Jarit at 1,200 liras per annum. The above leases together with that of Mejer Kebir bring up the sum total of their yearly rental to Government to 66,500 liras. Farmers willing to take small holdings came forward and, I am told, offered good prices for them but their tenders were not accepted.

It is clear from my information that there has really been no change in leasing the Muqata'as this year. Instead of granting them to the former sheikhs, who engineered the disturbances, the Government has merely assigned them to the sons and relations of those sheikhs, which is a distinction without a difference. I see no attempt in this to carry out the projected reform of the Arab feudal system to which the Government were supposed to attach importance and I think the course they have adopted is the one most likely to lead to trouble in the future. The first duty of the Government, if they mean business, is to disarm the tribes.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[28045] No. 34.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 26.)

(No. 583.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 21, 1909.*

IN continuance of my despatch No. 555 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have just received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the progress of events in that town. You will perceive that strenuous attempts were made to bring about a reconciliation between Turks and Armenians, but without success, the Armenian point of view being

that the punishment of the ex-vali, &c., must precede such reconciliation. Meanwhile orders arrived for the arrest and trial of the officials mentioned in my despatch above quoted, as well as for the change of the vali and of the president of the court-martial.

Now the court-martial has resigned in a body, owing to apparent want of confidence shown in their president, and it is to be feared that a check will thus be put upon the measures which were being taken for the restoration of order and the punishment of the responsible officials. The Armenian deputy, Babikian, also has, since his return to Constantinople, had interviews with correspondents which have been published in the Turkish press, and Major Doughty-Wylie expresses to me the fear that the effect produced is unfortunate, and calculated to unsettle the country again, and perhaps even to settle the military against the Armenians.

Matters will in any case be delayed until officers can be dispatched from here to form a fresh court-martial."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 34.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, July* 12, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch of the 6th July, I have the honour to report that Dr. Rejibian, lately a refugee in this house, has been put on his trial; I hope to hear the result before this mail goes. The others will, I believe, be tried immediately after him.

The great question of rebuilding houses depends on the credit sent for this purpose from Constantinople. Adana town cannot be touched till the general reconstruction plan is agreed upon. But a start might and should be made at once with outlying houses and villages, especially those in the mountains, where the rainfall is earlier and the winter more severe. With a view to helping this on our committee proposes to build a model house in order to settle details of construction and expenses.

Yussuf Kenal Bey informs me that the lists of killed are now finished for the province, and show a total of only 7,000 killed. He declares this is accurate, and that even the Armenians do not claim more than 10,000. He says that 800 Moslems were killed in Adana and 400 elsewhere. I cannot check his figures, but they seem to me, with the exception of those relating to Moslems, understated.

The reconciliation, which had been going well, is likely to receive a check. According to the Armenians several Turkish notables who are under suspicion are wishing to push themselves in in order to be whitewashed. They think to get the Armenians to sign some paper saying there is nothing against them. There was to have been a big meeting (the third) to-morrow, at which I had hoped the idea of private acquittals would be dropped, but this meeting has been postponed. All such questions should be left to the court-martial.

The Turkish side of this difference of opinion is that at the second meeting certain Armenians made accusatory speeches, describing Moslems as murderers and savages, thereby not unnaturally rendering reconciliation still untimely.

Yussuf Kenal Bey, the deputy to whom these ideas of debating-society meetings are due, was strangely absent from both of them. He is thinking of returning to-morrow to Constantinople, unless he can see his way to some final reconciliation during the next few days. He of course disowns all idea of whitewashing of accused people by private agreement, but I do not feel certain that he can answer for the town of Adana in this respect. He himself says that the Armenians have broken off negotiations purposely until proceedings are taken against some Moslem notables. He tells me that such proceedings have really been taken, and will shortly be published.

I asked him a question about the telegrams which passed between Mahmud Shevket Pasha and the mufti of Adana. He told me that the Moslems of Adana were annoyed with Babikian Effendi, because in his enquiries he made no effort to understand their side of the case, but talked only to Armenians, especially Armenian priests. Probably the Armenians would accuse Yussuf Kenal of being prejudiced against them in a similar fashion. He declares that the Khojas are still persuaded that there was

an Armenian revolution, that he was prepared to dissuade them of this in a public speech, but that the accusatory speeches of Armenians referred to have now rendered this impossible. I confess I do not see the reason of this impossibility.

Kemal Bey is very anxious to pose before Parliament as the bringer of reconciliation from Adana. He hopes to make a speech to the admiring House with the Adana delegates listening from the gallery.

These delegates are to be sent to congratulate the Sultan on his accession. There is a good deal of dispute as to who they should be, the notorious editor of the "Ittidal" having been proposed as one of them. This man, in my opinion, would be better bestowed in prison.

July 14.—I have received with great pleasure your Excellency's telegram announcing that, in view of the approaching trial of the ex-vali, commandant, &c., there is no need to be in too great a hurry for a reconciliation; and further, that the present vali and president of the court-martial are likely to be changed.

As regards the vali the change can hardly be bad. I myself hope he will be succeeded by a military governor; but the president of the court-martial, Kenan Pasha, is an amiable old gentleman whose chief fault, if fault it is, is to defer too much to his second in command, Zia Bey. However, Kenan Pasha is perhaps not the man to take strong measures against probable Moslem notables, should such be necessary.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE, *Vice-Consul.*

[28488] No. 35.

Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received July 28.)

Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,
Sir, *July* 27, 1909.

WE have the honour to inform you that we learn from Mr. J. B. Moore, the commander of our steam-ship "Gulistan" (which vessel recently loaded a quantity of red oxide of iron at the above island), that his steamer arrived at Abu Musa on the 15th June last, and that on the following day a German came across from Lingah, who stayed to watch what was being done. Mr. Moore adds that he gathered from Khan Agha Bader that the German did not like the fact of the mineral having been taken "from his" (the German's) "mine."

Mr. Moore also informs us that the Germans still have four carts on the island for the purpose of carrying oxide, each being of 1½ tons capacity.

We have, &c.
(For Frank C. Strick and Co.)
FRANK C. STRICK.

[28708] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 195.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1909.

I GAVE Count Metternich to-day the accompanying memorandum about red oxide at Abu Musa.*

After reading it, he remarked that Herr von Kuhlmann could not have been authorised to say that an answer would be forthcoming immediately, for a great deal of the material was in Arabic, and it had always been understood that this would take some time to translate and examine.

I told him that I had certainly understood that the material for an answer was ready, and that the answer would be forthcoming very soon. All I meant in the memorandum was that we could not give an undertaking for an indefinite time, and that it was therefore given on the understanding that there would be as little delay as possible in continuing the negotiations, which were not to be hung up. We had also guarded our reply so that the undertaking should not be looked upon as prejudicing our rights or the position we had already taken up. But, in substance, we had agreed to what Count Metternich had asked, on the assumption that the negotiations would proceed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* No. 37.

[26707] No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.

SIR EDWARD GREY presents his compliments to the German Ambassador, and has the honour to refer his Excellency to the conversation which took place between them on the 28th ultimo and to the memorandum handed to his Excellency on the 13th instant on the subject of the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa Island.

In the course of the conversation referred to Count Metternich expressed the opinion that His Majesty's Government ought to give an undertaking that no more red oxide should be mined pending a settlement of the matter in dispute, to which Sir E. Grey replied that he could return no definite answer on this point till he had consulted the Secretary of State for India as to the actual position of the question.

Sir E. Grey has now the honour to inform Count Metternich that, in view of all the circumstances, and of the fact that the reply of the German Government to the memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, may be expected immediately, as stated in conversation by Herr von Kühlmann on the 16th June, His Majesty's Government have no objection to giving the undertaking required purely as a matter of courtesy, on condition that the German Government, on their part, will undertake not to support any application by Messrs. Wönckhaus or others for a further supply of oxide beyond what has already been sanctioned, but not yet removed, until the question is finally settled, and that this concession on the part of His Majesty's Government should not be understood as prejudicing in any way the position taken up by them in their memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, above referred to, in the event of the reference to arbitration of the matter in dispute.

Sir E. Grey takes this opportunity of reaffirming that position, which His Majesty's Government expressly desire to maintain.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1909.

[28618] No. 38.

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Limited, to Foreign Office.
(Received July 29.)

3, Sutter's Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July 28, 1909.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith a statement of claim on the Turkish Government for loss sustained by this company in consequence of the recent interruption of traffic on the Tigris, caused by the revolt of certain Arab tribes.

I am instructed to inform you that our agents abroad state that the Hamidieh Administration has made a claim against these Arabs for £T. 15,000 damage sustained owing to the stoppage of their steamer service during the disturbances.

The claim we now present does not include the damages claimed in respect of the attack on the paddle-steamer "Blosse Lynch," referred to in our letter of the 24th March last.

I have, &c.
H. W. MACLEAN, *Secretary.*

Inclosure in No. 38.

STATEMENT of Claim by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Limited, on the Imperial Ottoman Government for loss of Revenue arising out of the suspension of running of the Company's Steamers on the River Tigris during the Arab disturbances in 1909.

(Estimate based on the gross earnings during the same period in the year 1907—24th March to 4th May.)

	£	s.	d.
Paddle-steamer "Mejidieh," 2½ trips	1,985	18	2
" "Khalifah," "	1,684	3	10
" "Blosse Lynch," 3 trips	1,903	7	2
	5,573	9	2
Less cost of coal not consumed by reason of suspension of service, 650 tons at 32s. 6d. per ton..	1,056	5	0
Total	4,517	4	2

[28917] No. 39.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 585.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 22, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a confidential memorandum from Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay relating to—

1. The affairs of Nejd;
2. The reactionary and anti-Jew feeling at Bagdad;
3. The difficulties encountered by Sir William Willcocks, and attempts to bribe him.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 39.

Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

(No. 20. Confidential.)

1. *Nejd Affairs.*—I have received a visit from Jarulla Dakhil, who is connected with the family of Ibn Rashid, and is also the unofficial representative of Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud at Bagdad. He said that the Dahamisha Arabs, a powerful section of the Anezya inhabiting the country in the direction of Kerbela and Nejef, and the Ruwalla, another powerful section of the same tribe living towards Damascus, had been at feud with each other for years. He said that Abdul Aziz had written to these two sections begging them to settle their quarrel and put an end to internecine strife among the Arabs. The messenger sent by Abdul Aziz is known as El Azuma. He is said to have taken back letters from the sheikhs of the Dahamisha and the Ruwalla, saying that they have taken the advice offered, and also intimating that they are ready to recognise the position of Abdul Aziz as the chief representative of the Arabs. Jarulla also said that the sheikhs of the Dulaim Arabs were in communication with Abdul Aziz through El Azuma. If the first part of the story is true (and I have no reason to doubt it), the latter part is also probably true, for the Dulaim have long been on bad terms with the Anezya, and if they see the various sections of this tribe combining under one head they are bound to take steps to strengthen their own position.

Jarulla also said that El Azuma had taken letters from the people of Jauf informing Abdul Aziz that the people of that oasis were willing to recognise him as their chief. Jarulla said that the sheikhs of Jebel Asair had been in communication with Abdul Aziz, but he did not know what had been said. He added that, as far as he knew, no advances had been made to the Muntefik Arabs or to the Beni Lam, but he said that this might have been done through Bussorah without his knowledge.

Abdul Aziz had thought of approaching the Sultan with a suggestion that he should fly the Turkish flag, pay a certain amount of tribute to the Turkish Government, and be recognised as the governor of the whole of Arabia. He sent a man named Masaud-bin-Suwaila as far as Bussorah on his way to Constantinople, with instructions to ascertain how such a proposal was likely to be received, but before the man could get beyond Bussorah the events of the 13th April occurred, and Masaud, at the advice of Yusuf Pasha, mudir of Bussorah, returned to Nejd.

Abdul Aziz is said to have very high ambitions, which would not be satisfied by his appointment as governor of Arabia under the Turkish Government. What he and a great number of Arabs are aiming at is Arab independence. His great difficulty is that he lacks the cash which is required to organise and start a combined movement.

Jarulla said that Izzat Pasha had sent his son to Egypt with about 40,000*l.*, a portion of which was to be spent in buying land, and the balance in organising a press campaign in favour of Arab independence. The chief organ to be employed was "El Muyyad." He argued that Izzat Pasha was a very rich man, that he hated the present Turkish Government, that he was working for the independence of Syria, and that, consequently, he might be induced to finance a movement for the independence of Nejd, as it would suit his own purposes to do so. He asked me what I thought of the proposal. I replied that I could not claim to be an expert in Arab politics, but two things appeared to me to be quite clear: (1) That Izzat Pasha

was one of the most successful robbers of the age; and (2) that until things at Constantinople settled down it would be difficult for Abdul Aziz or anyone else to know with whom he was dealing. In these circumstances any active policy might lead to results which had not been foreseen. Jarulla said that it is not the intention of the Arabs to take part in any fighting which may occur between opposing parties in Turkey; they will try to organise a combination among themselves. What they would like is Arab independence, but if they cannot get this they would prefer the supremacy of a foreign Power to that of the Turks. He said that it was perfectly obvious who that foreign Power would be, and it would not be unpopular, as it respects the religion of all its subjects. He ended up by saying that he was at all times at my service, if he could be of any use.

2. *Bagdad.*—There is again a feeling of unrest abroad. The reactionary club known as the "Mashwar," which was thought to have ceased to exist, again met on the 15th June. It is said that it met to consider a proposal made in the "Tanin" that a court-martial should sit on the reactionaries of Bagdad, Bussorah, and Mosul. The Russian consul-general, who has a large number of Mahommedan acquaintances, tells me that he does not think 10 per cent. of the Mahommedans are satisfied with the present state of affairs. He says that as long as Abdul Hamid remained as Sultan they were inclined to remain tolerant, but that now they think the Mahommedan supremacy is really in danger. Mr. Cree, who has a considerable connection with Bagdad society, tells me that he is inclined to agree with M. Maschkow. He says that the Jews have got nearly all the trade in their hands, having gone far towards ousting the Mahommedan merchants. The Jews have also left their old quarter of the town, and are getting possession of all the best houses and raising the rental of others; consequently there are a great many people who would not themselves take any part in riots or massacres, yet who would not care to use their influence to save those who are daily eating them out. The Mahommedans may dislike and despise the Jews, but the Jews loathe and hate the Mahommedans. The older ones have the sense to be civil in public, but the youths are apt to be more indiscreet. A few days ago my head clerk heard some Jewish boys pouring abuse on the Mahommedans, not for any reason, but just out of lightheartedness. I have no reason to doubt his word, and what he heard was ample to start a serious disturbance if it had been overheard by anyone interested in creating a riot.

The French consul has been rather posing as the protector of the Christians, but I think he would be much wiser if he told them that he was in no position to protect them, which is the truth, and advised them to be very careful in their behaviour.

I thought of speaking to the rabbi of the conduct of the Jewish boys mentioned above, but I thought it better not to do so, as I did not want to be cited as a witness to the provocative conduct of the Jews. Mr. Gaskin seems to think that there are emissaries from Constantinople at Bagdad for the purpose of stirring up trouble, but he can get no accurate information on the subject.

3. *Sir William Willcocks.*—The Minister of Public Works forced an adjoint on Sir William Willcocks. Some two months ago Sir William asked him to make a drawing, which he (Sir William) said looked as if a child had made it. The adjoint then said that he was too ill to come to office, and he has not been there since. Sir William now learns that he has been well enough to go to Samarra, for which he has got paid £T. 12½ by the vilayet. The local newspapers have begun to ask what this man is doing to earn his pay. I understand that the Accounts Department are giving Sir William a lot of trouble.

The Arabs have not yet learned that Englishmen do not take bakshish. One sheikh offered a gold watch and chain to Sir William Willcocks on the ground that he could not bear to think that he had been robbed by the Arabs of these articles. Another sheikh asked Sir William to lend him £T. 6 on the security of his mare, probably worth more than £T. 150. Of course he would never have redeemed the mare, and as he is a rich man he could not possibly have been in need of so small a sum.

J. RAMSAY.

Bagdad, June 21, 1909.

[28920] No. 40.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 3.)

(No. 589.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 26, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul-general at Smyrna reporting on recent political events in that city.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 40.

Acting Consul-General Heathcote Smith to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 69.)

Sir, *Smyrna, July* 20, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency as follows on the political situation here:—

Ismail Fazli Pasha, general of division and military commander of Smyrna, left yesterday for Adana, where he will preside the court-martial sitting to judge the high officials implicated in the massacres.

His reputation so far is that of being capable, energetic, and whole-heartedly in favour of reform.

Arif Pasha, brigadier-general, will act in his absence. It is considered likely that Ismail Fazli may not return to this post, although the inhabitants of Smyrna sent two petitions to the Grand Vizier lately begging for his retention here.

There have been persistent rumours lately as to the resignation of the Vali, Kiazim Pasha. Discontent on account of his inactivity and differences of opinion between him and Ismail Fazli Pasha caused the reports to be spread.

Great fears have been entertained during the past fortnight as to the action that the Turks, and more especially the Mahommedan Cretans—some 30,000 are settled in this vilayet—would take against the Greeks at the time of the evacuation of the foreign troops in Crete. The Greeks have been so sensible of the dangerous feeling abroad that they have not held the many local fairs ("panaghir") which are due to take place at this time of the year, and they studiously refrain from anything likely to excite the Turks. However, public feeling has now calmed down, and it is expected that nothing will happen.

I had a conversation yesterday with the Young Turk leader Dr. Nazim Bey, who said that a commission was destined to arrive within two months to sweep away all the high officials here considered incapable or dishonest, and to replace them by young men of the reform party. He added: "We shall begin with the vali, who is a mere figure-head, as I stated in two public addresses last night."

Despite the fact that he fully recognised the corruptness of nearly the whole body of those in Government employ here, he said that he considered it a wise policy to suppress the use of foreign languages in the law courts, as this would strike the imagination of the Greeks and Armenians, who would thereby see the necessity of looking on Turkish as their mother tongue.

He implied that this strange policy was that of his party, although adding in the same breath that Young Turkey desired to do all in its power to get foreigners to invest their capital in this country.

I have, &c.

C. E. HEATHCOTE SMITH.

[29214] No. 41.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 3.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous

letter, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 1st August, relative to the reported intention of Turkey to evacuate Sana'a and the Mokha districts of Yemen, and to establish a protectorate.

India Office, August 3, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 41.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 1, 1909.

THE political resident at Aden telegraphs to the following effect:—

"Information has reached me from reliable source that it is the intention of the Turkish Government to evacuate Sana'a and the Mokha districts of Yemen, and to establish a protectorate there. North-Eastern Yemen will be placed under the Imam of Yemen, who will be appointed ruler, with his head-quarters at Sana'a. In South-Western Yemen the Shafii tribes will be asked to elect a ruler. The head-quarters of the present Turkish administration will be withdrawn to Manakha.

"The result will probably be a declaration of independence on the part of the Imam, and general intertribal fighting throughout South-Western Yemen. Mokha meanwhile will be at the mercy of any Power. The Sultan of Lahej, who has asked whether he may endeavour to secure his election as ruler of the Mokha districts, endorses these views.

"I learn that the power of the Arab Mulla Sabia is increasing in the Asir district. He is said to be working in harmony with the Imam and to control 180,000 men. I am sending fuller information by letter."

On receipt of resident's letter we will communicate further.

[28438] No. 42.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 3*, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th instant, relative to the dispute concerning the mining of red oxide on Abu Musa Island, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co., Limited, reporting as to the conditions of the recent shipment of that mineral.*

Viscount Morley will observe that the only information in this letter which is not already in the possession of His Majesty's Government is that contained in the last paragraph, which relates to the presence on the island of carts belonging to Messrs. Wönckhaus for use in the transport of oxide.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[29735] No. 43.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 9.)

(No. 622.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 4*, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward two despatches from Major Doughty-Wylie of the 19th instant, concerning the resignation of the court-martial on account of the appointment of a new president and the strictures of the Armenian deputy Babikian. The latter, who had received threatening letters, died here suddenly three days ago, and though there are suspicions of foul play, they would seem to be groundless, as shown by the *post-mortem*. The Grand Vizier and the Minister of War have succeeded in inducing the court-martial to withdraw their resignation, and it seems highly probable that the ex-vali and ex-commandant will be condignly punished.

* No. 35.

The vali Mustafa Zihni has now at last been removed and replaced by Major Jemal Bey, one of the Young Turk officers. He is one of the two delegates who were a year ago sent to explain to me the views and intentions of the Committee of Union and Progress, and who has since maintained friendly relations.

He has played a prominent part in Macedonia during the events preceding and following the revolution of 1908. He is very modest and quiet in speech, but a man of action and determination, while both conciliatory and just. The Government is now allotting a further £T. 100,000 for relief in Adana and Aleppo, in addition to close on £T. 100,000 already devoted to that purpose. The Grand Vizier says that the condition of the treasury will not permit of more being spent.

As regards the refugees, I believe there is now no danger of the original promises regarding them not being kept. The promise was given to the Embassy irrespective of any decisions at Adana. The Armenian Patriarch has, as the result of Babikian's report, threatened to resign unless the Government retracts its original contention that the massacres were the result of an Armenian plot to found an independent principality, and admits the innocence of the Armenians who were hanged at Adana in deference to Moslem susceptibilities. The Government has practically consented to comply with the former demand. I received a telegram from Major Doughty-Wylie last night informing me that three Turks had been hung that morning.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 43.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, July 19*, 1909.

WITH reference to the two extracts from the Turkish papers forwarded by you to me on the 12th July, I have the honour to submit the observations asked for by your Excellency.

With regard to the interview with Babikian Effendi in the "Tezvir-i-Ifkiar" of the 9th July, I happened to have had a long talk over it with the members of the court-martial who gave me a copy in Turkish. The reported sayings of Babikian have made them very angry; and their anger will be certainly shared by all the soldiers of the province. As a first result the officers of the court-martial resigned in a body, preferring to go with Kenan Pasha, rather than to serve under Fauzi Pasha who is universally detested.

I think the majority of Babikian's statements will be contradicted by his colleague Yussouf Kemal Bey who is now in Constantinople, though no doubt Kemal Bey would have preferred to follow Babikian's discreet lead in declaring that there has been no breach between them.

To take the statements point by point. Babikian says that 20,000 were killed, on the authority of the vali, who in his turn will probably deny having made such a statement. Kemal puts the loss at 7,000, basing himself on statements by the mukhtars of villages and some Christian priests. The probabilities are all on the side of Babikian, but it will be difficult to disprove the other side's papers.

Their weakness really lies in the non or doubtful inclusion of the large influx of harvesters who are always to be found in the province at this time of year.

Babikian says that the massacre was prepared by the Moslems and that he holds proof of this. Some of these proofs are, I suppose, the letters referred to in the other extract from the "Turin" which you sent me.

Kemal Bey, on the contrary, says that there was no preparation and that the massacre was a sudden storm rising out of a long growing hate for which the Armenians were largely if not altogether responsible. It is certainly true that at the time of last Bairam there was much talk of massacre and a sort of panic reported in my despatches at the time.

It will be interesting to see if Babikian can make out a good case. He can at any rate prove that the talk of massacre was no new thing. Muftizade Ismail, of Bagche, has been for a long time well known as a firebrand. Muftizade Ahmed was certainly imprisoned under the orders of Djevad Bey, who declared that he would be deported. So freely was this said that I was under the impression that he had been deported. Muftizade Ismail who destroyed Bagche and Hassan Beyli is now in prison. He was

once set free but rearrested on an urgent telegram from the deputies to the Grand Vizier. It seems to me that Babikian Effendi has a possible clue in his hand.

The non-complicity of the ex-Sultan and Izzet Pasha is generally accepted. As these two people have many enemies they would, I think, have certainly been implicated if there was the least shadow of suspicion against them.

No one in authority now thinks that the Armenians were prepared for a rising or to declare their independence. The idea is rather that they were agitating politically for decentralisation, and were perhaps plotting a real rising later on in the year. Among the Hodjas and the ordinary Turks there is still a firm belief that the Armenians were in rebellion, but neither the court-martial nor Kemal Bey would maintain this.

Babikian says that the Armenians gave no cause for massacre. This is true enough, for in no circumstances can massacre be justified. But if he means as he seems to mean that there were no faults on the Armenian side, he goes too far. Considering the country and the people, there was certainly provocation in the violent and insulting language which was all too common. There remains too the propaganda for the buying of arms.

Babikian's remark that Sissilian was employed as a mustantik by the court-martial is, so far as I know or can find out, entirely unjustified. It has particularly enraged the officers of the court. Sissilian was, however, employed as a principal witness against his own people.

As to Bishop Musheeh, whom Babikian declares to be innocent, he may be a much maligned man. He can be proved to have toured his province exhorting his flock and others to buy arms at any price, and if he was not a dangerous man, why did his own people ask me to keep him away from Adana?

The court-martial are very angry over Babikian's attack on their justice. They have certainly this much right on their side, that the instance which he gives is a very bad one. The man whom he names, one Kessissian, is now a refugee in Cyprus, and has never even been tried, much less condemned to death. The evidence of the bank director, quoted correctly by Babikian, is held to be so strong that, relying upon it, he is returning to Adana to stand his trial.

As for the work, it is unfortunately true that there is little work in Adana. The agricultural population have been largely killed, and the townsmen have nothing left to trade with.

Babikian's account of my being wounded, which he professes to have had from my own lips, is purely imaginary. I do not think he ever asked me anything about it, and I never have said a word of what he puts me down as saying. This is a very unimportant detail, but I am afraid it is of a piece with much of the graver parts of his statement. His wisest course is to deny the interview altogether.

As regards the article in the "Tanin" and the letter from the mufti and several Turks of Hajin denouncing Mutlizade Ahmed, I have never heard of the latter before. This Ahmed Effendi is, however, well known as a bad character, and was, as I have said, in prison under Djevad Bey. It appears to be true that he was allowed to escape, and I do not know his present whereabouts. He is well known to have threatened Christians, and is accused of having ordered the deaths of three Armenians who were murdered about three months ago outside Hajin.

I never heard of the second letter referred to from the local Committee of Union and Progress. It is not said if this is the Adana committee or that of Hajin.

The answer to the "Tanin's" query why no steps were taken to preserve order in the Adana district will be that steps were taken, that the vali asked for and received troops, and that had he been a man of energy they could have been used.

I have the honour to return the documents as directed.

I have, &c.

C. M. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE, *Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 43.

Major Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Adana, July 19, 1909.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch of the 12th July, I have the honour to report that Dr. Rejibian and Dikran Dizdikian, both lately refugees in this house, have been acquitted by the court-martial and are now free.

As regards the other three men, the evidence against them has largely broken

down, except that of a certain Arshanian, who cannot be cross-examined as he is not here. The court received written evidence, but allowed the demand of the prisoners to be confronted with this man. However, as Arshanian is supposed to be in Aintab (he is really in Egypt, I believe), there has been a delay in producing him. He has charged the prisoners with distributing arms gratis and with giving certain fedais a monthly salary.

Zia Bey, in talking over the matter with me privately, told me, much to my astonishment, that, in spite of the lack of this important witness, the court had practically made up their minds on the case. The sentences would be short terms of imprisonment and for one man, Challian, perpetual exile. It does not seem to occur to him that my idea of courts-martial are somewhat different to his.

The resignation of all the officers of the court, which was telegraphed to your Excellency last night, but which has not yet been accepted, of course alters the situation of these prisoners altogether. Zia Bey visited me to explain that if they had to go, their pledge to me would be valueless, unless I could persuade the prisoners to waive their claim to see the witness Arshanian, so that they might be judged before the members of the court leave Adana. Even if I was willing to do this, it would not be practically possible. I could not go to the prison to see these men without exciting undesirable talk, nor is it the sort of affair that I could confide to anyone who could go without being noticed. In the end I told Zia that I considered that they had fulfilled their pledge as far as it was possible for them to do, and that the prisoners must take their chance with the new court.

As to the general resignation of the officers of the court-martial, while one cannot really consider them as a court of justice, I am afraid their departure under such circumstances will make now for unsettlement and even for disorder. They have now begun to work on more reasonable lines. The people have become accustomed to them, and they in their turn to the cloud of false witnesses. There was some hope of the trials being finished if not in accord with ideal but unlikely justice, at least with some measure of regard to future tranquillity; and just or unjust, it is highly desirable that some end should be reached in a reasonable time. Now I am afraid it will be all to do again. Fauzi Pasha, if their accounts are to be trusted, is a man with whom everyone quarrels, a Candiote, whom, among other things, produced the mutiny at the military school. They say he is worse than an Armenian, whatever that may mean.

Bibikian's interview in the paper has to the last degree disgusted them, and will, I am afraid, accentuate the deep-seated dislike of Armenians, which has already made a sympathetic treatment of the province so extremely difficult.

It will be misrepresented—it has already been misrepresented by the "Ittihad"—as a slanderous attack on the Turks and on the religion of the State. Bibikian's facts are in some cases wrong, which is to the last degree unfortunate. He had a good case, but his inaccuracy has spoilt it. Every mis-statement will be held up as the result of relying on Armenian priests, with whom Bibikian principally consorted. It will be held up as a type of the work of those unscrupulous and dishonest people (I speak as a Turk). The men who are supposed to have prompted Bibikian will be called liars, traitors, and slanderers. They in their turn will reply with murderer and robber, and peace and prosperity will be further off than ever.

Talking with the court-martial over Baghdadi, I discovered that he has been already condemned to some measure of exile, there being no proofs against him sufficient for a heavier punishment. The date of his condemnation is the 24th June in Adana, but it has not been confirmed up to the present. He had not been arrested because the court considered that to have arrested him might have caused trouble with the Turks. This is a fair commentary on the state of the country as seen by the court-martial. They have the force of the army and the constitution behind them, and they think it advisable to proceed against a man of really no importance in secret. I am myself of the contrary opinion. The arrest of Baghdadi at an early stage would have cleared up the affair as nothing else could have done. But their point of view is interesting: Baghdadi suddenly banished would have been forgotten in a week, while in prison he would have been the centre of intrigues and bribes of all sorts. Baghdadi attributes his arrest to me, and is now trying to be released by the influence of M. Savromati, the Russian consul, in whose debt he is said to be. Hasan Effendi, who is also in gaol, is, I hear, in danger of rather more than exile; but his paper last night published an open threat against his accusers.

Yesterday the 1st Battalion of the 38th Regiment arrived here. I presume to replace some of the Adrianople troops. It has come from Yemen, I am told. A bis-

Emin Pasha also arrived in place of the Ferik Mustapha Ramzi, who is at last deprived of his functions.

Our relief committee had a joint meeting with the Patriarchal delegates, at their request. They wished to ask us to accept the principle of international control of the orphanages to be built hereafter in Adana. We did so. Their object is to receive all the money subscribed abroad for orphans, in order to divert it from foreign establishments. The Patriarch forbids Armenians to send children to foreigners, but at the same time Armenians are very well aware that foreign orphanages enjoy some measure of a useful protection. They hope, by naming some foreigners to their board, to secure the money and the protection, and to retain the management and education on their own lines. Personally I do not see many reasons against it, except that money for orphanages is often given to particular societies, such as the German, who demand in return the excellent German control and institutions.

Our relief committee are pushing forward a survey of houses on the outskirts which have been damaged but not destroyed, with a view to their being repaired as soon as possible. The lists prepared for us show 127 houses which can be repaired at an estimated cost of £ T. 1,905. This is now being carefully checked. These houses at any rate can be got ready before the autumn rains, whereas it is more than doubtful if new houses can be built this year.

The "Ittidal" of last night published what purported to be a report of a speech made by an officer at Mersina, in which he makes unfortunate references to rebellion, fedais, burning of villages, &c. Mr. Chafy went to the vali in my place this morning (I being unable to go on account of my accident), and pointed out to him the difficulties which such articles place in the way of reconciliation, which is of such vital importance for this province. The vali said he would do his best in the matter. He said also that £ T. 100,000 had been granted by Parliament for rebuilding.

Nothing has been heard here of any change of valis; nor has Carasso Effendi, the deputy, arrived.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE, *Vice-Consul.*

[29214] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 239.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 11, 1909.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the India Office,* relative to the reported intention of the Turkish Government to evacuate the Sanaa and Mokha districts of the Yemen and to establish a protectorate there.

I should be glad if your Excellency would report to me whether you have any knowledge of this rumour, and would furnish me with any observations which you may have to offer of the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. GREY.

[30630] No. 45.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 14.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter of the 3rd August, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 12th August, relative to reports that Mokha is to be made over as a coaling station to Germany.

India Office, August 14, 1909.

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* No. 41.

Inclosure in No. 45.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 14, 1909.

IN continuation of my telegram of the 1st instant. A telegram dated the 10th August has been received from the resident at Aden to following effect:—

A rumour prevails from different sources that Mokha is shortly to be made over to Germany as a coaling station. Visit there by German cruiser "Cormoran" on the 12th August is expected.

[30747] No. 46.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 634.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 8, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 362 of the 21st May last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Jeddah reporting on the arrival of the new Vali of the Hedjaz and other affairs connected with the Hedjaz and Yemen.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 46.

Acting Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Jeddah, July* 18, 1909.

I HAVE now the honour to report the arrival here on the 9th instant by the Khedivial mail steamer "Tantah" of Lieutenant-General Fuad Pasha, to take up his appointment as Vali of the Hedjaz and Commander of the 16th (Hedjaz) Division.

His Excellency, as is customary on first arrival of governors-general in the Hedjaz, landed in "ihram" or haj dress, and in consequence did not exchange visits with the local foreign consular corps.

He proceeded the same evening to Mecca, whence after a very short stay he moved on to Taif, the summer head-quarters of this vilayet.

I am informed that Fuad Pasha who came from Monastir, where he occupied the dual post of vali and military commander, has a very good record.

He was formerly chief of staff and chief of intendance in the Second Army Corps. It would also appear that Fuad Pasha has been in this vilayet before as a junior officer, and that he has served in the Yemen too.

I take this opportunity to report the departure from this port for Cumfuda of the Ottoman gun-boat "Tash-Kubri" that has been lying at anchor in the harbour for the past four or five weeks.

The Director of Telegraphs here informed me confidentially of the passing through to the vali at Taif of a cablegram from the Assyr authorities requesting the urgent dispatch of two gun-boats to Cumfuda, as serious trouble is anticipated shortly in the province.

The gun-boat "Custamuni" that is now patrolling the coast north of Jeddah has been recalled here by the authorities and will be sent to Cumfuda.

I further learn that a Turkish transport has landed a number of fresh drafts, guns, and horses at Cumfuda for the Assyr sanjak; but, owing to scant and irregular communication with Hodeidah, no details have as yet reached me.

There are rumours afloat in this town that the authorities in both the Hedjaz and Yemen vilayets are getting anxious on account of the daily increasing influence of Syyed Ali ibn Ahmed-el-Idrisee, the mahdi resident at Sabyeah. The latter is receiving numerous visits from Arabs, including syyeds and notables in the Hedjaz and Yemen, and natives of Aden and the Hydramaut have undertaken journeys to call on him.

Although Syyed Ali the Idrisee openly announces his allegiance to the Ottoman Government, and professes not to have any sinister or hostile designs towards it, the

fact of his being able to muster without difficulty some 12,000 armed followers cannot but be a source of uneasiness to the Turks.

The following officers, viz., Major Mahmud Bey, of the late Sultan's household, Major Adhem Akif Bey, lately professor in the Ottoman Army Medical School, Adjutant-Major Hassan Bey, in the personal service of Sultan Abdul Hamid, Captains Dastan Effendi, Mahomed Effendi, Ibrahim Effendi, late librarian at Yildiz Kiosk, Mahomed Shakir Effendi, candlebearer Ali Bey, and three sergeants who recently arrived here by the transport "Hijjein" to undergo banishment in this province (reported to your Excellency in Jeddah despatch No. 31 of the 16th June), have now under orders from the Central Government been liberated and permitted to return to their homes. They took passage for Constantinople by the Khedivial mail steamer "Negileh" that sailed from here on the 15th instant.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

[30749] No. 47.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 630.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting on the situation in the Montifik and Amara sanjaks.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 47.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Bussorah, July 12, 1909.*

I VISITED the vali on the 11th instant, and, in reply to my inquiries regarding the collection of arrears of revenue from the Montifik tribes, his Excellency stated as follows:—

The principal sheikhs of Montifik are descended from the brothers Mansur Pasha and Nassir Pasha, the former of whom wasted his substance and died in comparative poverty at Bussorah, while the latter died in exile at Constantinople leaving large estates. The two brothers were on bad terms and enmity continued to exist between their descendants, Sadun, son of Mansur Pasha, and his cousins, the sons of Falih and Mizel, and Mezied, the son of Nassir Pasha. Sadun is to all intents and purposes a freebooter and a centre for all the disaffected elements among the Montifik tribes. Such as prefer a roving life to a settled existence join him and aid him in predatory attacks on his neighbours and in hostile enprises against the Ottoman Government. Sadun has hitherto made considerable sums in running arms from the coast for distribution to the Arabs, and the vali stated that he was taking measures to stop him doing this. Hassan Bey, ex-Vali of Bussorah, supported Sadun and made him a sort of tahsildar over the sanjak with disastrous results. If a man had to pay 10*l.* in taxes Sadun collected 150*l.* and only gave 5*l.* to Government. He treated the inhabitants of Montifik with great cruelty and was tyrannical and extortionate. Although Sadun is no longer deputed to collect revenue for Government, he continues to levy contributions on his own account, and the sums due to Government remain unpaid. Hamdi Pasha, the mutessarif, is a creature of the Nassir family and was formerly a clerk in their employment. He is not respected by the tribes, and the vali finds him useless as a sub-governor, as he is too much under the influence of the Nassir family. Under these circumstances the vali seemed to think that the collection of Government revenue in Montifik would be attended with great difficulties.

I drew the vali's attention to the allotment of the muqata'as this year in the Amara Sanjak, and remarked that the Government seemed to be giving them as before, collectively, to the big sheikhs and their families instead of splitting up the holdings among petty proprietors as had been proposed.

The vali replied that the Porte had approved the plan of dividing the contracts among the small farmers so as to lessen their dependence on the big sheikhs and so weaken the latter's influence, but said he had encountered great opposition in the

matter from Yusuf Pasha, the military commander, who held contrary views. The vali expressed the opinion that Yusuf Pasha's views were influenced by Ibrahim Pasha, former director of the Seniye at Amara, who was pecuniarily interested in the question, and said that Yusuf Pasha urged the adoption of the present system on military grounds, and considered it advisable to grant the muqata'as to persons who would oppose Ghadban in any future attempt to reassert his influence. The vali had therefore been overruled by the military party at Bagdad, and the present allotments were made on grounds of military expediency for the better protection of public safety. The vali also said that he had met with opposition from Yusuf Pasha on the question of disarmament. His Excellency estimated the present number of rifles of a military pattern in the hands of Arabs in the Bussorah Vilayet at 250,000, and observed that Ghadban maintained a personal body-guard of 1,200 men who were all armed to the teeth. When at Amara the vali discussed the question with Yusuf Pasha and advocated some attempt being made to collect arms. The result was a general outcry. The commander of the forces said it was not an opportune time to deal with the matter, and said he felt sure any attempt in that direction would lead to revolt among the tribes. The vali said he had received information that several hundred rifles of the Government pattern had been deposited by Ghadban with one of the Azerij tribe at Amara, and suggested to the commander that immediate steps should be taken to confiscate them, as their existence was not denied. The commander, however, demurred, and the matter was dropped. The vali said he was studying the question and hoped to be able to deal with it shortly, but that steps had already been taken to check the import of arms from Koweit. His Excellency seemed to think that Yusuf Pasha would not remain long in Amara. It is rumoured here that he is going to Kerkuk to superintend the military operations there.

I have, &c.

F. E. CROW.

P.S., *July* 16.—Since writing the above I hear that the Montifik question came up for discussion at the last meeting of the administrative council, and that the vali tried to persuade the members that the Arabs of that district were loyal to the Government. It was, however, pointed out that the situation was extremely serious, the Turkish authorities having lost all control there, while at Suk-es-Shiyukh even Turkish soldiers who wanted to shop in the bazaar could only do so in safety if they were accompanied by an Arab guide. An Arab sheikh sat daily in the bazaar to administer justice, and the authority of the kaimakam was completely disregarded. Turkish officials and soldiers were nicknamed "jackals" by the Arab populace. In view of these considerations the reassurances of the vali fell rather flat, and by general consent a telegram was dispatched to the Minister of the Interior urging the adoption of forcible measures to restore Turkish authority.

F. E. C.

[30752] No. 48.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 639.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana giving further details as to the causes of the recent massacres there.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 48.

Vice-Consul Doughty Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, July 24, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the recent events at Adana. The report is based on my diaries written at the time and amplified from information which has come into my hands since then.

Causes of the Massacre.

The proclamation of the constitution found Adana a very badly-governed province. The vali at that time was Bahrhi Pasha, who, on account of his long exactions, had to fly for his life. A corrupt vali is a source of general corruption in an administration, and the new ideas of the revolution fell on a most unaccustomed people. The Turks, masters for centuries, found their great stumbling block in equality with the Christians. The Christians, with all the assertiveness of the newly emancipated, made equality seem to mean superiority. They were the most intelligent, the most educated, and by far the most talkative. It was natural that too blatant a boasting by men so long regarded as of a lesser race should be held offensive by the old-fashioned.

Nearly no one in Adana was really satisfied. The Turks hated the idea that they were no longer masters. The Armenian wanted to rush into Home Rule. The Greek mistrusted the constitution because he had not made it himself and because under it he seemed likely to lose certain facilities he had enjoyed under the old venal system. There were also electoral irregularities, and he felt uneasy about the privileges of the cherished patriarchate and the Hellenistic schools.

Among the fiercer professors of Islam resentment grew. Were God's adversaries to be the equals of Islam? In every café the heathen were speaking great mouthing words of some godless and detested change. Where the Hodja had of old met with at least respect there was now (the shame of it!) derision.

Some of them, such as the Muftizade of Hajin, are accused of speaking with hatred of the constitution as a Christian invention and contrary to the sacred law. He was said to have preached that without blood Islam could not come to its own again. When three Armenians had their throats cut near Kars last autumn the murderers were supposed to have been instigated by this man. He was imprisoned, and it was given out that he had been deported. But in reality he was released on bail and remained in the country.

And in their clubs the Armenian orators, drunk with their own verbosity, talked *ad nauseam*. They never seem to have thought of the possible consequences of wild words. Natives of the country, they should have known its dangers, but with the word liberty they forgot them all.

Under the constitution all men might bear arms. From the delightful novelty of the thing, many thousands of revolvers were purchased. Even schoolboys had them and, boy-like, flourished them about. But worse followed. The swagger of the arm-bearing Armenian and his ready tongue irritated the ignorant Turks. Threats and insults passed on both sides. Certain Armenian leaders, delegates from Constantinople, and priests (an Armenian priest is in his way an autocrat) urged their congregations to buy arms. It was done openly, indiscreetly, and, in some cases, it might be said wickedly. What can be thought of a preacher, a Russian Armenian, who in a church in a place (not in the province, however) where there had never been a massacre, preached revenge for the martyrs of 1895. Constitution or none, it was all the same to him. "Revenge," he said, "murder for murder. Buy arms. A Turk for every Armenian of 1895." An American missionary who was present got up and left the church. Bishop Musheeh, of Adana, toured his province preaching that he who had a coat should sell it and buy a gun. His apologists say that he foresaw the massacre and wished his people only to defend themselves; his accusers, that the hope of a beylik was in his head, that he saw himself in the old cradle of the race in the future as Prince of Armenia. It is immaterial now which, if either, of these things is true. What the bishop must surely have known was that his words would carry far and wide by the incurable loquacity of his race, and the effect upon the Turks—whom he knew to be savage, ignorant, and fanatical—would only be dangerous. A man who believed that a massacre was coming, would he not have made a secret rather than an open propaganda in favour of self-defence. The Armenian deputy, Babikian Effendi, urges for the bishop that he not only clearly foresaw the massacre, but warned the local government of it.*

* Since writing the above on Bishop Musheeh I got another view of him and his conduct, which may be of some interest. I was urging on one of the delegates of the patriarch the necessity of finding some *modus vivendi* between the two races. In the forefront of his conditions for peace, he placed the pardon of this bishop.

"He has done nothing," he said, "nothing at all. It is true that he took bribes from Bahri Pasha. It is true that he was in the arms trade, and sold the people bad arms for good money. It is true that he preached to them to buy arms, and thereby made much money. It is true that he made foolish speeches. It is true that he used to go to the vineyards with a rifle and bandolier on his shoulder. It is true that he had himself photographed in the costume of the old chiefs of Armenia. But what of all that? It is nothing—nothing at all."

I did not know so much about Bishop Musheeh before, and do not know that he appears so very estimable a prelate even on his friends' showing.

But all this talk of arming made the Moslems believe that they were to be attacked, thereby enormously strengthening the hands of the muftizade and the fanatics on his side. From this arose the widespread fear of fedais, and there is nothing more cruel than fear.

Quarrels arose and were followed by murders. The local government and the administration of justice were alike in feeble hands. If the police arrested anyone, even red-handed, he was at once released. No wonder that the police became discouraged. They even at one time refused to go on duty, saying that they had become a common laughing-stock.

Djevad Bey, at that time vali of Adana, a man of weak character, applied at the last Bairam, when there was talk of massacres, for troops. A battalion of Arab troops from the fifth army corps was sent to him. Adana is the headquarters of a general of a division of the reserve. The holder of this office was Mustapha Remzi Pasha.

The Arab battalion shared in the increasing dislike of Christians. Stories were diligently put about of an approaching massacre. Some say it was the arm-sellers spread them in order to sell their goods. The battalion could have been held and used by a good officer, but such a man was lacking. The ferik was an old man incapable of action. He has been accused of abetting the massacres, and it has been pointed out that he was in command at Marash at the time of the massacre there in 1895. His staff officer was in my opinion useless. Whether it is true or not that they abetted the massacre their incapacity and inaction rendered it possible.

It is natural to think that on a place so prepared the seed of the counter revolution at Constantinople did not fall fruitless. The counter revolution began on the 13th April, the Adana massacre on the 14th April. I have heard many stories of the League of Mahommed and of their secret meetings. Various names have been mentioned in connection with them, noticeably those of Abdul Khadri Effendi Baghdadi and his son Abdur Rahman Effendi, but at present there are no proofs. Still less is there any proof of any direct orders from Constantinople, from the late Sultan or Izzet Pasha. If such there were (and I very much doubt it), they might have been given through this same League of Mahommed. Babikian Effendi, the Armenian deputy sent by the Parliament to Adana, declares that he can prove from certain documents which he holds that the massacre was planned many weeks beforehand. The Turkish deputy, Yussouf Kemal Bey, his colleague, denies this, and says that there were no orders given and no League of Mahommed in any dangerous form. On the contrary, he suggests that among the Armenians there was a secret agitation in favour of the ideas of Prince Subaeddin, whose gospel was decentralisation.

Kemal Bey thinks that the Armenians, or rather their leaders, wished to make some sort of a demonstration not amounting to an armed revolution, which should call the attention of Europe to their grievances, and overthrow if it were possible at once Abdul Hamid and the Committee of Union and Progress. He declares that in the streets of Adana was killed an emissary of Prince Subaeddin, and that Bishop Musheeh had preached that the time was coming when the Armenian nation would be kissing the feet of Subaeddin.

The theory of an armed revolution on the part of the Armenians is now generally discredited with the more intelligent people.* An agitation in favour of some form of decentralisation is more credible. It would conceivably have led up to the larger policy.

Such a policy as that of the Liberals in Constantinople would have many attractions for a thinking Armenian.

That the massacres were encouraged by reactionary feeling, if not directly caused by it, there is ample proof. Many Christians were killed with these words: "That for your liberty!" The arch outside the konak put up to commemorate the constitution was pulled down. Cheers were given for Sultan Abdul Hamid. He had set the fashion of massacres.

* The reasons of this briefly are as follows:—

It is plain that had the Armenians really wished to revolt in arms they would have retired to Zeitoun or to some other natural fortress, of which there are several in their country, where they could have made a dramatic defence, and by it appealed to the sympathies of Europe, the thing of which the Turks are always thinking. They would not have left their sons and brothers scattered widely through the province for harvest without arms, without any hope of escape.

Nor, armed for the most part with shotguns and revolvers, would even the Armenians have thought their few thousands an easy match for the regular Turkish army without the help which a fortress would give them. When I say that the idea of an armed revolution is generally discredited among the more intelligent people, I do not mean the great majority who still firmly believe in it. But little by little they will change. Some of the intelligent, while admitting that there was no idea of revolution in April, say that the troubles took the Armenian leaders by surprise, and that, if left to themselves, there would have been a revolution in the autumn.

As the party of reaction base themselves on the Sheriat, so it would be natural to find that the ulema and hodjas of Adana were forward in the massacres. There appears to have been a difference of opinion.

From one minaret it was cried to kill the Christians; from another rifle fire was maintained. When the American missionaries were killed, a hodja was seen among the five men who fired the volley. In the villages hodjas were often the leaders. After the killing of the Christians at Baghshe the Moslems, lead by Muftizade Ismail with a banner, advanced on Hassan Beyli. At Islahia the attacking party, turned back by a Kurdish chief, were led by a mullah with a banner. The kadi at Islahia prayed publicly for the success of the faithful fighting for Islam. I give these stories for what they are worth. In Adana it is said that some sort of fetwa was given by the mufti. The story goes that the late kadi of Adana, a man of the enlightened sort, declared this to be the case. I saw the mufti myself on the first day of the massacre, having asked the vali to send for him. He declared to me that he had given orders to all the religions to stop the killing. He is an old man. I may have been wrong, but he did not give the idea of any very violent condemnation of what was then going forward.

On the other hand, during the fight itself I found a hodja in the street who was certainly busy trying to calm the crowd. He came to my stirrup and asked me for soldiers to keep clear a street out of which I had just driven a mob of ruffians. On the third day of the massacres a well-known and much-respected hodja named Hadji Osman Bey, himself led a body of troops on a peace-making mission into the Armenian quarter. He worked honestly and sincerely to stop the massacre. After the second massacre, when it became necessary in order to save them from being burnt, to take over 2,000 terrified people through the Moslem quarter by narrow lanes—when troops were very few—I appealed to a hodja, whom I took to be the imam of the great mosque, under the shadow of which the crowd defiled, for protection for them. It was given. In those crooked alleys it was impossible to be everywhere, and nearly all those wretched people might have been killed. But the imam gave his word, and none were touched.

Those who in normal times only have known the Turkish peasant, a kindly, honest and hospitable man, wonder by what devilry he can be suddenly changed into a cruel killer of unarmed men and even in some cases of women and children. He has two masters whom he never disobeys, the religion and the Government. When he is told that the religion is in danger, and that he must rise and kill, that the women and the goods are lawful plunder, when the Government distributes arms or by remaining inactive gives at least a tacit consent—with the hodja and the yuzbashi he kills the Armenian with the horrible thoroughness with which Samuel and Saul killed the Amalekites. As to the distribution of arms, even the officers of the court-martial find, I believe, that arms were distributed nominally to redifs, but practically to all that asked. There was a real terror among the Moslems. The word went round that the Armenians were in arms and had massacred the Turks. I was told many times of 500 fedais on horseback led by one Guerkderelian. They were here, they were there—they had burnt Tarsus—they were going to assault the Konak. So fast was this last believed that when I was going out of the Konak with 50 soldiers by the gate towards the town, officers tried to turn me back saying that if they opened the gate there would be a rush of fedais. Of course I had the gate opened, and neither at that time nor at any other did I see any fedais at all. But none the less they were certainly believed in. The fear of bombs and dynamite, and of subterranean passages by which the fedais were going to blow up the Konak, had, I think, something to do with the terror of the governor and the reluctance of the military chiefs to leave the Konak, or to allow the soldiers to leave it either.

Plunder to all mobs is a lure irresistible. To loot a rich city like Adana, to kill God's enemies and have their goods; to be rich in this life and to be in Paradise in the next, these were the thoughts in the heads of many. And even to men of other faiths looting becomes an absorbing passion.

To recapitulate, the massacre seems to me to have been remotely caused by the talk of equality, by the extreme orators of both religions, and by the feeble Government, and to have been more nearly caused by the killing of two Turks by an Armenian, by the victory of the league of Mohammed at Constantinople, by the inaction of the ferik with the distribution of arms to so-called redifs, and by the idea that it was lawful to kill and plunder. I cannot find that there was any insurrection on the part of the Armenians, and consider that the Government could both have foreseen and prevented the outbreak. This, however, is not to say that the Government, except by feebleness and incapacity, aided and abetted.

The First Massacre.

The tension between the races became severe in the month of April. The population had been disturbed by the intrigues of Ihsan Fikri Bey, editor of the "Ittidal" who incited a crowd against a certain Guel Guelizade, his rival for the position of director of the school of arts and crafts. The factions nearly came to blows and the Government fell into still greater contempt.

Then came the killing of two Turks by an Armenian. It was said that they had threatened him and he shot them both with a revolver. The murderer was never caught. It seems that he was demanded from the Armenian community. I have never found the reason why the police should not have followed the regular course and have arrested him themselves. The Armenian community either could or would not give him up, and feeling ran very high. The funeral of the murdered men was made the scene of a great demonstration. Mr. Chambers, as head of the American Mission, went to the vali on Monday night, the 12th April, the day of the funeral, to point out to him the unrest in the quarter in which these men had lived. The vali gave him all possible assurances, and declared that nothing could possibly happen.

The conduct of the chief of police during these last few days is of interest. He was a Turk of the best family in Adana (they were of old the beys of the place) named Khudri Bey, and a good man. This Khudri Bey had for long been asking for more help from the Government and been bewailing the lack of official support. He now tried to warn the Armenians through the Union and Progress Club of which many of them were members. On Saturday he visited a notable Armenian, Zachariah Bizdikian, who was afterwards a refugee in my house. Khudri Bey talked of impending danger, but he did not say anything definite. Bizdikian thought that nothing would happen. On Tuesday Khudri Bey tried again. He sent for Zachariah Bizdikian to come to his house. Bizdikian went at the wrong hour and found the house full of Turkish notables. Khudri Bey, however, took him on one side and again warned him of danger. Bizdikian again thought that there was nothing particular in it.

Some information which a Greek telegraphist gave me later throws light on this conduct of Khudri Bey. The Greek who was either crazed with terror or pretended to be crazed, came to me one day to ask for asylum. He said that he would be hanged. On the Saturday before the massacre he had gone to Khudri Bey and asked for police protection. On being asked the reason of this, he had said that he knew of 700 fedais among the Armenians who were going to burn the town and the konak. This wretch who was employed in the konak declared on Wednesday morning that he had seen fedais in the konak, thereby causing the deaths of several perfectly innocent people who were then in it. Khudri Bey on getting this news on the Saturday seems to have disbelieved it. He knew that the man was a spy. But the chief of police would, of course, have been able to estimate the danger of such stories, and after refusing the protection asked for and laughing at the Greek, he went to warn Bizdikian. The Greek was probably bribed to tell his story, and Khudri Bey would think of the men behind him.

On Tuesday night it would be likely that some news of the counter revolution in Constantinople should have reached the vali.

According to an account by Abdurrahman, the son of Abdul Khadir Effendi Baghdadi, the vali sent for his father before the morning prayer on Wednesday while it was still dark. The son went with his father and says that the vali asked Baghdadi's advice. In the night he (the vali) had heard that the Turks were planning a massacre. Baghdadi asked how the vali knew this thing, and was answered that the konak had been besieged by a crowd in the night, entreating the vali to give the order to kill. The vali had refused, but was afraid that they might still kill in spite of him. Baghdadi advised that at morning prayer they send to every mosque men to forbid the massacre. This was done, but the men returned saying that by some chance on that morning there were but very few worshippers, and that so the prohibition would scarcely reach everybody's ears. Baghdadi then advised that there was nothing to do but wait and say no word of massacre lest the word should bring the thing. Thus his son.

That the vali was visited by several persons on that night is, I believe, true. I do not know at what time the news from Constantinople came, nor who got the telegrams.

Tuesday is market day in Adana, and many villagers would have heard of trouble coming, of fedais, of dynamite, and of armed revolution in which the Moslems were to be killed. Possibly they were told something of the fight for the Sheriat in Constantinople and to be ready to defend the faith. Near the konak on that night a crowd on

their way to see, or coming back from seeing, the vali, killed an Armenian whom they met by chance.

On Wednesday morning, the 14th, the Christian shops opened as usual, but were quickly closed again in the face of a great and growing crowd armed with clubs and hatchets. The heads of communities and Mr. Chambers, and I believe some of the foreign dragomen went to the konak to beg the vali for protection. Some of the Moslem notables were there also, among them Baghdadi and his son. The vali gave the Christians all assurance of safety. There was, he said, no thought of massacre or any danger at all. Everybody was to open their shops; the Armenian bishop and the notables should go through the bazaar; the soldiers were ready and the crowd should be dispersed.

I do not think the vali was wrong to hide the knowledge of danger which he must have had at that time. If he had sent troops under a good officer into the bazaar at that time with orders to clear out everyone who was armed and to strike at the first sign of disorder, he might have saved his town easily enough. A braver man might have gone round the town himself.

Mr. Chambers left the konak and went with his nephew, Mr. Lawson Chambers, into the bazaar. They found there an ugly menacing crowd. Two wounded Armenians were taken past as prisoners towards the konak. They did what they could to induce the shopkeepers to open, relying on the vali's promise, but the crowd was too threatening, and they went to their house in the Armenian quarter. Lawson Chambers, with Mr. Gibbons, an American missionary, who had come to Adana like several others for the annual missionary meeting, went to the station to meet a friend, who happily did not come. On the way they were stopped by a crowd who were going to search them for arms. Finding that they were foreigners the crowd let them go, saying that there was nothing against foreigners, but that every Armenian should be killed. On reporting this to Mr. Chambers he sent them into the bazaar again to see what was going on. They saw the beginning of the outbreak and the firing of the first shots. At that time the ferik was coming into the bazaar with troops, but at the noise of shooting he turned about and went back to the konak, troops and all. The first shots seem to have been fired by some young Armenians into the air as a sort of warning or signal. They formed themselves into a band to cover the general retreat into the Armenian quarter. There measures of defence were at once taken. Certain houses were occupied, some of which were not Armenian at all. The inhabitants were told to leave. This shows, I think, that some plan of defence had been decided upon, and it was very well that it was so.

About this time Mr. C. Trypani, British dragoman, who was flying with his wife for refuge to his brother's house near the station, was nearly killed by the mob. They rushed at his carriage, and a man with a reaping hook caught his sleeve to pull him out. But the coachman, a Turk, whipped up his horses, and luckily the sleeve tore.

The Trypanis had sent me a letter by the morning train telling me of unrest in Adana, but they said nothing of the events of the night before, and indeed at that time did not know of them. I decided at once to go to Adana where, though I had no idea of a wholesale massacre, I had for some time been expecting troubles. I went to see the French consul to tell him what I was going to do, and to ask him for news. He had none.

The ferik had called up the reserves, and it is interesting to find in the report by the court-martial that they attribute the massacre in great measure to this. The reservists, loose in the town without uniform and without officers or discipline, made every ruffian believe that the Government had ordered a massacre, and that the time to kill and plunder had arrived. The ferik's or the vali's telegrams to the villages and outlying districts to call up the redifs, were the signal in every case for the most horrible outbreaks. The last restraint was gone, except in the few places where the local officials had the character and the courage to face and resist the mob.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY WYLIE.

[30759] No. 49.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 16.)

(No. 646.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 8, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your information, copies of despatches which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah reporting

on the difficulties raised by the vali with regard to the registration of a certain property at Fedaghia in the name of the Sheikh of Koweit. The objections raised by the vali were, as you are aware, on the ground that Sheikh Mubarek must first take out an Ottoman teskereh as a Turkish subject. Influence is, however, being brought to bear on the Council of Ministers to have these objections removed, and the vali himself has promised Mr. Crow to do what he can in the matter.

The question is, I may add, a different one from that of the Fao lands near the fort of Koweit, which was settled satisfactorily a few months ago, as reported in my despatch No. 396 of the 28th May last.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 49.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Bussorah, February* 12, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegrams No. 67 of the 29th December, No. 2 of the 8th January, and No. 3 of the 9th January last, I have the honour to report that I proceeded to Koweit on the 29th ultimo by sea, my departure having been delayed two days in consequence of the weather, and returned overland on the 11th instant. Major Knox was good enough to place his steam launch at my disposal, and Sheikh Mubarek provided me with camels for the return journey.

As already reported by telegraph, my journey was in connection with the difficulties raised by the vali in regard to the transfer of the property of Fedaghia, situated in the kaza of Fao, and consisting of 430 jereebs (about 115 acres) of land lately purchased by Sheikh Mubarek of Koweit from Ahmed Pasha-es-Zoheir for £T. 48,706. The vali would not allow the transfer to be made unless he, the sheikh, registered himself as an Ottoman subject. What the vali actually said when remonstrated with was that the person who wanted the transfer must produce papers of nationality, and, if an Arab, he must produce papers of Turkish nationality. In accordance with your Excellency's instructions, I suggested to the vali that "nationality— Koweit" on the transfer might be accepted in place of "Ottoman subject," but his Excellency refused to entertain the suggestion, and insisted on the sheikh describing himself as a Turkish subject in the transfer papers, and on his taking out a nufuss teskereh as well.

At the desire of the sheikh two preliminary agreements respecting the sale of the Fedaghia land were drawn up, one copy of which, signed by Abdul Wahab Kirtas, as representative of the sellers, Zoheir Pasha and his wife, was executed in my presence at Bussorah and witnessed by a number of the Bussorah notables; the other copy in blank being handed to me to deliver to Sheikh Mubarek at Koweit for his signature and legalisation by His Majesty's political agent at Koweit. These documents, duly executed, record the fact of the sale having taken place and the receipt of the money, and are good and binding as between the parties themselves. They would form a basis for arbitration should occasion arise, but they would have no validity in the courts of the Sheriat, nor would they, it appears, operate as a legal transfer of the land or take the place of the usual proceedings at the Tapoo Office, which are left over for completion until the vali's opposition in the matter can be overcome.

I took the duplicate agreement to Koweit with me for signature as described, and availed myself of the opportunity to discuss the whole question with Major Knox and the sheikh himself. It would appear that the vali's opposition is premeditated, and goes to the root of the whole matter. His Excellency has, according to Sheikh Mubarek, again raised the question of Koweitis who reside and trade at Bussorah taking out certificates of Turkish nationality before their claims or complaints are entertained by the vali or the courts. In July 1907 Sheikh Mubarek appears to have reported to His Majesty's political agent that the then Vali of Bussorah, Hassan Bey, had notified certain Koweit merchants trading at Bussorah to register themselves as Ottoman subjects under penalty of expulsion if they refused. The merchant interested, however, left Bussorah of his own accord, and the matter dropped. Sheikh Mubarek also complained of the treatment accorded to Hammad-el-Khalid, a rich pearl merchant of Koweit, who sought to recover £T. 1,000 at Bussorah. The vali, according to the sheikh, insisted on the man registering himself as an Ottoman subject before entertaining the claim, and it seems that he acceded to this demand in order to recover his debt. Major Knox is of opinion that Khalid was probably instructed by the sheikh to

take out the nufuss teskereh with a view to bringing about our interference, and so obtain the issue of instructions to the vali which would assist the Tapoo operations in connection with the transfer of the Fedaghia property, in which the sheikh himself is deeply interested. The vali also wrote to Sheikh Mubarek, so the latter informed us, inviting him to send a deputy to the Turkish Parliament, but the sheikh had not yet answered the letter.

The vali is undoubtedly doing his best to disturb the *status quo* previously arranged between His Majesty's Government and the Sublime Porte in regard to the Koweit question, and it is unlikely he will be induced to modify his attitude by any arguments of mine without special instructions from Constantinople. Moreover, in view of your Excellency's telegram of the 2nd January, in which you say it would be inexpedient to raise the Koweit question at present, I hesitate to approach the vali directly on the subject without your Excellency's instructions, as in view of his general attitude and his recent action in regard to Tapoo proceedings it would be difficult to do so without going into the whole question.

It would perhaps tide over the difficulty if the vali could be instructed to grant facilities to the sheikh for the transfer of his property in the present instance, failing which it seems not improbable that the sheikh may cause the land to be registered in the names of his sons, and direct them to take out certificates of Turkish nationality for the purpose. In the course of a conversation which Major Knox and I had with the sheikh, I gathered that the latter entertained no great objection himself to such a proceeding, but I presume it would be against our interests to permit him to do so in view of the complications it might lead to after his death. It would certainly strengthen the contention of the Turks that Koweit belongs to them.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 49.

Consul Crow to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Bussorah, July 12, 1909.*

IN conversation yesterday with the vali I referred to the registration of the Sheikh of Koweit's land at Fedaghia purchased from Ahmed Pasha-es-Zoheir, to which the late vali, Moharrem Effendi, had raised objections on the ground that Sheikh Mubarek must take out an Ottoman teskereh as a Turkish subject first, and I pointed out that the sheikh was already the holder of large estates in the vilayet, which had been registered previously in his name without this difficulty. I said the teskereh precaution seemed to be superfluous and meaningless, as according to the convention of 1867 foreigners could acquire land in Turkey, and that the arrangement entailed their assimilation to Ottoman subjects. His Excellency agreed, and said that Moharrem Effendi had blundered, but that the real difficulty arose from the matter having been misunderstood at the Sublime Porte, which imagined that the transfer referred to large tracts of Government land at Ghermet Ali claimed by Ahmed Pasha-es-Zoheir, and regarding which litigation was proceeding between the latter and the Ottoman Government. The vali said he was in communication with Constantinople on the subject, and hoped to settle the question shortly. He added, however, that Sheikh Mubarek desired the land registered in the name of one of his sons, and had offered no objection to his taking out an Ottoman teskereh for the purpose, though he seemed to shrink from letting him appear personally at Bussorah to complete the formality.

I said I hoped his Excellency would endeavour to smooth over the difficulty, and let the sheikh register his land at Fedaghia in the same way as his other properties, and the vali promised me to do what he could in the matter.

This is the first I have heard of the Fedaghia property being mistaken for that at Ghermet Ali. They have of course nothing to do with one another, and are situated in totally different parts of the district. I am informed privately that Ahmed Pasha-es-Zoheir and his family have been in possession of property at Ghermet Ali for many years, and hold the title-deeds of the land. There is great enmity between his family and that of the nakib, with whom the vali is at present very friendly, and the claim now put forward to this property by the Government seems to be the result of an intrigue on the part of Seyyid Talib, the nakib's son. It is possible the vali may have wished to mislead me, for it is quite certain that the Porte laid great stress on Mubarek-

es-Sabah taking out a teskereh of Ottoman nationality, and gave orders to hold over the registration of the transfer of Fedaghia until the formality was completed.

I am also informed that Ahmed Pasha-es-Zoheir has been endeavouring to settle the matter through the Council of State at Constantinople, and that he telegraphed recently that instructions were being sent to the vali to permit the registration of the transfer. The vali made no allusion to this in his conversation with me yesterday.

I have, &c.
F. E. CROW.

[30762] No. 50.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 649.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 9, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the local European press giving the substance of a circular recently addressed by the Sheikh-ul-Islam to the naibs, ulema, muftis, and sheikhs of the Empire, in which they are recommended to use their influence to bring together the various elements of the Ottomans. The Sheikh-ul-Islam attributes racial animosities and consequent foreign interventions to the decadence of the Empire, to past tyranny, and violation of justice. Obedience to law alone offers the requisite peace and tranquillity. He even claims that the principle of equality of Ottomans is founded on the sacred law, which can but appear a somewhat startling new departure for the zealous Moslems of Anatolia.

The people are exhorted in the name of religion to maintain good relations with their non-Moslem compatriots.

During Ramazan, the sacred month of fasting, when Moslem fanaticism is revived each year, the ulema of the provinces are instructed to preach social equality and obedience to civil law in accordance with this circular.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Newspaper Extract.

DÉCLARATIONS DU CHEIKH-UL-ISLAM.

LE Cheikh-ul-Islam a adressé à tous les naïbs, ulémas, muftis, et cheikhs de l'Empire une déclaration dans laquelle il les invite à travailler auprès des populations pour la fraternisation des divers éléments ottomans.

La violation de la justice, dit-il, et la domination de la tyrannie ont détourné le peuple de l'État et suscité des haines parmi les divers éléments de l'Empire; ainsi ont eu lieu des interventions étrangères et l'ottomanisme marchait à grands pas vers la catastrophe.

Heureusement, le Tout-Puissant a fait naître à ce moment grave des sauveurs. Après avoir enregistré les événements du mois d'avril et le triomphe de l'armée libératrice, le Cheikh-ul-Islam adresse au peuple musulman les recommandations suivantes :—

"C'est de l'obéissance aux lois que dépendent la paix et la tranquillité du peuple. Si ces lois-là n'assuraient pas l'égalité absolue des droits et des devoirs entre les sujets, il serait impossible de parvenir à la paix et à la tranquillité, but qu'il est nécessaire d'atteindre.

"Quant aux lois judiciaires et administratives de l'Empire ottoman, se basant parmi la loi sacrée, l'égalité nécessaire sur les sujets est assurée. La différence de la religion n'empêche pas l'égalité. Le devoir, d'après la loi sacrée, impose un droit analogue. Imposer un devoir et violer un droit, c'est tyranniser. C'est au Gouvernement à respecter l'égalité et la justice dans la répartition des devoirs et des droits.

"Le peuple, de son côté, est engagé par la religion à être en bonnes relations avec ses compatriotes non-musulmans et à respecter leurs droits.

"C'est sur la base de cette circulaire que les ulémas des provinces prêcheront pendant le mois de Ramazan."

[30766] No. 51.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)

(No. 653.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 11, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 622 of the 4th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, the two last despatches that I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana concerning the situation there. You will perceive that though the members of the court-martial have been induced to withdraw their resignations yet dissension exists among them, and that Major Doughty-Wylie does not share the opinion that the ex-vali and the ex-Commandant will be subjected to any very severe punishment.

In reference to the last paragraph of my above-mentioned despatch concerning the demands of the Armenian Patriarch that the allegation throwing the blame for the massacres on to the Armenians should be disavowed officially, I have the honour to report that the Grand Vizier instructed the Ministers of Justice, Finance, Public Instruction, and Public Works to draw up a circular to be addressed to the provinces, so worded as to give satisfaction to His Beatitude. I enclose herewith the text of this circular, and it remains to be seen whether it is sufficiently explicit for the Armenian community, which had gone so far as to demand that the Government should admit officially the innocence of the six Armenians hanged at Adana, who were supposed to have been executed so that the Government should not be accused of only hanging Moslems. Whatever the merits of the case may be the insistence of the Patriarch seems somewhat to overstep the limits of prudence or expediency.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, July 28, 1909.*

IN continuation of my despatch of the 19th July I have the honour to report that an ugly rumour was passed round, prior to the fête of the constitution, to the effect that if there was no amnesty the Turks would kill as many Christians as they could to emphasise their disagreement with the views of Babikian. This story sufficed to send half Adana in terror to Mersina. The fête passed perfectly quietly. Much money was expended on decorations and lamps, which few of the population had the courage to go and see.

Being unable to walk I sent Mr. Chafy to the Government to congratulate the officials in the usual way.

I have since received a visit from the new President of the court-martial, Ismail Fazil Pasha, wrongly described as Fauzi Pasha in my last despatch, and also from Emin Pasha the new Gérant for the Ferik. Ismail Pasha makes a good impression, and seems determined to do justice. The resignation of Kenan Pasha, Zia Bey, &c., has not been accepted. They are to continue to work it appears. Ismail Pasha is to be President of another court-martial.

It is satisfactory that there should be no outward split among the army officers. But as I know that there is a private one, I hope the court-martial may arrive speedily at their decisions and have them executed before the difficulty becomes public property.

Ihsan Fikri Bey of the notorious "Ittieal" published from his prison an extraordinary attack on Hilmi Pasha and Babikian, declaring that Hilmi Pasha was a traitor and that he, Ihsan, relied only for protection on the glorious army, &c.

There is a rumour that Ihsan Fikri will receive perpetual imprisonment as his reward, so there will be one firebrand the less.

The province remains quiet. The Turks are afraid of some imminent punishment. It is the moment to strike, and without striking there will be no long tranquillity or prosperity in the province.

Our relief commission has began the work of repairing houses. The other commission is confronted with a gift of 100,000*l.* and the loan of another 100,000*l.* As a commission they do not really exist. They sit with open doors and various notables, not members of the commission, appear and give their views on the subjects under

discussion. As a result the Christians say nothing, and everybody will soon begin to line their own pockets.

I have telegraphed to Mr. Peet on the International Commission at Constantinople to try to bring influence to bear to procure the immediate appointment of the Director of the Ottoman Bank to this commission. He is already a member of our commission and would make a most useful addition to their counsels on the right spending of the 100,000*l.* He is personally popular, and his appointment would be well received.

I have, &c.

C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, August 4, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to report that three Moslems were hanged yesterday morning. One was an Arab zaptieh guilty of murder, rape, and robbery in this quarter of the town, whom I have had the pleasure of denouncing with the evidence of some of the wounded in my wife's hospital. The other two were Turks, one from Nimroon, found guilty of murder, and the third the son of the Mukhtar of Ayas, who headed a band of murderers to break into the municipality of that town and kill seventeen unarmed Armenians who had taken refuge there.

Djevad Bey the late Vali arrived on the 2nd and was being tried yesterday and to-day. Nothing more than incapacity will be proved against him, but the most interesting point in his trial might be his evidence for or against certain Turkish notables such as Baghdadi. Djevad Bey must know what they said and did in the days and hours before the massacre. I look upon him as the last hope of proving anything against Baghdadi, as no one will come forward to accuse him. Kenan Pasha sentenced him to exile without trial, and if this sentence had been allowed to remain it would have been best in the end. It remains to be seen whether Babikian Effendi has any documentary evidence against him.

In this connection I have the honour to enclose a printed statement by a Dr. Martin, an American missionary of Antioch, which came into my hands only yesterday. The point of interest lies in the opening sentences, in which Dr. Martin states that an emissary of the Jemmayyet Mohammedieh did arrive in Antioch on the 15th April, the day of the Adana massacre. It is just such a man as I have always expected to hear of in Adana, but up to the present there has been no evidence of any emissary here.

Of course Dr. Martin's statement might be found to be only an Armenian rumour. I notice he gives no names. Perhaps the British vice-consul referred to knows something about this supposed emissary.

I visited Ismail, Kenan, and Emin Pashas, and Mehemet Ali Bey on the 1st August. Ismail Pasha told me he thought that the courts-martial would last for two months. They all deplored the lack of evidence. The trial of my refugees is still delayed by the lack of one witness.

Mehemet Ali Bey told me that the cavalry sent after the Saigetchid murderers came up with them near Nigde and had a fight with them, in which two or three men were wounded. The remainder, he said, were captured and are being brought in. If this is correct the effect of a long hunt such as this by the cavalry will have a very good effect on all the Yuruks and Aiblitis.

I hear from Mr. Fowle, now at Hajin, that the people there complain bitterly of injustice, and that they are sending the most unwise telegrams. In this I am afraid they are backed up by the delegates from the Patriarchate and by the priests. If the Government at Constantinople should change, the Armenian position in such places might easily become worse.

Zia Bey came to pay me his farewell visit yesterday as he leaves on the 6th August. Though I like Zia Bey I am glad he is going as he cannot get on with Ismail Pasha. He returns to the command of his brigade at Kirk Kilisse. He is not, it seems, to be replaced on Kenan Pasha's court-martial, there being sufficient members without him.

I received with pleasure your Excellency's telegram announcing the appointment of a new acting vali, whose name was not decipherable in the telegram.

I have, &c.

C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

[31395] No. 52.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(*Received August* 20.)

Sir, *India Office, August* 19, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 6th ultimo, enclosing copy of despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, regarding the difficulty that has arisen at Muscat in consequence of the desire of the American Mission there to open a dispensary at Muttra, in spite of the prohibition of the Sultan, I am directed to enclose copy of a telegram from the Viceroy asking what assurances should be given to the Sultan in view of the fact that a new American consul is being sent to Muscat to settle the question.

Viscount Morley would propose, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that a telegram should be sent to Mr. Bryce explaining the present phase of the question, and asking him to secure, with as little delay as may be practicable, the views of the American Government.

The draft of a telegram which, subject to any observations Sir E. Grey may have to offer, Lord Morley proposes to address to the Viceroy is enclosed.*

I am, &c.
A. GODLEY.

Inclosure in No. 52.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August* 17, 1909.

MUTTRA. American missionaries' hospital. My telegram of the 21st May last.

We understand that Mr. [? Hay], an American, has been appointed consul, and is being sent to Muscat for purpose of settling question connected with the hospital. Recommendation has been received from resident in Persian Gulf that Sultan should be informed, with as little delay as possible, whether he will receive the support of His Majesty's Government in the attitude he has taken up. May such an assurance be given to His Highness?

[31395] No. 53.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Bryce.

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 20, 1909.

THE India Office have communicated the following telegram, dated the 17th August, from the Viceroy:—

"Muttra. American missionaries' hospital. My telegram of the 21st May last.

"We understand that Mr. (? Hay), an American, has been appointed consul, and is being sent to Muscat for purpose of settling question connected with the hospital. Recommendation has been received from Resident in Persian Gulf that Sultan should be informed, with as little delay as possible, whether he will receive the support of His Majesty's Government in the attitude he has taken up.

"May such an assurance be given to His Highness?"

(For reference, see my despatch No. 176 of the 6th July.)

You should request the United States Government to let us know their views with as little delay as possible, as we must know their opinion before answering the above.

[31619] No. 54.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 600.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 13, 1909.

I HAVE the honour, in reference to my despatch No. 375 of the 25th May last to you, to transmit herewith further contributions to the correspondence on the subject of

* Not printed.

the Bagdad Railway, which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad.

I shall refrain from forwarding any comments on these despatches until I have had an opportunity for discussing them with the commercial attaché to this embassy, who should return to Constantinople shortly.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 735/79.)
Sir, *Bagdad, July* 9, 1909.

I FORWARDED to your Excellency, as enclosure No. 3 to my despatch No. 251/25, dated the 10th March, 1909, a memorandum drawn up by Sir William Willcocks on the advantages of establishing direct railway communication between Bagdad and Alexandretta viâ Aleppo. I have now the honour to enclose a further memorandum by Sir William dealing with the same subject, with the practicability of railway communication between Bussorah and Bagdad, and also with the terms on which money might be raised for a railway and for the Kut Barrage.

I understand that Sir Ernest Cassel is at the present time the financier who is most likely to take a leading part in any negotiations for rendering pecuniary assistance to Turkey, that Sir William has worked with him for many years in Egypt, and that consequently Sir William's opinion on the question of security for a loan or for money spent are likely to carry great weight. I think it is fortunate that he has suggested a method by which the capitalists and the Turkish Government will be partners; for such proposals, if accepted, will convince the Government that, in the best expert opinion, the schemes proposed are sound. If objection is taken to placing so much land as Sir William proposes in the hands of foreign capitalists, it could no doubt be arranged that the land should be sold in small lots within a given period, say, fifty years.

Regarding the Aleppo–Alexandretta section of the railway, there is one point to which I have not seen any allusion. The Germans, under the terms of their concession, have a right to take their line to Aleppo, and they have certain qualified rights to the construction of any line joining their railway to the sea. As far as I can understand they would have no concessional right if it was decided to join Alexandretta to the Aleppo–Beyrouth Railway, say, to take an extreme case, half a mile south of Aleppo, for in that case the line to Alexandretta would not be joining the German Railway to the sea.

I have, &c.
J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

Further Memorandum by Sir W. Willcocks on Possible Railway Communications in Mesopotamia.

I WRITE this in continuation of my memorandum on the true development of Mesopotamia depending on a line of railway from Bagdad to Alexandretta, viâ Aleppo. Every day I live in the country the more am I impressed with the truth of the statement.

After careful examination of the question of railway communication between Bagdad and Bussorah, I have come to the conclusion that there are only two alignments possible. The first, viâ Museyib, Karbala, Nedjef, Ur, and Zobeir, to Bussorah, which is practically the line of the proposed German Bagdad Railway; the other viâ Kut, the Hai branch to Nasria, Ur, and Zobeir to Bussorah. Swamps, deserts, marshes, and inundations, would interfere with any other alignment; but the above two could be constructed fairly cheaply and maintained at reasonable cost. The first might be constructed to-day, but would be a very unremunerative line, except in the reach from Bagdad to Nedjef. The line viâ Kut and the Hai would be of no value until the

irrigation of the country was undertaken, which would immediately follow the construction of the Kut Barrage. Both lines of railways would have to compete heavily with river transport in an exceedingly flat country (Bagdad is only 115 feet above sea level), where navigation would become very cheap the moment regular freights offered and competition supervened. In this connection it might be useful to note the question of liquid fuel and the development of the oil fields on the Karun River. The present cost of transport by water is no gauge of what may be expected under altered conditions; for boats which lie idle for months at a time, and then have sudden demands made on them, exist on extraordinarily high rates.

With the best information at my disposal I estimate as follows: By river from Bagdad to Kut is 220 miles, from Kut to Bussorah, viâ Amarah, along the present course of the Tigris is 255 miles, or 505 miles in all. Taking the river route along the Hai from Bagdad to Kut is 220 miles, from Kut to Bussorah along the Hai and the new channel which the Euphrates is cutting out for itself is 225 miles, or 445 miles in all

A line of railway from Bagdad to Kut, along the right bank of the Tigris, would be 110 miles, Kut to Nasria 110 miles, Nasria (Ur) to Bussorah viâ Zobeir 90 miles, or 310 miles in all. As the railway must of necessity run parallel to and near a navigable river in this flat delta of the Euphrates, where the fall from Bagdad to Bussorah in 500 miles is only 110 feet, the competition would be exceedingly severe.

The Tigris between Kut and Bussorah, as it exists to-day, is a very poor river for navigation. Leaving Kut with a width of about 1,000 feet and depth of 25 feet, before reaching Amarah it loses five-sixths of its water in flood times, owing to overflows and deep offcasts, of which the Batera on the right and Chala on the left are the principal; below Amarah the width is about 500 feet, but the river is comparatively shallow. Between Amarah and Kila Saleh it loses nearly the whole of its water through numerous branches and overflows, of which the principal are the Majer Kebir on the right and the Atalanta on the left, while its channel dwindles down to a width of about 200 feet, and its depth in flood to 10 feet, and about 6 feet at low water. Down stream of Kilah Saleh, fed by numerous intakes from the marshes, it gradually increases to a width of 500 feet with a depth of 15 feet.

To build works at the heads of the branches or offtakes of the river, which between them takes about 175,000 cubic feet a second (or very nearly the whole discharge of the river at Bagdad), would cost at least 250,000*l.*, and there would always be the danger that, no sooner had one branch been controlled, the river might cut a channel for itself at some neighbouring place. For it must be remembered that in the neighbourhood of Amara the Tigris is only some 800 years old, and is practically a deltaic embankment through continuous marshes with its water surface some 6 feet above that of the marshes on either side, while there is the ever present danger of the river leaving its channel altogether and flowing bodily into the marshes.

The true channel for navigation lies down the Hai branch, which was the main Tigris for thousands of years, and which could again be made the main channel by the construction of the Kut Barrage, which would insure sufficient water both for navigation and for the irrigation of some 2,000,000 acres of the rich highlying lands of Lower Mesopotamia.

For the development of the country on natural lines, and the execution of works which would be profitable alike to the concessionaire and the country (for there can be no really true difference between them in honest undertakings) the true solution lies in the construction of a railway from Alexandretta on the Mediterranean, viâ Aleppo to Bagdad, with the establishment of river transport between Bagdad and Bussorah along the Hai branch.

The Kut Barrage project which I have proposed will cost 600,000*l.*, and the dredging and encouraging of the Euphrates to establish its channel will probably cost 200,000*l.*, or 800,000*l.* in all. As payment for the execution of such works the concessionnaire might be given all the abandoned and swamped lands between Ur, Zobeir, Bussorah, and Fao, which could be converted at a reasonable cost into a veritable garden. Those lands were known in early Moslem times as one of the four terrestrial paradises.

The railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean, following the shortest route to Europe, which is the natural market for the products of Mesopotamia, and also the source from which its outside wants are supplied, would, I think, be of itself a profitable undertaking. But to make the project complete, I think a concession should be asked for a railway from Alexandretta to Bagdad viâ Aleppo, a steamer service on the Euphrates and Tigris, the construction of the Kut Barrage, with half the double tithe

which the State would take from land irrigated by free flow on the Hai Canal, and all the Government waste lands between Ur, Bussorah, Zobeir, and Fao. The development of these lands will be hurried up by a cut from the Euphrates to the Khor Abdulla, where the mean sea level is two feet lower than it is at Bussorah, and by which a navigable connection will probably be soon established with the Persian Gulf through the Khor (see the 3-fathom line on the map).

I inclose a map.

W. W.

Inclosure 3 in No. 54.

Consul-General Ramsay to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 738/80.)

Bagdad, July 10, 1909.

Sir,

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 375, dated the 25th May, 1909, to the Foreign Office, I have the honour to submit for your Excellency's consideration a memorandum dealing with the question of direct railway communication between Bagdad and the Mediterranean Sea.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 54.

Memorandum by Consul-General Ramsay.

I HAVE received a copy of his Excellency the Ambassador's despatch No. 375, dated the 25th May, 1909.

There are one or two points on which I am afraid that I did not make myself sufficiently clear in my original despatch No. 251-25, dated the 10th March, 1909, and as the matter is a very important one I venture to offer some further explanations and remarks for his Excellency's consideration:

(*a*) I did not mean so much that the Germans would be able to manipulate rates to such an extent as to make the all German route the cheaper, but that they could by charging high rates on the Aleppo–Alexandretta section unreasonably increase the freight, and consequently reduce the price of produce in Mesopotamia, and with it the return on irrigation works. To make the all German route actually the cheaper would probably not suit them, but it would be delightfully simple for them to levy a heavy toll on all goods passing to the sea.

(*b*.) Sir Gerard Lowther has assumed that if the French and German railways come to terms about the Aleppo–Alexandretta Railway the former will certainly stipulate for favourable tariff treatment. If the matter was not of great public importance I should not venture to question the correctness of this assumption; but in the circumstances I humbly suggest that the assumption may not be correct.

Suppose the through rates on the Aleppo–Alexandretta section are lowered, as has been assumed; what is likely to be the effect of this on the French port of Beyrouth, and on the Beyrouth–Ryak section of the railway? I understand that Alexandretta has great natural advantages over Beyrouth, and if the former becomes the terminus of two great trunk lines from Haidar Pasha and Bagdad there is little doubt that the artificial facilities will be superior to those at Beyrouth. Also the larger traffic will attract more tonnage, and it seems to me that the result of cheap rates on the Aleppo–Alexandretta line would be to ruin Beyrouth and the Lebanon section.

It appears much more likely that the German and French, if they come to terms at all, will agree to very high rates on the Aleppo Alexandretta section. By this means less injury would be done to Beyrouth and the Lebanon Railway, while the Germans would console themselves for small losses on this account by cutting into the profits of the Bagdad–Aleppo Railway, and of the irrigation works. I think, therefore, that unless we make an effort to get this line for ourselves, or for the Turks, or for others on conditions as to freights which are reasonable, we stand in danger of letting others reap where we have sown (and watered).

(*c*.) Even in the matter of minimum freights I think that the Germans must have

a good deal up their sleeves. The through rate for grain in bulk is 6 paras a ton a kilometre = 9 prs. 6 p. a mile. The £T. = 4,000 paras for railway purposes, and if it is taken to be worth 18*s.*, $\frac{9{\cdot}6}{4{,}000} \times \frac{18 \times 12}{1} = {\cdot}5184$ pence a mile.

The average Indian rate for all goods carried, small and great, long distances and short, is ·421 pence a mile.

(*d.*) If existing rights on the Alexandretta–Aleppo line hamper us too much, we can turn the flank of both German and French competitors and give most valuable assistance to the Turkish Railway by taking our line from Deir to Damascus, thence to join the line to Haifa. I see that the Damascus Trade Report for 1902 describes Haifa as a partially protected harbour.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Baghdad.*

Baghdad, July 10, 1909.

[31632] No. 55.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 674.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 17, 1909.

IN your despatch No. 471 of the 10th November last, you instructed me to give the representative of Messrs. D'Arcy's syndicate all the assistance in my power in their negotiations to obtain a concession for oil springs in Mesopotamia.

The negotiations have since then been actively pursued despite sundry unfortunate interruptions due to the political crises which have from time to time occurred, and on the 20th June I was able to inform you (in my telegram No. 212) that the Council of Ministers had, according to a statement made to me by the Grand Vizier, practically decided to grant the concession.

But this decision proved not to be final. I informed you on the 13th ultimo that the matter was being reconsidered on the point of reserving certain springs, but on the 1st August, as you will have gathered from my telegram No. 251, matters appeared to be proceeding favourably. Suddenly a quite new series of obstacles has, however, presented itself. The Ministry with which the D'Arcy group has been dealing suddenly informed him, no doubt owing to parliamentary pressure, when their proposals were all but agreed to, that it would be necessary first to publish the offer, giving a delay of three months, in order that it might be ascertained whether there were not others who would tender for the concession on terms more favourable to the Turkish Government. Mr. Nicholl naturally returned an absolute refusal to this proposal, but was obliged to provoke a telegraphic confirmation from the syndicate that they would definitely abandon the scheme rather than have their offer thus, so to say, put up to auction, before he could induce the Turks to believe that he was serious. They next proposed not to publish the D'Arcy offer, but merely to put up the concession to the highest bidder. I gather they have been prompted to do this partly by a not very serious offer made to them by an apparently not very serious Roumanian firm, but more especially by the fear of the responsibility for granting any concession whatever, lest it should be commented on unfavourably and to their disadvantage in the Parliament.

Mr. Nicholl is greatly concerned at the turn things have taken, which shows, he says, a breach of faith on the part of the Grand Vizier, who had made him promises on the subject, but I am inclined to think that Mr. Nicholl was over sanguine, and regarded as a promise what was more in the nature of an engagement.

I think he is more seriously alarmed about a new scheme which has recently been launched upon the sea of concessions. I refer to a proposal which has been made by Mr. Glasgow on behalf of the American Oil Trust to build railways in Anatolia without any guarantee at all, but with the right to exploit mines lying within 20 kilom. on either side of the line, and I have the honour to enclose* a document which has been drawn up by a warm partisan of the scheme setting forth the advantages which may be expected to accrue to the Ottoman Empire from it. It is an ingenious and specious paper, though vitiated by sundry manifest fallacies upon which it is unnecessary for me to dilate, but it is characteristic of Mr. Glasgow's methods, who has adorned his

* Not printed.

projects with much skill. He has informed the Grand Vizier—and his statement has received the confirmation of the United States chargé d'affaires—that he has 20,000,000*l.* ready to invest for the scheme provided it is accepted; otherwise he will employ his 20,000,000*l.* in one of the many other properties in the world which are crying for development, and which very likely will prove more profitable than this. But Mr. Glasgow discloses that he cannot start construction quite at once, but will need some sixteen months to study the trace of the line, which, however, he would be prepared to alter to suit the military necessities of the country. From the Turkish point of view the prospect of giving a line to an American is rendered doubly seductive by the thought that he at least can have no *arrière-pensée* as to territorial aggrandisement or political interest.

I am not disposed, however, to think that the D'Arcy group have any grave reason to fear the competition of the Standard Oil Company's railway. I am assured by their agent that their Persian oil-field can always beat out of the field any competition from the Turkish side on account of its greater remoteness from the sea, and it will in any case require a long time before this line can reach down to the vicinity of Mosul or Kerkuk. Mr. Glasgow's plans are more likely to prove a stumbling block in the way of certain negotiations which I understand are being carried on by an English group under the auspices of a Mr. Beckett for the acquisition of a concession of a railway from Samsoun, in the direction of Sivas. This is a matter to which I have already referred in my despatch No. 553 of the 10th ultimo.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[31634] No. 56.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 676.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 17, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 653 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the scandalous administration of the money voted by the Ottoman Chamber for relief of sufferers at Adana and on the work of the court-martial there.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 56.

Vice-Consul Doughty Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, August* 11, 1909.

I HAD the honour to telegraph yesterday that, with your Excellency's approval, I proposed to leave Adana on the 13th or 14th August, leaving Mr. Chafy in charge. I should then travel slowly over the Bulgurlek pass, which is rarely crossed, as it is closed by snow until the month of June. From Konia I hope to write again on the subject of leave. As my dragoman says he wishes to go from there, it will be difficult to find any one suitable to take his place.

The new vali is expected to-morrow.

There appears to be a gross scandal in the administration of the first 20,000*l.* voted by the Chamber for the relief of the sufferers in Adana. The Ottoman committee, which was established by the deputy Yussouf Kemal Bey, soon became impotent. They never took hold of their money, which the vali kept in the provincial treasury. At a joint meeting to-day I asked to see their accounts. These show an honest expenditure of 12,670*l.* on feeding those in want in Adana, made under their personal supervision on lists furnished by the heads of the churches. They have also shown accounts giving an expenditure in the outlying districts up to some date in July of 4,000*l.* roughly. This money was sent out by the defterdar and received by local officials. They had no control over it. They are now informed that there is more money, thus leaving over 13,000*l.* to be accounted for, presumably by Moustapha Zihni Pasha. There being no money, this committee are ceasing to feed the people. They estimate that in Adana there are in want in round numbers 19,000 people and

elsewhere 17,000. Yussouf Kemal Bey assured me that the severest scrutiny of relief funds would be made. This is the first fruits.

Zia Bey, late of the court-martial, has left Adana. He told me that he hoped to emphasise in Constantinople that though the blame for these massacres was 75 per cent. Turkish, yet 25 per cent. was Armenian.

The last three of my refugees are still in prison, waiting for their accuser to appear. He, Arslanian, cannot be found, in spite of great efforts on the part of their friends and relations. I am told by Armenian lawyers that under the Code Napoléon a deposition before the Mustantik can be employed at a trial, although the man who made it cannot be found. In the meantime, there is just a faint hope that I may secure the release of one of these men before I leave.

The country is now perfectly quiet. The villagers are thoroughly apprehensive. A certain Arab Mahmoud was hanged two days ago. He was condemned for murder before the massacres, escaped, and was retirrested.

I believe there is a little more hope of evidence being in the end forthcoming against Baghdadi. The delegates of the patriarchate are working on the evidence, and from all that I hear Ismail Fazil Pasha seems to be bent on justice. The trial of Djevad Bey is not yet finished. The Ferik, who is seen every day in the streets in uniform, talks of retiring to Samsoun. His former services are to count in his favour, and he will not be sentenced to anything more than loss of rank, if that.

Two sentences of fifteen years have been promulgated against Armenians. In neither case is there much probability of guilt. One was the man who was arrested in spite of a personal promise to the contrary on the part of the vali to the captain of the "Lübeck," the German consul, and M. Stoeckel. Every possible effort has been made by the Germans to help this man without success. The other man was sentenced because near his house a Hodja was killed in the fighting. The Armenian, who is an elderly jeweller, is said never to have owned a gun or fired one in his life.

I have, &c.

C. H. M. DOUGHTY WYLIE.

[31035] No. 57.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 677.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 16, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 234, in which you request me to offer my observations upon a claim against the Turkish Government which has been put forward by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (limited) for loss sustained by them in consequence of the recent interruption of traffic on the Tigris caused by the revolt of certain Arab tribes.

This revolt was directed against the Ottoman Government, which, as you will remember, promptly took all the measures in its power to suppress the outbreak, and was successful in a degree and with a rapidity which were distinctly surprising.

It might be argued that the revolt of the tribes was due to the maladministration of the Turkish authorities, but this is a defect which has—in the past at all events, whatever a reformed future may produce—been inherent in the Turkish Government, and it is obviously a factor which the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company must have taken into their calculations when they obtained their concession. The revolt, however, was not called forth by any specific act of the Turkish Government, who did not spare either money or men to check it, nor were its causes within their control. Further, the stoppage of traffic on this occasion was not due to an attack directed against the company or its steamers as was the case in the incident of the "Bloss Lynch" in April of last year, and the arguments put forward by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad in his despatch No. 56 of the 13th June, 1908, which was forwarded to you in Mr. Barclay's No. 204 of the 16th June, apply with still greater urgency under the present circumstances. I would also recall to your mind the observations contained in the 4th paragraph of my despatch No. 515 of the 5th September last. Finally, where there are great profits made, it is necessary to anticipate great risks. The risks are manifest in a country where order is so notoriously precarious as that which the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company have chosen as the field of their activity, and the profits certainly appear to be commensurate.

I must confess myself, therefore, unable to see on what principle either of law or of equity a claim can be justly founded by the company against the Turkish Government.

When the company write that the Hamidieh Administration has made a claim against the Arabs for 15,000*l.* damages on account of the disturbances, it is to be presumed that this association are making a claim against the Arabs through the proper channels of the legal tribunals. There can be no objection, of course, to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company adopting this course if they deem it likely to conduce to their interests. But they should not, I submit, count on the support of His Majesty's Government for their demands.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[31733] No. 58.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(No. 204.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 23, 1909.*

THE acting vice-consul at Hodeidah telegraphs through Dr. Richardson at Jeddah that Hodeidah and Loheya are threatened by a serious Arab rebellion. Loheya is being abandoned by the Turkish authorities, who have no troops to devote to the protection of Hodeidah and foreign subjects. Dr. Richardson thinks it would be well to send a warship to Hodeidah, which might pick him up on the way.

[31739] No. 59.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to transmit herewith, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,* reporting the outbreak of a serious rising in Arabia threatening Hodeida and Loheya. It is also stated that the local authorities are abandoning the latter place, and that there are no troops available for the protection of foreign subjects.

In these circumstances, I am to request that you will suggest to their Lordships that orders should be issued for the immediate dispatch of the most easily available of His Majesty's ships to the scene of the disturbances for the protection of foreign lives and property. Should their Lordships see their way to comply with Sir Edward Grey's request, and should a vessel be sent to Hodeida and Loheya from the north, I am to suggest that she should adopt Mr. Richardson's proposal of visiting Jeddah on the way, in order to embark him if necessary.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[31199] No. 60.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 23, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd instant, relative to the dispute respecting the working of the mines of red oxide on Abu Musa Island, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that the German chargé d'affaires called here on the 13th instant and stated that his Government would be unable to come to a decision on the subject till they had examined the very voluminous correspondence regarding the ownership of the place. In the meantime they took note of the assurances offered by His Majesty's Government as to the maintenance of the *status quo* there.

Herr von Kühlmann added that Messrs. Wönckhaus would continue to ship the

* No. 58.

oxide which had already been extracted from the mines, but would cease mining operations pending a settlement of the question, subject to the reservation of their rights to put forward any claims which might arise in connection with the stoppage of their working of the mines.

On the 14th instant Herr von Kühlmann forwarded to this Office a note, of which a translation is enclosed herewith, résuméing his declarations which he had made the day before.

I am to observe in this connection that, as you were informed in my letter of the 21st June, Herr von Kühlmann promised on the 16th of that month that His Majesty's Government should receive an answer to their note of the 10th July, 1908, in about a fortnight, whereas they now state that before reaching a decision they must examine the whole question of the ownership of Abu Musa. As the German Government have had the opportunity of undertaking this task at any time within the past year, but have apparently not availed themselves of it, Sir E. Grey is disposed, with Viscount Morley's concurrence, to inform them that the assurance given by His Majesty's Government that they would suspend mining operations on Abu Musa pending a settlement of the dispute was offered on the understanding that the German answer was nearly ready, and that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to prolong the present situation indefinitely.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

Inclosure in No. 60.

Note communicated to Foreign Office by Herr von Kühlmann, August 14, 1909.

(Translation.)

GERMANY takes act of England's assurance in the Abu Musa affair that until the question is definitely settled she will take care that the *status quo* is preserved.

The firm of Wönckhaus and those associated with them will, in accordance with the desire of Great Britain, extract no more oxide until the solution of the matter, and will, on the contrary, limit themselves to sending away from Abu Musa the rest of the oxide already extracted. All claims for compensation on account of the suspension of extracting the oxide will, however, remain reserved.

[31916] No. 61.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to India Office letter of the 2nd June, 1909, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 15th July, relative to Turkish encroachments in the vicinity of Rubeaten.

India Office, August 23, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 61.

Government of Bombay to the Government of India.

Sir, *Bombay Castle, July 5, 1909.*

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with Foreign Department endorsement dated the 2nd June, 1909, regarding Turkish encroachments in the vicinity of Rubeaten, I am directed to state, for the information of the Government of India, that the political resident, Aden, now reports that the position has so changed that he does not consider it necessary that any action should for the present be taken in the matter. The Turkish Arabs have left Nawa, which has been occupied by the yafais under Sheikh Ali Mohsin Askar, of Mausatta, and pillaged as a punishment for harbouring the Turkish Arabs.

The political resident is writing to Sheikh Ali Mohsin, advising him not to take any action which is likely to embroil him with the Turks or their tribes.

I have, &c.
J. H. Du BOULAY,
Secretary to Government.

[31910] No. 62.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 24.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to India Office letter of the 25th May, 1909, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 15th July, relative to the loan to the Sheikh of Koweit.

India Office, August 23, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 62.

Major Cox to Government of India.

(Confidential.) *Bushire, June 20, 1909.*

REFERRING to the correspondence ending with your telegram dated the 31st May, 1909, I have the honour to forward copies of papers, in the last of which Sheikh Mubarak expresses his appreciative acknowledgments of the fresh favour vouchsafed to him by the British Government in the shape of a loan of two lakhs of rupees.

The money was duly conveyed across by the Royal Indian mail-steamer "Lawrence" on the 10th instant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 62.

Major Cox to Captain Shakespear.

Bushire, June 1, 1909.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with residency endorsement dated the 4th May, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of India have now telegraphed (dated the 31st May, 1909) that the loan is sanctioned, and I attach a translation of a letter addressed to Sheikh Mubarak to-day, which I enclose for favour of delivery, informing him of the fact and of the conditions of the grant.

Please confer with him as to how he wants the money placed at his disposal and as to dispatch of telegram viâ Fao if necessary, which you had better dispatch for him in English, supposing that he accepts the conditions of the grant. He should do the latter in writing either to you or to me.

Inclosure 3 in No. 62.

Major Cox to Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah.

(After compliments.) *Bushire, June 1, 1909.*

YOUR honoured letter, dated the 5th Jemadi I, regarding the loan which you had asked for, reached me at a propitious time, for on the same day I received the final reply of my Government on the subject.

It is in the sense which we desired, that is to say that, in accordance with your request, the British Government is prepared to accommodate your Excellency with a loan of two lakhs of rupees without interest on two conditions; firstly, that repayment is made in two instalments, one lakh after this date season and the other lakh after the next year's date season; secondly, that until this loan is entirely repaid your Excellency undertakes not to borrow money from other sources.

These conditions are simple, and I know will be accepted by you readily.

Now if you wish for the money in cash it is here in rupees, and should you need it urgently, and will send your launch or ask Captain Shakespear to send his launch to Fao with a telegram to me saying that you accept the conditions and wish the money sent across, then I will send it over in the "Lawrence" at once.

May you be preserved and salaam.

Inclosure 4 in No. 62.

Captain Shakespear to Major Cox.

Koweit, June 7, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 1st June, 1909, with an inclosure for Sheikh Mubarak.

2. The letter was delivered on the 4th June, and the same evening I had an interview with the sheikh, who expressed himself profoundly grateful at the generosity of the British Government in accommodating him.

3. In the course of conversation the sheikh categorically accepted the conditions of the loan, and requested me to telegraph his acceptance, promising to send to me on the following day a document in the form of a letter to you formally accepting the conditions. I wrote out the telegram dispatched to you from Fao, and, having read it over to the sheikh, handed to him the closed envelope for conveyance to Fao.

4. The following morning I received the enclosed letter from the sheikh to your address, a copy of which I have taken the opportunity of retaining for my records. In it the sheikh accepts all the conditions of the loan, and duly expresses his gratitude, promising the first instalment in the beginning of Shawal 1327, A.H., and the second in the end of Shawal 1328, A.H.

Inclosure 5 in No. 62.

Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah to Major Cox.

(Translation.) *Koweit, 10th Jemadi I, 1327*
(After compliments and enquiries after your health.) *(June 5, 1909).*

I HAVE duly received your esteemed favour of the 12th Jemadi I, stating that the high British Government have favoured me, according to my application, with a loan of 2,00,000 rupees. I, your sincere friend, admit and acknowledge the generosity of the Government towards me, and am sensible to their good graces. Inshallah, these graces will endure for me and for those succeeding me, and there will be obedience and sincerity on our part. The terms contained in your esteemed favour have been duly accepted by me, and I will, Inshallah, pay the first of the two lakhs during this date season of 1327, viz., that I will refund 100,000 rupees in the beginning of Shawal 1327, with gratitude. The remaining 100,000 rupees I will pay, Inshallah, during the season after this, namely, of the year 1328, which will be over at the end of Shawal 1328.

As to the last condition that I should borrow no money from any other quarter (I beg to say that) as long as the British Government exists we will, Inshallah, have no necessity to refer to any other besides them.

You have enriched me and honoured me, and I will not agree absolutely to deal with any one besides you. I represented to Captain Shakespear, political agent at Koweit, accordingly, and I sent you a telegram viâ Fao on the night of Saturday, the 16th instant, intimating my acceptance of the conditions contained in your esteemed favour, and asking you to order the remittance of the money by man-of-war "Lawrence" according to your letter.

May you remain preserved and guarded.

[31942] No. 63.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)

(No. 298.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 24, 1909.*

ARAB revolt in Yemen.

I learn from the Grand Vizier that the Turkish Government are dispatching to Loheya and Hodeidah two gun-boats, as well as nine battalions of troops on two transports, to cope with the revolt in the Yemen referred to in my telegram No. 294 of yesterday.

[31942] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 615.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August 24, 1909.*

ORDERS had already been given for the dispatch to Jeddah and to Hodeida of one of His Majesty's ships, in order that the consul and other British subjects might be taken on board, should the necessity arise. The nearest British ships are at Colombo or with the Mediterranean squadron. In view of the dispatch of Turkish troops reported in your telegram No. 298 of to-day's date, you should consult Richardson as to whether there is now any need for taking the above measures.

[32090] No. 65.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)

(No. 151.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Rome, August 25, 1909.*

IT has been decided, in view of the Arab revolt, to send a war-ship to Hod the request of the Italian consul there.

[32105] No. 66.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 26.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 25th August, 1909, relative to disturbances in the vicinity of Hodeida.

India Office, August 25, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 66.

Government of India to Viscount Morley.

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 25, 1909.*

WE have received through the Bombay Government a telegram from the resident at Aden, under date of the 24th August. Following is the purport:—

"A telegram to following effect has been received from the British Consul at Hodeida: 'The Arab rising in this neighbourhood forms a serious menace to Hodeida. No troops are available, and the authorities are unable to afford protection to the town. The presence of a man-of-war is necessary for the protection of British subjects. Authorities are leaving Loheya, menaced by Arabs.' There is no man-of-war at Aden."

The resident's telegram has been repeated to the naval commander-in-chief, with an enquiry as to measures taken.

[32219] No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 627.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1909.

DISTURBANCES at Hodeida and Loheya (see your telegram No. 294 of to-day).

His Majesty's ship "Philomel," *en route* for Aden, will pass Port Saïd on the 3rd September. She might call at Jedda and Hodeida. If she went to Loheya she would have to anchor 5 miles off. Do you consider it necessary, in these circumstances, for her to visit Loheya?

[32337] No. 68.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(No. 300.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August* 27, 1909.

YEMEN revolt.

In reply to your telegram No. 627 of yesterday, I do not consider there is any necessity for His Majesty's ship "Philomel" to visit the port of Loheya.

[32546] No. 69.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 684.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 22, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 676 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting further on the work of the court-martial and feeling among the troops at Adana.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, August* 13, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received your Excellency's telegram granting my leave, and I accordingly am leaving to-morrow for Mersina, and on the 15th for Konia, where I should arrive about the 23rd or 25th August. I should have liked to stay a little longer to see the new vali, but my wife's health renders it desirable to go into the mountains at once.

In paying my farewell calls to-day, I learnt from Ismail Fazil Pasha that the late Vali Djevad Bey had given the court-martial very useful information on the state of Adana before the massacres; that they held him blameless in intention, but would punish him without severity for his incapacity; that he had telegraphed to Constantinople for help and found none: neither there nor from the old and equally incapable ferik, nor from the rest of the feeble functionaries. The trial is not yet over.

The ferik will be placed on the retired list, but I think will not be punished in any other way. He is 75 years of age. The real finding of the courts-martial will be against the system which allows incapable functionaries to govern Turkish provinces.

The Turks are beginning to given evidence against their own chiefs. One man was imprisoned to-day for shouting that the Government was bad; that it ordered massacre, and then imprisoned the faithful who carried out its orders.

One of my refugees is to be released. The other two will get two or three years' imprisonment or perhaps a sentence of exile, depending on to what extent they can demolish the evidence of Arslanian, who it appears has now been found and will be here in a few days.

Underneath the calm which martial law produces, there is still a possibility of trouble. Everything depends on the troops, and they, to some extent at least, are influenced by the hodjas. There are stories which I have not had time to verify of

religious remonstrances with high officers for slackness in observances, and for allowing their children to ape the giaours, and these remonstrances appear to have been meekly received.

Muftizade Ismail, of Baghche, has been sentenced to death. It is said that the soldiers at Erzin refuse to allow him to be executed. This is only a story, which at present is denied by the court-martial officers, but it is a sign of the times.

The arrival of the new vali a week hence is to be welcomed if he is a strong man. But as he will be entirely dependent on the troops, he will not offend them too far. I was rather afraid that Mehemet Ali Bey might prove a little jealous of his junior officer preferred before him, but he has not let it appear.

All the officers of the Arab battalion here before the massacres are to be changed in about ten days. This is a good thing, though there are some good men among them. I had the pleasure of recommending some of them to their general, and they have been promoted.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

[32548] No. 70.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 686.)
Sir, *Therapia, August* 23, 1909.

IN my despatch No. 674 of the 17th instant I had the honour to bring to your notice a scheme for railway construction, without kilometric guarantees, but with the right to exploit mines within 20 kilom. of either side of the line, which was being put forward by a Mr. Glasgow, acting on behalf of the Standard Oil Trust. The project was discussed at the sitting of Parliament on Friday last. The commission which had been appointed to report upon it reported favourably, but drew attention to another scheme on similar lines but more favourable to Government—a percentage of profits and a tax on minerals exported to be paid to the Government, &c.

After a little preliminary discussion the Minister of Public Works addressed the House, saying that similar concessions were granted in America, that the construction of railways was of urgent necessity, that the Government was not in a position to afford further kilometric guarantees, and that the sum necessary for building the line (which is to reach from Samsoun viâ Sivas and Kharput to Van) would be about £T. 20,000,000, the expenditure of which in the country would be of the greatest advantage. It would, he said, be desirable that the gauge should be greater—1·45 metres, as in the other Anatolian lines—but the cost would then amount to between £T. 30,000,000 and £T. 40,000,000. He begged the House to authorise him to negotiate with foreign capitalists on the lines proposed by Mr. Glasgow, and to decide as to the necessary measure of the gauge.

On resuming his seat he was subject to a violent attack by Jahid Bey, and a considerable digression, ending in the suspension of the sitting, followed.

On resuming the discussion later the report of the committee was adopted by a large majority, the result being that the Minister of Public Works is authorised to enter into negotiations with capitalists on the basis proposed.

The Grand Vizier told me to-day that if this scheme was realised the *tracé* would be laid down by Turkish military engineers, but if it did not suit Mr. Glasgow's syndicate to accept that *tracé* they would be at liberty to withdraw. His Highness also told me he had caused a copy of the scheme to be given to Mr. Nichol, representing Mr. D'Arcy, in the event of his wishing to present a counter-proposal more favourable to the Ottoman Government.

His Highness also said that another American syndicate had proposed to build 5,000 kilom. in Asia Minor. He was enquiring as to the stability of this syndicate.

The House next proceeded to consider a Bill for a railway from Hodeida to Sanaa in the Yemen, and after a discussion upon the merits of offering at auction great enterprises such as this railway, in which Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian gave way and accepted the auction system, the Bill was passed, subject to the consent of the Senate.

The Bill, the text of which, as published in the press, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, provides for the construction of a line from Hodeida to Sanaa and on to Amran, of a branch line from Hodeida to Jebana Bay, and of a port Jebana, the said enterprise to be carried out on the lines laid down in the preliminary

convention drawn up between the Minister of Public Works and David Elie Leon Bey, of Paris.

For information on this scheme I have the honour to refer you to the two despatches addressed by His Majesty's consulate-general at Constantinople to your office on the 9th June and 14th last.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 70.

Extract from the "Turquie" of August 21, 1909.

VOICI le texte du projet de loi que la Chambre a accepté, et qui, si le Sénat l'approuve, sera mis en vigueur :—

"Article 1er. Il est décidé de constituer une ligne principale, à écartement de 105 centim. de Hodeïda à Sanaa, avec une embranchement du golfe de Djébana à Hodeïda et un autre se dirigeant de Sanaa à Emran, et de créer à Djébana tous les bâtiments nécessaires pour l'accostage des bateaux, pour le débarquement et l'embarquement des voyageurs, des soldats de terre et de mer, des armes et munitions de guerre.

"Art. 2. Le chemin de fer et les ouvrages maritimes mentionnés dans l'article 1er de cette loi seront étudiés, construits, et exploités selon la convention préliminaire intervenue entre le Ministère des Travaux Publics et David Elie Léon Bey, demeurant à Paris, agissant au nom et pour compte d'un syndicat financier.

"Art. 3. Pendant le délai mentionné dans la dite convention, la concession sera transféré à une société anonyme ottomane assujettie aux lois et règlements de l'Empire ottoman.

"Art. 4. Le Ministre des Travaux Publics est chargé de l'exécution de la présente loi."

[32552] No. 71.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 690.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 22, 1909.

THERE have been few incidents of interest in European or Asiatic Turkey worth reporting to you since I wrote my despatch No. 614 of the 2nd August last. His Majesty's consul at Monastir reports that great consternation has been caused in that district by the publication of the provisions of the new Associations Bill, which is considered to menace the existence of all the national clubs that have sprung up since the constitution. This menace has had the effect of drawing all the different nationalities together to defend what they hold to be one of the few benefits the constitution has conferred on them. A petition is being drawn up by all the clubs against the Bill, and the Young Turk Committee has been invited to join in signing it, as their existence is equally threatened by the terms of the Bill. The clubs maintain, with some justice, that it is far better to leave them untouched as they are than to force the various nationalities to form secret societies.

His Majesty's Consul at Adrianople reported to me on the 2nd August that the remains of the Greek band at Kadikeui, on whose activity I reported in my despatch No. 614, was pursued by gendarmes from Malgara, their chief, Bildirjin Stavraki, was killed, and his two companions, who had escaped, were still being pursued.

From the Bitlis district I have received accounts of the Government's extortion from the Armenian residents of the taxes paid by Christians in lieu of military service. Everywhere the Armenians made a passive resistance, protesting that under the proposed new law Christians would be exempt from the tax, and would do their service. Eventually the Armenian deputies in the Chamber have answered their complaints by telegraphing to them that the law on military service has been passed, and since then the collection of the taxes has ceased.

In Khizan, Sheikh Seyyid Ali continues his evil ways, and although in several instances recently the Government have compelled him to make good his depredations, he seems determined to continue his fight against the new order of things.

The sporadic crimes which are still committed by Kurds in this district against

Armenians are mostly traceable to the followers of this turbulent sheikh, and it would seem advisable that the Government should take some decided steps against him, for the people of the district are inclined to look upon this case as a test of the efficiency of the new régime. Since the 300 complaints made against him last autumn, new abuses have been laid to his count throughout the winter and spring with no sign of any drastic action on the part of the authorities, and if things continue thus much longer the people will certainly lose faith in the powers of the new régime.

Grave dissatisfaction has also been aroused at Bitlis by the arrest and dispatch to Van for trial by court-martial of twelve common soldiers, accused of complicity in the events of April last, while the local Kurdish chiefs, whose ignorant tools they were, continue to enjoy favour and authority.

The vali of Bitlis, Husni Bey, has been transferred to Kastamouni, and replaced by Salim Pasha, mutessarif of Urfa. Husni Bey had only three months' administration of the district, but during that time he did much to bring malefactors and murderers to the law, though he was unpopular among the Armenians for his biassed and partial administration.

I am, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[32838] No. 72.

Foreign Office to Mr. D'Arcy.

Dear Mr. D'Arcy, *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1909.

WE have been approached by the Shell Company for our support in obtaining for them the Mesopotamian oil concession.

I have told them that we had been supporting you, and that, until the other day, we had hoped that your concession would go through. They said that they heard that an American syndicate had come into the field, which tallies with Sir G. Lowther's information, and that your immediate chances had diminished.

I inquired whether they had put themselves in touch with you, but they had not done so, and they asked me whether I would mention the matter to you. Hence my letter. Possibly, if you felt inclined, you would communicate with them.

I made it a condition that, if we supported any application of theirs, we should have to insist on assurances that the company formed to work the concession would be preponderatingly British, with a majority of British directors on the board, and would remain so.

I may mention that, on hearing from Sir G. Lowther that an American syndicate was in the running, we telegraphed, strongly urging that the concession should be given to a British applicant.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[32337] No. 73.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter of the 26th instant respecting the reported disturbances at Hodeida and Loheia, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to state that he would be glad if the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty would instruct the officer commanding His Majesty's ship "Philomel" to call at Jedda and Hodeida on the way through the Red Sea to Aden. Sir Edward Grey concurs in the view expressed in your letter that a visit to Loheia would serve no useful purpose.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[32759] No. 74.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(No. 701.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 27, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 230 of the 11th August, 1909, instructing me to furnish some observations as to the Ottoman Government's rumoured intention to evacuate the Sana'a and Mokha districts of the Yemen, and to establish a protectorate there.

Last year, during the Grand Vizierate of Kiamil Pasha, it was decided in principle to put an end to the internecine struggle and consequent expenditure of blood and treasure that has gone on intermittently in the Yemen since its reoccupation by the Turks in 1873, by granting the Zedi Imam and his followers an autonomy on colonial lines, and to that end Kiamil Pasha invited the Imam to send delegates to Constantinople. After their arrival the negotiations between them and the Porte were frequently interrupted owing to the unsettled political situation in the capital.

During the events between the fall of Kiamil Pasha and the dethronement of the ex-Sultan, the Arab deputies began to conceive a certain distrust of Ottoman constitutionalism, in which they detected the note of Turkish national ascendency, while the Yemen delegates also grew impatient. Hilmi Pasha, who has had seven years' experience of the Yemen as vali, pushed the scheme through on the following lines:—

1. To discard for the moment the idea of converting Assir into a separate vilayet, but to divide Yemen into two provinces, the first comprising the mainly Zedi districts of Amran, Hajjé, Tawila, Dhamar, Yerim, and Jebel Anis, to be governed by the Imam Yahya; and the second, comprising Sana'a, South-east Yemen, and the Tehama or littoral, to be administered by Ottoman officials.

2. The sheriat, or sacred law, to be the law of both provinces, except in the coast towns of Hodeida, &c., and the cadis, or district sheri governors, to be elected locally, but approved by the Porte.

3. The revenue of both provinces to be expended on local needs, after satisfying which any surplus to be divided between the Yemen and the central administration.

4. No Ottoman troops to be stationed in the Imam's districts, but small garrisons with their head-quarters at Sana'a to be maintained in the principal centres of the second provinces.

From this it appears that the Central Government has no intention of evacuating Sana'a and the Mokha district, as reported in the Government of India's telegram of the 1st August.

The Chamber of Deputies showed considerable reluctance to accepting the above scheme, owing to their fear that the granting of autonomy to the Yemen might lead to similar demands in Albania, &c., and that the Shafi inhabitants of the districts handed over to the Imam might resent being ruled by Zedis and rebel against his authority. The project thus remained for two months before the Chamber without a solution being arrived at, and the Imam, losing confidence in the Central Government's intentions, began to assume a threatening attitude; while a Mahdi named Idriz, working apparently in sympathy with the Imam, rose in revolt and secured a considerable following even in the south-west districts of Taiz, Zebid Ibb, &c. Again, as reported in my telegram No. 294 of the 23rd August, a third Arab rising is rumoured to be threatening Hodeida and Loheya. In view of this general unrest in the Yemen, the new Minister of the Interior, Tahi't Bey, who was appointed shortly before the Chamber was prorogued, determined to drop the whole scheme of autonomy until the province shall have been reduced to a state of submission. For that purpose it has been now decided to at once dispatch twelve battalions of infantry, while two Ottoman cruisers and the two gun-boats, "Marmaris" and "Euphrate," are to proceed to Hodeida, &c., to patrol the coast and prevent the smuggling of arms by sea.

The Government tries to minimise the seriousness of the situation, and professes confidence that now that the troops are regularly paid the expedition will soon succeed in bringing the Arabs to reason, but the Yemen climate and Arab guerilla tactics are redoubtable enemies, and it may turn out that they are unduly sanguine.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23986] No. 75.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 263.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 471 of the 22nd June, I request that you will inform me whether your representations to the Sublime Porte for the removal of the garrison from Zalikhaunieh have yet borne fruit, and whether you have, in consequence, been able to take any action in the matter of the exchange of money orders between Turkish and British Indian post offices.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[33067] No. 76.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to previous letter, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 27th August, relative to disturbances in the neighbourhood of Hodeida.

India Office, September 2, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 76.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August 27, 1909.*

AFFAIRS at Hodeida. Your telegram of the 25th August.

Admiralty have been requested by Foreign Office, on the 23rd instant, to dispatch a man-of-war, and to arrange that, if ship went from the north, Richardson should be embarked at Jeddah. In a telegram dated the 24th August, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reported that he had been informed by the Grand Vizier that he was sending two transports with nine battalions, and two gun-boats.

[33134] No. 77

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 3.)

Sir, *India Office, September 1, 1909.*

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd August, 1909, enclosing copy of a note from the German chargé d'affaires as to the maintenance of the *status quo* at Abu Musa, pending a final settlement of the question.

The undertaking given to the German Ambassador in Sir E. Grey's note of the 28th July was based on the fact that the German Government had stated that their reply to the British memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, might be expected immediately.

The position, if the *status quo* conditionally established by Sir E. Grey's note of the 28th July were prolonged, would be that, whereas the British Government could do nothing in respect of the oxide industry on the island, Messrs. Wönckhaus would be able, whenever it suited them, to send to the island to remove portions of the oxide already mined on their account. Such a state of things could not but be to the detriment of British interests. In this connection it may be observed that we have no knowledge of the contracts in respect of which the rights of Messrs. Wönkhaus have been reserved. The point was dealt with in the Viceroy's telegram of the 3rd January, 1909, and your letter of the 12th February, 1909.

On the other hand, if the German Government agreed to waive Messrs. Wönkhaus's rights to remove oxide from the island pending a settlement of the whole question with His Majesty's Government, the result would be politically to "sterilise" the

island. There would be certain advantages in this course if, as seems not impossible, the German Government are not anxious to press the question to a definite issue.

If, however, Sir E. Grey is of opinion that it is best to maintain the position taken up in the British memorandum of the 10th July, 1908, Viscount Morley concurs in the proposal to inform the German Government, in reply to their note of the 14th July, that His Majesty's Government cannot undertake to prolong the present situation indefinitely.

I have, &c.
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[32759] No. 78.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 3, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, regarding the reported intention of the Turkish Government to evacuate the Sanaa and Mokha districts of Yemen and to hand over Mokha to Germany as a coaling station.

I am to state, in reply, that on the 11th ultimo a despatch was addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, instructing him to furnish a report on the former point, and I am to transmit to you herewith, for Viscount Morley's information, copy of that paper which has just been received, from which it will be seen that the scheme which the Turkish Government had entertained for the grant of a considerable measure of autonomy to Yemen has been postponed pending the suppression of the rebellion which has broken out in the province.*

In these circumstances, Sir Edward Grey thinks that it is hardly necessary to dispatch to the Viceroy of India the telegram, draft of which was enclosed in your letter under reply; but he has instructed me to express his general concurrence in Lord Morley's views as set forth therein, and in the second paragraph of your letter, to the effect that, notwithstanding any possible change in the political status of Yemen, His Majesty's Government should confine their responsibilities strictly within the demarcated border, and the chiefs within the British protectorate should be discouraged from extending their influence beyond that frontier.

As regards the second point dealt with in your letter, I am to state that Sir G. Lowther was instructed on the 18th ultimo to furnish a report on the subject, but that his Excellency's reply to that communication has not yet been received.

I am to point out, in this connection, that the established fact that the Turkish Government do not now intend to abandon Yemen obviously renders the truth of the rumour less probable.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[33345] No. 79.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 705.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 1, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Mr. Donaldson Rawlins, acting vice-consul at Diarbekir, giving a summary of recent events in the vilayets of Mamouret-el-Aziz and Diarbekir.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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* No. 74.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Kharput, August 20, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency a short summary of the recent events in this vilayet and that of Diarbekir.

Christians for the army.—On Sunday last, the 15th instant, an order was received from Constantinople to the effect that the formalities connected with the enrolling of Christian recruits for the army should be begun.

As I had the honour to mention in a previous despatch to your Excellency, the Christians appear now to have lost some of their martial enthusiasm, and I am hearing it said on all sides that the continued payment of a tax in lieu of military service would have been preferable.

Emigration.—Emigration (my despatch No. 33 of the 22nd July, 1909) still continues upon a large scale, as many as sixty persons having left here for America during the past week.

The general feeling of insecurity is, rightly or wrongly, responsible for this continued exodus.

Cretan Question.—Volunteers are still being enrolled and money raised for the proposed volunteer expeditionary force to Crete.

It has been reported to me from Diarbekir that Abdul Kader Pasha, a man of over 70, and one of the richest and most influential Moslems of the town, has been enrolled as a volunteer, while various other Moslem and Christian notables—in many cases quite elderly men—are also putting down their names for the same purpose.

It can, however, hardly be supposed that the authorities are taking such registration seriously.

Mustapha Naim Pasha, commandant at Mezereh, has been recalled to Constantinople, and is leaving Mezereh in a few days.

Dersim Campaign.—I have been able to obtain no further news of the doings of the Mushir Ibrahim Pasha in the Dersim, beyond the fact that the Mushir is still in the Ovajik region with six battalions, and that his object is to make roads, collect the taxes, and take recruits for the army.

Raising of Prices.—Both here and at Diarbekir there has been a general raising of prices in corn, barley, meat, &c., in fact, in nearly every commodity.

This is, I am told, attributable to the machinations of a kind of "ring" or trust which several of the richest merchants and corn brokers have started.

Appeals have been made to the local authorities, but the latter have as yet taken no action in the matter.

Continued augmentation in the prices of bread and meat may cause disturbances on the part of the poorer classes, who are already murmuring against the high prices of the most necessary commodities.

Mr. Mugerditchian writes from Diarbekir that, since the arrival of the new Vali, 4 people (2 Christian and 2 Moslem) have been killed, 1 Christian and 1 Moslem having been killed on the 8th instant at a place called Koz-Dereh, one hour from Diarbekir.

Affairs of Diarbekir.—Mr. Mugerditchian continues that, up to the present, the murderers have not been caught, and considers that this will weaken the local government in the eyes of the Eshreffs.

I hear also from Mr. Andrus (American Mission, Mardin) of much disorder in the Mardin and Mediat districts, so that, on the whole, the general condition of the Vilayet of Diarbekir cannot be said to be encouraging, while the new vali does not appear to have shown proof so far of any special energy.

My French colleague, who arrived here last week, tells me that he is much disappointed in Ghalib Bey, of whom great things were expected.

Musret Pasha, the Vali of Mamouret-el-Aziz, is still in office here, and there is no definite news as to the arrival of Mehmed Ali, who is to take his place as acting vali, but who, it is generally supposed, will be finally appointed vali.

I have, &c.
E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[33347] No. 80.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 707.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 31, 1909.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 686 of the 23rd on the subject of Mr. Glasgow's railway scheme, I have the honour to state that I am now informed that that gentleman does not represent the Standard Oil Company, but is acting on behalf of I. and S. White and Co., a constructive company in the United States.

I asked the Grand Vizier yesterday how matters stood, and he explained that Mr. Glasgow's scheme had been made public, and the Turkish Government were ready to receive offers on the general lines laid down. This procedure does not seem to have pleased Mr. Glasgow, who left Constantinople, but it is not known whether he has done so definitely. I asked whether his scheme was considered to encroach on the Bagdad Railway system. His Highness was of opinion that it might, but that would form the subject of a settlement direct between the two parties interested. The proposed outlet into the Mediterranean would be Yimurtalik, in the Gulf of Alexandretta. His Highness added that several were seeking concessions on similar lines—another American company, a Belgian company, and a company represented by an Armenian—but his Highness seemed somewhat doubtful as to the financial standing of the different bidders. If all the railway schemes came to nothing, the Government would be prepared to receive negotiations with the representative of Mr. D'Arcy for the oil-field. In the meantime the latter had taken to England the Glasgow scheme in order to consult his principals. His Highness implied that as long as such generally favourable offers of a very comprehensive nature were being made, it was impossible for the Government to deal with Mr. D'Arcy's agent in a comparatively small concern, as, under the new conditions in Turkey, Government is bound to be guided by the wishes of its Parliament, which is naturally determined to insist on acceptance of the scheme which appears to be most advantageous to the interests of the country in general.

I took the opportunity of telling his Highness that there was an impression that the Government was endeavouring generally in the matter of concessions and orders to drive too hard a bargain, and that the effect would be to discourage and drive away *bonâ fide* competitors. His Highness declared that this was not so. The Government, his Highness said, had such innumerable offers in all directions that some severity must be shown in order to eliminate such as were not really serious competitors.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[33365] No. 81.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(No. 309. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, August 31, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 213 of the 18th instant, enclosing a letter from the India Office relative to a report that Mokka is about to be made over to Germany as a coaling station. Before the receipt of this despatch I had never heard of such a rumour.

It will, I fear, be somewhat difficult to obtain absolutely reliable information as to the truth of this report. As yet I am only able to state that in the course of a conversation on general matters with Enver Bey, Captain Heath mentioned that such a rumour existed. Enver Bey at once declared that to the best of his knowledge and belief there was absolutely no foundation for it; and that certainly no negotiations on the subject had passed between the Turkish Embassy and the German Government. I will, however, bear the matter in mind, and endeavour to obtain some corroboration of Enver Bey's statement.

I may mention that in the account of the movements of the Imperial ships periodically published in the newspapers, and which is usually correct, the "Cormoran" was mentioned as having touched at Port Said and Aden, and proceeded straight to Colombo. According to the latest report, she has already passed the latter port on her way to Batavia.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[33701] No. 82.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 312.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 6, 1909.*

LYNCH concession.

Mr. Whittall has presented Lynch's altered scheme, by which he proposes to give 50 per cent. of the priority shares to the Turkish Government, and it will be discussed by the Council of Ministers on the 8th instant.

I spoke strongly to-day both to Rifaat Pasha and the Grand Vizier, giving them to understand that unless a favourable decision were come to as regards the Lynch scheme, our attitude towards the increase in customs dues might not be favourable.

Hilmi Pasha, however, informed me that he had always been well disposed towards the scheme, and that the Porte would not consider any application but that of the Lynch Company.

[33628] No. 83.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 316.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 7, 1909.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 625 of the 26th August, the acting consul at Jeddah thinks that the presence of a warship is unnecessary owing to an improvement in the state of affairs, but the information he has received is scanty.

I was informed to-day by the Grand Vizier that the state of affairs had actually improved, but that the arrival of an Italian warship had led to the dissemination among the natives of the rumour that the Turkish Government had contracted an alliance with Christian foreigners with a view to handing the country over to their administration.

This being the case, perhaps it would be advisable to postpone the dispatch of a warship for the present.

[33693] No. 84.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 7.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, September 7, 1909.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 6th instant, from the commanding officer, His Majesty's ship "Philomel," at Port Said.

I am, &c.
C. I. THOMAS.

Inclosure in No. 84.

Commanding Officer, His Majesty's ship "Philomel," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Port Said, September 6, 1909.*

I SHALL arrive on the 12th September at Jeddah, and on the 16th September at Hodeidah.

[32548] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 277.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 7, 1909.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches Nos. 674 and 686 of the 17th and 23rd ultimo in regard to the concession applied for by Mr. Glasgow, of the Standard Oil Company, for the construction of a railway from Samsoun to Van. I should be glad to be informed whether, in your opinion, this proposed concession would not be barred by the Russo-Turkish agreement of March 1900, with regard to railway construction in Anatolia (see Sir N. O'Conor's despatch No. 104, Confidential, of the 22nd March, 1900).

I should also be glad to learn in what manner, if any, you consider that the concession applied for by Mr. Glasgow could, if granted, affect that which Mr. D'Arcy is seeking to obtain for the exploitation of oil-fields in the Mosul and Karkuk districts of Mesopotamia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[33693] No. 86.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 7, 1909.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th instant regarding the movements of His Majesty's ship "Philomel," I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reporting that, according to a message from His Majesty's consul at Jedda, the situation at Hodeida appears to have improved, and that he does not consider that it will be necessary for one of His Majesty's ships to visit that port. Sir G. Lowther also reports that the recent visit to Hodeida of the Italian vessel "Volturno" had, according to the Grand Vizier, given rise to some misunderstandings, and proposes that, in these circumstances, the orders to the officer commanding His Majesty's ship "Philomel" to visit Hodeida should be cancelled.

I am to request that, if their Lordships concur in this view, orders in accordance with Sir G. Lowther's suggestion may be issued to His Majesty's ship "Philomel," which, as appears from your letter under reply, does not expect to reach Jedda till the 12th instant, and would consequently receive them in time to prevent her continuing the journey to Hodeida.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[33347] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 661.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 8, 1909.*

TIGRIS Railway and its extension to the Mediterranean.

Please see your despatch No. 707 of the 31st August.

This question has presumably not been raised by you as yet. If the applications of other concession numbers are being considered by the Turkish Government, might it not be advisable to lose no time in broaching the subject, seeing that this application is at any rate serious?

Matter would in all probability be taken up by interests with whom I am in touch.

[33134] No. 88.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 8, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, relative to the dispute as to the working of the mines of red oxide on Abu-Musa Island.

I am to transmit to you herewith draft of a memorandum* which, in view of the arguments put forward in that communication, Sir E. Grey would propose, subject to the concurrence of Viscount Morley, to hand to the German chargé d'affaires in reply to his note of the 14th ultimo, and with reference to his statement of the previous day to the effect that, before coming to a decision on the subject, his Government would be obliged to examine the correspondence regarding the ownership of the island.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[33913] No. 89.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 9.)

(No. 318.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 9, 1909.*

LYNCH Concession.

Nouradoungian Effendi has resigned the portfolio of Minister of Public Works in favour of the Armenian deputy for Constantinople, by name Halajian. This change has been made primarily with a view to introducing a man of the new régime into the Government.

Owing to this, the final discussion of the Lynch Concession has been postponed, and will take place at next Sunday's meeting of the Council of Ministers, instead of yesterday, as originally intended.

[33985] No. 90.

Mr. W. K. D'Arcy to Foreign Office.—(Received September 10.)

Dear Mr. Mallet, *Bylaugh Park, East Dereham, September 8, 1909.*

I HAVE to thank you for your kind letter of the 30th ultimo advising me that the Foreign Office had been approached by the Shell Company for their support in obtaining the Mesopotamian oil concession, and of the reply given to them by you.

I have not been approached by them in any way, nor should I think of approaching them, as I have not the least desire to be associated with them in this business, nor should I be satisfied with any assurances they might give that any company that they formed to work the concession would be preponderatingly British, because it is common knowledge that this company and its allied concerns are now more than ever under foreign control.

As to the steps that I am taking to secure the concession, you will have learned from Mr. Greenway, who called at the Foreign Office a few days ago, together with Mr. Nichols, who has been representing me in Constantinople, that I am still doing all in my power to secure the concession, and that, in view of the new competitors who have come into the field, Mr. Nichols has come to London to discuss the position and to take fresh instructions.

A meeting will be held next Tuesday to decide upon the best means of meeting this competition, and Mr. Nichols will immediately thereafter return to Constantinople to carry out the steps decided upon, and to use his utmost endeavours to bring matters to an issue at the earliest possible moment.

In the meantime, I have no doubt I may rely upon the continued support of the Foreign Office, and if you can, through the instrumentality of Sir G. Lowther, do anything to expedite matters I shall be very grateful.

* See No. 116.

In accordance with the request made by Mr. Norman, I enclose a note made up by Mr. Nichols of the various concessions having a bearing on the Mesopotamian oil concession which are now being sought for in Constantinople.

Believe, &c.
W. K. D'ARCY.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Note by Mr. Nichols respecting Turkish Concessions connected with Oil now being sought.

1. By Dr. Bruce N. Glascow, for the J. G. White and Co. (of New York) Syndicate.

(*a.*) Sivas to Van viâ Karpout, Arghana, Diarbekir, Bitlis, and north or south of Lake Van.

(*b.*) From a point to be determined in the line Sivas–Diarbekir to Youmourtalik (Gulf of Alexandretta) viâ the Valley of Djihan.

(*c.*) From a point to be determined in the line Diarbekir–Van to Moussoul, Kerkouk, and Suleimanie.

Rights to all minerals (including oil) 20 kilom. either side of line. Gauge 1·05 metres. Option to construct port at Youmourtalik. The concessionnaire must construct a line between Angora and Sivas, gauge 1·44 metres, if the Ottoman Government require it. Option for examination and survey, sixteen months.

2. By Admiral Arthur Chester, for Mr. Moore, director of an American Syndicate. I understand the proposal to be practically the same as that of Dr. Glascow as regards route, but Admiral Chester further offers, I believe—

(1.) Gauge 1·44 metres.
(2.) Duty of 6 per cent. on all minerals exported.
(3.) Fourteen months only for survey.
(4.) Undertake irrigation works, &c.

3. The Banque Franco-Turque of Paris and a certain individual named Chahrikian were mentioned in Parliament as also wishing to tender for the same concession.

4. By Mr. C. C. Campbell, representing Standard Oil Company.
Right to construct oil tank installations in Turkey in Europe and Asia.

[33701] No. 91.

Foreign Office to Colonel Picot.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 11, 1909.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, according to which Mr. Whittall has presented to the Turkish Government the alternative scheme of the concession for the navigation rights on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, by which half the priority shares should be given to the Porte. The scheme will be submitted to the Council of Ministers on the 12th instant. Sir G. Lowther has spoken strongly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Grand Vizier, and conveyed to them a hint that the decision reached with regard to this scheme might affect the attitude of His Majesty's Government on the question of consenting to the proposed increase of the Turkish customs duties. The Grand Vizier assured His Majesty's Ambassador that it was not intended by the Government to accept the offer of any other combination, and that he himself was strongly in favour of granting the concession.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[34129] No. 91*.

Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *North-East Harbour, September* 12, 1909.

AMERICAN missionaries in Muscat.

Your telegram No. 130 of the 20th August.

I am informed by State Department to-day that they have been considering the question for some months, and that United States vice-consul had been instructed to request that most-favoured-nation treaty rights on the same footing as other missionaries at Muscat should be accorded to Dr. Thom.

United States Government can give no decision on Dr. Thom's claim until the new American vice-consul, who has been instructed to settle the matter with due regard to United States treaty rights, has reported on the situation.

[34186] No. 92.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 13.)

(No. 714.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 6, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Adana, reporting the arrival of the new vali and his energetic character and attitude.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 92.

Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, August* 25, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the new vali arrived in Adana on the 19th instant, his predecessor leaving overland for Constantinople the following morning.

I paid an official call on his Excellency on Saturday, and received his return visit the following morning.

Djemal Bey, a small dapper soldier of from 35 to 38 years of age, dressed like an English gentleman a contrast to his collarless and slippered predecessor—possesses a most courteous presence, a fair knowledge of French, and a pretty wit. He makes an exceedingly good impression.

I should judge that he possesses an untiring energy and a determination brooking no interference.

He evidently faces the situation in an attitude radically different from that of the old-fashioned type of provincial governor. He has the chance of making a fine reputation for himself and the prestige of the army and Young Turkey to vindicate before the eyes of Europe.

In conversation he expressed his disgust at the deplorable events here, and the supine incompetency of the local authorities to deal with them, as well as dissatisfaction with the delay in the work of justice. He touched among other subjects on that of the wholesale change of officers and officials, and the good results expected from a radical reform of police and gendarmerie, which is apparently to take early effect in Adana. He told me he intended to make separate harangues to public meetings of Moslems and Armenians. He seems anxious to establish at once a *modus vivendi* between the two elements, and asked me privately if I could help him in identifying certain persons whom he apparently suspects of putting deliberate obstacles in the way of reconciliation. He is dead set against idling and battening on temporary relief doles, and means to drive the loafers from tavern and bazaar to lend a hand in the work of reconstruction. He made me the medium of his thanks for British help during the disturbances.

If he is given a free hand with full support from Constantinople, and is able to steer clear of the obstacles which local jealousies and petty cabals may strive to put in his path, excellent results may be expected from his efforts. The principal danger to his career is perhaps its rather headlong nature, judging from its beginning. He will probably make a camp of enemies in a week, and he told me himself that the first attempt to hamper his designs would be sufficient to produce his resignation. It is a lucky coincidence that he professes a long-standing friendship with the Commandant Mehmed Ali Bey; this should serve to avert all friction between them.

His Excellency is evidently determined to strike at once at the roots of the relief problem, and to this end contemplates in a week's time making a personal tour of inspection of the affected districts. Such an undertaking should have the very best effects, as serving the double objects of establishing a complete and comprehensive relief organisation and of pacifying and inspiring confidence throughout the country. It is to be hoped that this project may be duly realised.

The new vali's energy seems to be undoubted. Though he only arrived on Thursday evening, Friday morning found him, after seeing off his predecessor at the station, personally inspecting the refugee camp outside the town and questioning its inmates. The following day he convened a joint meeting in the konak of the international and Ottoman relief committees, over which he presided for four consecutive

hours in the full heat of the afternoon. The work in hand being still uncompleted, further meetings took place on the two following days.

At the public reading of his firman, his Excellency took occasion to address the assembled crowd. Emphatically he called down a thousand curses ("bin kader la'net") on the authors and perpetrators of the massacres, referred to the necessity for the union of all classes in the work of reconstruction, and declared his intention of suppressing all idling with a strong hand. In this speech he announced the possibility of the beginning in a month's time of work on the Bagdad Railway both from the Eregli and Adana extremities.

At the initial meeting of the relief committees, which I attended in my capacity of member of the international committee, the vali called on the twenty members present to forget for the time being their separate callings, official positions, and nationalities, and to unite in the common work of humanity. He aptly compared the various bodies formed for relief to the different doctors, anæsthetists and assistants co-operating in a surgical operation. The healing of the patient was the principal object to be attained.

As a result of these three meetings, it was decided that the international committee is to maintain its separate identity, and continue for the present the useful work of repairing damaged houses and fitting out artisans with tools and capital which it already has in hand.

Of one of the sums of £T. 100,000 voted by the Chamber £T. 15,000 is to be devoted to the actual feeding of the hungry here and in the districts for the next three months, by which time it is hoped that building construction, the now ripening cotton crop, and work on the Bagdad Railway will have largely reduced the distress.

The following separate committees were formed or are in process of formation:—

(a.) *In Adana City.*

1. A committee for the finding of work for the unemployed, and for the distribution of the £T. 15,000 voted for feeding the hungry, to embrace the whole vilayet.

2. A committee to draw up a plan for the reconstruction of the ruined quarter of the town, and for estimating the cost of rebuilding Christian churches and schools.

3. The sub-committee of the international committee formed for repairing damaged houses in and near Adana is to be reinforced by three members appointed by the Government. Their work is also to include the erection of houses for former householders now homeless.

4. A committee to draw up a plan for the foundation of orphanages.

5. A committee to prepare an exhaustive report as to the needs of agricultural relief.

6. A general advisory financial committee, to consist of the vali, the director of the Ottoman Bank, the representative of the British consulate, and possibly a Government commissioner.

(b.) *In the Districts.*

Separate committees for the distribution of relief and for rebuilding are to be formed in the following cazas, which include all the affected districts, namely, Baghshe, Hajin, Erzin, and Cozan.

The vali seems to appreciate the urgent necessity of beginning the work of reconstruction at once, and talks of employing all the available local architects and engineers, as well as of accepting the services of the engineers employed on the Bagdad Railway.

The following official notice has to-day been posted up in the city: "Notice is hereby given that, as the reconstruction of burnt and ruined houses will be begun in three or four days, individual petitions to the Government and formal expenses are superfluous."

Timber for construction is to be supplied from the Government forests at the sole cost of carriage. His Excellency, in the presence of the assembled committees, gave explicit orders on this head to the Inspector of Forests, and forcibly overruled various objections advanced by that functionary.

The committee for the caza of Baghshe was telegraphically formed as the result of the first meeting. It is to include Dr Shepard, of the American Mission, who already has the situation there well in hand.

Each district committee is to include one officer. No definite decision as to the question of a loan to the municipality, possibly of foreign capital, has yet been arrived at.

His Excellency appeared anxious for an explanation as to the expenditure of the first £T. 30,000 voted by the Chamber, and the defterdar, brought to book on this head, was obliged to confess to the lack of the "defter" in question. Possibly satisfactory accounts will be concocted later.

The vali's invitation to me (which, subject to your Excellency's approval, I am ready to accept) to sit on his financial control committee seems to be significant of his whole attitude, which seems to rest on an honest, unselfish desire for the good of his country, and of this unfortunate province in particular, unspoilt by petty anti-foreign prejudices. In this connection it is significant that, when approached on the subject by the American consul, he raised not the slightest objection to the opening of the projected American Mission hospital in Adana, but even urged on the progress of the work. I saw Kenan Pasha yesterday, and learnt that the trial of our three remaining refugees is not yet finished. The man Arslanian, whose presence the court was at some pains to secure, in the hope that his previous evidence against the prisoners might be refuted, has apparently flitted through Adana *en route* for Egypt, leaving nothing in the hands of the court-martial more substantial than a sworn declaration (submitted through the medium of the ecclesiastical authorities) contradicting his former statements, which he declares were made under compulsion. Kenan Pasha implied that, reaching the court as it did through an unofficial channel, this document could not be taken into serious consideration. He said they will no longer wait for Arslanian. The document in question, a translation of which lack of time forbids my submitting to your Excellency by this mail, if true, throws a lurid sidelight on the workings of the court-martial, but it must, of course, be received with great caution.

Kenan Pasha denied having said that Esai Bizlikian would get off scot free, as was implied to your Excellency in a former despatch. He inferred that the sentences on the three men would be light, and in any case they will strictly abide by their promise.

He told me that the Mufti Zade of Baghshe, as well as his brother, have been sentenced to death, and that the confirmed order for the execution may be sent through this week. In this connection, enquiries as to the truth of a rumour of trouble on the part of the troops at Erzin seem to prove the story entirely false.

Ismail Fazil Pasha tells me that his work here is now finished, but he did not disclose its result.

The remaining Redif battalions in Adana have been disbanded now that recruits have come to swell the ranks of the garrison.

The vali apparently expected to find a foreign gendarmerie officer at his post in Adana, and has sent him a peremptory summons to appear.

The mutessarif of Mersina states that he will not allow a Greek boycott except on the receipt of orders to that effect from Constantinople. All is quiet there and in Adana.

Mention was made in a despatch to your Excellency, dated the 10th August, of a sentence of exile pronounced here on a certain Hussein Daim Bey, an ex-Alai Bey, who has rendered signal services to the Armenians throughout the disturbances, and who is a useful member of the international relief committee. I am afraid this sentence is likely to take effect. The new vali's mind appears to have been poisoned against the man on the very day of his arrival. In reply to a contemptuous reference on his Excellency's part to the colonel who was the "baba" of the Armenians, I took occasion to emphasise Hussein Bey's philanthropic deeds. He replied that the Government's thanks for them had already taken the form of placing him in charge of the refugee camp, and dwelt on his former misdeeds. Whatever these are, this person's present case seems a hard one, and possibly your Excellency could bring influence to bear in his favour.

I have, &c.
R. E. W. CHAFY.

[34200] No. 93.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 60. Consular.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 8, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which reached me yesterday from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, on the subject

of a proposal, of which up to the present I have had no knowledge, to transfer the consulate-general at Bagdad from the Indian to the Levant consular service.

Colonel Ramsay's arguments against this proposal seem to me sound in every way, and I have the honour to recommend them to your most favourable consideration. I deprecate the proposed change altogether, as it appears to me that it would be extremely detrimental to British interests, more especially at this moment, when it is essential that British influence and prestige in those regions should make themselves felt.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 98.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to Government of India.

Sir, *Bagdad, August* 7, 1909.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in foreign department telegram No. 285 S, I have the honour to submit my views on the proposal to transfer the consulate-general at Bagdad from the Indian to the Levant consular service.

2. In the India Office the Bagdad post appears to have been treated as if it was on all fours with the consular posts in inland Persia, but I venture to suggest that the proposal to withdraw an Indian officer from Bagdad should be considered on its merits, without reference to inland Persian posts. Such of the latter as are held by officers of the Indian service are, to the best of my belief, of comparatively recent creation, they have never been, and have never pretended to be, more than consular posts, and our representatives have probably to deal with no large Indian population except at Meshed.

At Bagdad the reverse is the case. The Bagdad residency has a traditional influence, acquired by more than a century of liberal expenditure. There is no comparison between the style in which it is maintained and the style of the establishments kept up by other Powers. It dates back to the time when the Government of India used to make treaties with the Pasha of Bagdad, when the resident had under his orders a flotilla of gun-boats which used to freely navigate the waters of Mesopotamia, when the resident was in touch with the chief Arab sheikhs of the country. In fact, it may truthfully be said that at one time the resident at Bagdad was the most powerful man in Mesopotamia. I have read in the old records letters from the Pasha of Bagdad asking the resident to assist with his ships at Bussorah and against the Arab tribes, and asking for his advice in international questions. All this has changed with the introduction of the telegraph and better means of communication, the introduction of a more centralised Government into Turkey, and the appointment of consular representatives of other Powers. So much has it changed that Europeans who have not studied the history of the past are apt to forget the past. The Arabs, however, except that they are better armed, are very much what they were 100 years ago, for information and guidance they rely more on tradition than on the telegraph, and the result of this is that they consider the English as the foreign nation. The Turks they despise and hate as a corrupt and inefficient body of robbers and cheats, while they have been taught in the past to trust the word of an Englishman, and to believe in the real power that lies behind him. Their traditions tell them that we are in a different plane from other nations, and when they compare the British establishment with other consulates, they feel convinced that there has been no real change. I will give a few instances to show what I mean:—

Only a few days ago the Nakib of Bagdad, the most influential Sunni Mohammedan in the country, when talking to Sir William Willcocks, pointed to the new residency buildings and said that he and others looked upon our expenditure and establishment here as a sure sign of the interest we have in the country. How would the uneducated sheikhs be likely to interpret visible reductions?

It will be remembered that our steamers were fired on in 1906 and again in 1908. I think no one doubts that the Arabs fired on us because they wanted us to force the Turks to treat them justly. They had no quarrel with us, and they had a feeling that justice would be done to them if we could be dragged into their quarrel. After the second attack I took pains to let it be known that the Arabs were mistaken in supposing that they could force us to be their advocates by such methods, and during the very serious river disturbances of 1909 the British steamers, when they were alone,

were only once molested by a few irresponsible Arabs, and the only time that the British steamer was seriously attacked was when she was in company with Turkish steamers carrying large numbers of troops for offensive purposes.

One night, when I was going down the Tigris in the "Comet," we reached the village of a sheikh who expressed a wish to see me, unfortunately the message was not delivered to me till we had left. I was then informed that he had said, "This is our ship and our beg (officer), how is it that he was not able to see us?"

Going down the Euphrates as the guest of Sir William Willcocks, when we got to the most disturbed part of the river, near Suk-esh-Sheyukh, the Turkish official who was with us begged us to pull down the Turkish flag and hoist the British flag, as he said that we should otherwise certainly be fired at.

When Sir William Willcocks was arranging for the survey of the country between the Tigris and the Euphrates near Bagdad he saw a number of the influential sheikhs of the powerful Delaim tribe. They said that his operations might have very serious consequences for them, and that they could not allow the work to go on unless Sir William gave his promise as an Englishman that the survey should be done by Englishmen, and that no engineering proposals should be made which would be hurtful to the Arabs. The sheikhs said that they would accept no promises made on behalf of the Turkish Government, but they wanted the word of an Englishman, because they knew from experience that they could trust it.

3. The Arabs judge by experience, tradition, and appearances. Whether our reputation among them is worth what it has cost us in the past is not the question that need now be considered, but rather the question whether we should at the present time do anything that may diminish our influence.

There is no Anglo-Russian agreement in force at Bagdad, and the Turks seem to be quite incapable of governing the country.

On the Lower Euphrates they are unable to collect any revenue, even within gun-shot of the Naseriyeh Fort. On the greater part of the Lower Tigris they are able to collect very little, and there are annual military expeditions to the east and west to collect revenue. In fact, I think I am only expressing the universal opinion when I say that the Turks do not govern the country and that their position is precarious. Turkish rule in Arabia may, of course, continue for many years, but there is always a possibility that the Arabs will oust it. If Sir William Willcocks' schemes are carried out, external pressure will force the Turks to introduce some semblance of decent government, but the initiative will in that case have to come from foreigners, for the Turks have no men of experience in the art of civilised government.

4. I am therefore strongly of opinion that no change should be made in Bagdad, which might be misunderstood by the sheikhs, until it is definitely known whether this country is going to be really developed or not. If it is not, an occasion may at any time arise when we shall have need of all our influence; if it is developed, Bagdad will be brought into railway communication with the Mediterranean, and it would then lose its isolated position and its importance as an outpost of British interests.

5. I have tried to show above that it would be unwise in the present critical state of Turkish affairs materially to reduce the style and status of the British representative at Bagdad. There would not be any great saving unless the "Comet," the residency surgeon, and the sepoy guard were abolished. The saving on the consul-general's salary would not perhaps be as large as at first appears, for it would surely be considered fair to give a man more for living in Bagdad than for living, say, in Salonica or Beirout, and he would no doubt expect concessions in the way of leave and counting his service for pension.

It may be argued that there would be a great saving in the cost of the office establishment. Here, again, it would be unwise to draw inferences from other posts in Turkey. I do not think that elsewhere the courts can be as dilatory and inefficient as they are here. Cases of the simplest nature are heard day after day, and an immense amount of the dragoman's time is taken up without result. At most places the British subjects are probably Europeans of respectable position, but at Bagdad, including Karbala, there are about 1,800 Indians who are registered as British subjects. These have mostly been born in the country of Arab or Persian mothers, and have become land-holders united by many ties with the people of the country, with the result that there are sometimes two or three cases in the courts on the same day at which the British dragoman has to attend. He often has to attend the court at Kadhimain, which is about 5 miles from Bagdad.

The office establishment might be less well paid, but it would be less efficient, and the saving would not be very great. I have ventured to lay my views before his Excellency the Ambassador in regard for the need for increasing the office establishments maintained by consular officers, and I enclose copies and extracts of some letters which I have received. These show that the result of an efficient office establishment is appreciated, if the necessity for it is not admitted.

6. The Foreign Office, in addition to urging financial grounds for transferring Bagdad to the consular service, has urged that the consul-general should be under the sole control of the Ambassador at Constantinople, and that Indian political and commercial interests would not suffer by the change. I have certainly considered myself, while at Bagdad, as entirely under his Excellency's orders, and I have seen nothing in the records to show that my predecessors have held a contrary opinion. Consequently it seems to me that the argument that the consul-general should be under the sole control of the Ambassador is sufficiently answered by the statement that he already considers himself so.

I venture to think that an officer with Indian experience can more usefully serve the political and commercial interests of India than can an officer of the consular service.

As regards commercial interests, an officer of the consular service would be at a disadvantage, because he would probably know little about the products of India. He would not know the best sources of information, and he would be able to supply enquirers with little first-hand knowledge. These difficulties might of course be partially met by addressing all communications to the Government of India, and leaving it to that Government to send them on to the person concerned; but the fact would always remain that an officer of the consular service would lack that personal interest in India without which he could no doubt work with honest effort, but not with enthusiasm.

It is the political interests of India which will, I think, suffer most by the withdrawal of an Indian officer. Since the consul at Bussorah has been appointed from the Levant service, the resident at Bagdad is the only officer in Turkish Arabia with any knowledge of India and Indians. There is not only a resident population of about 1,800 Indians, but there are large numbers of pilgrims who pass through on their way to Karbala and Nedjef, and Sir William Willcocks has proposed importing 15,000 Indian labourers. Whether he does or not, if the irrigation of Mesopotamia is undertaken, the Indian population will largely increase by the immigration of traders, artisans, and labourers, many of whom will probably settle down in the country.

This office has a great deal of work connected with India. It distributes the Oudh bequest which amounts to 8,000*l.* a-year; it pays a number of pensioners and Wasikadars; it finances the whole establishment by cheques drawn on the Government of India; it has the control of the post-office; and it is continually being applied to for assistance by Indians. Pilgrims of all classes come here, and often find themselves in difficulties, generally of a pecuniary nature. Some are gentlemen of position, some are or have been servants of Government, some come from the native States, including distant parts of Cashmere, and some are little more than beggars. It requires a good deal of experience of Indians correctly to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving. To some I give money, to others I give loans, and some I decline to help. So far, I have made no bad debts, but I doubt if a consular officer would be equally fortunate. He would not have the experience to enable him to judge between different claimants, and he would not have sufficient knowledge of India to enable him to ascertain the probability of recovering money lent. I think that the help given to Indians in trouble must have a good effect on the Mohammedans of India, and it would not be to our political advantage for the Mohammedan Anjumans to think that the interests of their co-religionists were being less well looked after than in the past.

It is very difficult for uneducated Indians to explain their troubles to a man who understands neither their language nor their country. On one occasion a man came all the way from Jaffa to Bagdad to see me, because he said that he and his companions had been put in gaol and he could get no assistance, so he had come to Bagdad to ask help of the sahib from India. I found that he was a British Indian subject, but he had been refused assistance because, in reply to a question, he had said that he was an Afghan. He was an Afghan by race, but he was a resident of the Kohat district, and some of his companions were also British subjects.

Considering that India, according to the latest information at my disposal, pays 1,400*l.* a-year for the consulate at Bussorah, and will pay half the cost of the Bagdad establishment, it seems fair that at least at one place there should be an officer of the Indian Government.

As resident I do many little services for Indians free of charge, for which I should have to charge consular fees if I did them as consul-general. It is, perhaps, not a very important matter, but little kindnesses are much appreciated by Indians. Here they feel like strangers in a strange land, and seem delighted to meet a responsible officer who understands their difficulties.

7. Sir William Willcocks and the schemes which he is preparing seem to me to form the chief factors in the problem. If his schemes are not carried out it is difficult to see how the Turkish finances are to be put on a sound basis and a decent Government established; while without these supports the Ottoman Government can scarcely hope to withstand the strain that will be put upon it by internal dissensions over a large area in which the Turks are foreigners neither liked nor respected.

Should the schemes be carried through they will probably attract a large number of Indians, and they will certainly lead to a period of great commercial activity, which will not allow of any reductions in the office establishment. If the schemes are carried out with British capital it seems clear that we shall require some guarantee that the money is properly spent, and that in important matters of local administration our views receive respectful consideration. The financial control might be arranged through a bank perhaps, but the political control could best be exercised by the resident and consul-general. For work of this kind I cannot help thinking that an officer of the Indian Political Department would be best fitted. He is likely to have had experience of advising native chiefs, of directly administering a district, of dealing with Mohammedan tribes, and of judicial work. A consular officer has probably enjoyed few of these advantages, while he would not even have had the advantage of seeing an oriental country well governed. In the matter of advising a *vali* on practical questions of administration the consular officer would be to the officer of the Indian Political Department as an amateur is to an expert.

8. Further, I think it is against the interest of the Young Turk Government that anything should be done which the Arabs can take as a sign that our interest in this country is diminishing. The employment of Sir William Willcocks and a number of British engineers is taken as an unmistakable sign that the present Turkish Government enjoys our friendly assistance and approval. But for this the survey parties would never have been able to move about freely, as they have done, in the tracts where Turkish authority is no more than nominal. I have confidentially consulted Sir William Willcocks on the proposal to reduce the status of the residency and consulate-general, and he tells me that he would consider any reduction as a most serious impediment to his work. He says that his surveys have only been possible owing to British influence, and the confidence which the Arabs have that we will do nothing to injure them. He has gone so far as to say that if there is any sign of our withdrawing, in outward appearances, from our paramount position in Mesopotamia he will not feel justified in taking the risk of sending survey parties into outlying and disturbed parts of the country. I have personally no doubt that, unsupported by British influence, the Turkish Government would be unable to arrange for the surveys.

9. His Majesty's Ambassador is inclined to favour the construction of a railway from Bagdad to the Mediterranean by British capital or under British control. Such a railway is essential to the development of the country, but perhaps it cannot be constructed without raising questions regarding the railway rights of German and French groups. It seems to me important that we should keep up all external appearances of influence and power until discussion of this subject is closed, for the more we show our determination to keep the position we have earned by a century of sacrifice and expenditure the better terms are we likely to get.

10. I am addressing you in a separate communication regarding certain confidential matters concerning Sir William Willcocks.

11. Put briefly, the arguments which I have ventured to urge are as follows:—

The question of a change at Bagdad should be considered separately from questions connected with inland posts in Persia, because for more than a century Bagdad has been maintained in a style out of all proportion to foreign consulates here. The resident has in the past exercised a unique influence in the country, and in the estimation of the people he still enjoys much of his past power, but he is likely to lose this if reductions are insisted on.

The inland Persian consulates are of recent creation, and have not the same close connection with large Indian interests.

The present is the worst possible moment for making reductions. The Turkish Empire is practically in a state of revolution. It rules an alien population which

detests it, and this is especially true of Turkish Arabia. It is in financial straits, and its only means of escape seems to be the development of Mesopotamia. If irrigation works are carried out it will be convenient to have at Bagdad as British representative an officer who has had some experience of governing in oriental countries. If irrigation is not introduced, the hold of Turkey on the country is precarious. Should the Arabs prove too strong for the Turks we shall need all our influence.

Very little will be saved by changing the Indian officer for a consular officer, unless the "Comet," doctor, and sepoy guard are abolished. The abolition of these would be locally interpreted as an intimation to withdraw from our position. The Turks are not strong enough to get the irrigation surveys completed, and the engineers working under Sir William Willcocks have only been able to go to all parts of the country because they were Englishmen.

If the Arabs think that our interest in the country is waning, Sir William Willcocks will hesitate to send out his parties, and thus for a small saving the early development of this rich country may be jeopardised.

It is to our interest in India that there should be at least one officer of standing in Turkish Arabia who can understand and appreciate the difficulties of the large Indian population, both permanent and floating.

If reduction is desirable, the most suitable time for bringing it into force will be when Bagdad is brought into railway communication with the Mediterranean.

12. I should, perhaps, state in conclusion that my opinions are not biassed by any personal consideration, however unconsciously, for I some months ago asked the Government of India to allow me to leave Bagdad shortly, and since I began the preparation of the letter I have been offered an appointment in India.

I have, &c.

J. RAMSAY, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

P.S.—I have examined the first 500 entries in my register of letters received in 1908 with the following result :—

Letters from India	262
Other letters	226
Letters from Embassy	12
Total	500

J. R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 93.

Sir N. O'Conor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, September 4, 1906.*

I HASTEN to express to you my best thanks for your despatch No. 67 of the 6th August, with its very interesting enclosures regarding the probable demand for mechanical pumps in Mesopotamia.

I appreciate your efforts on behalf of British trade, and I am writing to draw the particular attention of the Foreign Office to the opening for British manufacturers which you have brought to the notice of the Board of Trade.

I sincerely trust that you will continue to give the matter your attention, and that the assistance you are rendering to British commerce in Mesopotamia will be attended with satisfactory results.

I am, &c.

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 3 in No. 93.

Sir N. O'Conor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, January 30, 1907.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 130 of the 31st ultimo, enclosing copy of your letter to Messrs. Rafhal Brothers respecting the market for high-speed looms in Mesopotamia. It is with great pleasure that I have learnt of your action in the matter,

and I am convinced that such enterprise on the part of consular officials and British trade agents is calculated to produce satisfactory results.

I am, &c.

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 4 in No. 93.

Sir N. O'Conor to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, April 16, 1907.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 22 of the 19th ultimo, reporting the steps which you have taken to bring to the notice of British firms the requirements of the concessionnaires of the Nedjef Kufa tramway in respect of plant and carriages, and I wish to express my warm approval of the activity which you have displayed in this and other kindred matters.

I am, &c.

N. R. O'CONOR.

Inclosure 5 in No. 93.

Sir N. O'Conor to British Resident.

Sir, *Constantinople, March 17, 1908.*

I FORWARDED to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Major Ramsay's despatch No. 115 of the 16th October last on the subject of the right of British vessels to navigate the Tigris above Bagdad, and I have now received instructions from Sir E. Grey to convey to Major Ramsay the thanks of His Majesty's Government for his interesting report.

Should events or special circumstances suggest or favour an opportunity of navigating the Tigris above Bagdad there is no objection to Major Ramsay taking advantage of it.

I am, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

G. BARCLAY.

Inclosure 6 in No. 93.

Sir G. Lowther to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

Sir, *Therapia, December 12, 1908.*

I FORWARDED to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of your despatch No. 84 of the 22nd August, forwarding a note on consular efforts made to encourage trade in Bagdad during the last two years, and I have now received a despatch from Sir Edward Grey in reply, requesting me to express to you his thanks for your concise and interesting report, and his appreciation of the energy and enterprise which it shows. Copies of your report have been circulated to His Majesty's consular offices in Turkey and Asia Minor.

Sir Edward Grey is considering, in consultation with the Board of Trade, your proposal that in future similar reports should be required from all consular officers for circulation among their colleagues in the country in which they reside.

I am, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 7 in No. 93.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.

Sir, *Board of Trade, May 3, 1909.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to your letter of the 4th December, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at

Constantinople, with notes by His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, in regard to the promotion of British trade in his consular district.

With reference thereto, I am to say that the Board fully concur in Sir Gerard Lowther's remarks as to the great credit which is due to Major Ramsay for the pains which he has taken in this matter, and the success which he has achieved.

I am accordingly to suggest that, should Sir E. Grey see no objection, an expression of the Board's appreciation of his work in the interests of British trade, and of the notes transmitted by His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, may be conveyed to Major Ramsay, together with their thanks for the assistance rendered by him to Mr. C. E. Akers in the course of his recent enquiry.

I have, &c.
G. R. ASKWITH.

Inclosure 8 in No. 93.

Director, Commercial Department, Board of Trade, London, to Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay.

(Semi-official.)
Dear Colonel Ramsay, *Board of Trade, July 9, 1909.*

ASSURING you of my most earnest desire to second your strenuous efforts in the direction of helping British trade, I am, &c.

THOMAS WORTHINGTON.

[34394] No. 94.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 320.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 13, 1909.*

REFERRING to my telegram No. 318 on the subject of the Lynch negotiations, as the new Minister for Public Works was not yet fully acquainted with the question, the Council of Ministers could not come to a final decision at their yesterday's meetings; the difficulties which still remain to be settled will now be referred to a committee composed of three Ministers, who will discuss them with Mr. Whittall, who appears satisfied that their decision will be favourable, more especially as the three Ministers have all declared themselves favourable to the project. I have not failed to impress again upon the Grand Vizier the urgency of coming to a settlement in the matter as soon as possible.

[34502] No. 95.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

THE Under Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 8th September, relative to affairs in the Aden Hinterland.

India Office, September 14, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September 8, 1909.*

ADEN Hinterland. See your telegram dated 1st August last.

Despatch from Sir G. Lowther, dated 27th ultimo, reports that, pending suppression of rebellion (see my telegram of 27th August), scheme of practical withdrawal from Yemen has been postponed by Turkish Government. This alters the

situation, but His Majesty's Government desire, in any circumstances, that their responsibilities should be strictly confined within the demarcated border of the Protectorate, and that any attempt of chiefs within border to interfere beyond it should be discouraged.

Instructions were sent on the 18th ultimo to Sir G. Lowther to furnish report as to the rumour that Mokha was to be ceded to Germany, to which your telegram of the 14th August referred.

[34129] No. 96.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 14, 1909.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he caused to be repeated to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington the telegram from the Government of India relative to the opening of a dispensary by American missionaries at Muttra, copy of which was enclosed in your letter of the 19th ultimo, at the same time enquiring whether his Excellency could expedite the reply of the United States Government to the communication made to them on the subject.

I am to transmit to you herewith copy of a telegram which has now been received from Mr. Bryce,* from which it appears that the newly-appointed United States consul at Muscat has been instructed to settle the matter with a due regard to the treaty rights of the United States and the "enjoyment of equal opportunity" for American missionaries, presumably with those of other nationalities.

I am accordingly to suggest that the terms of the telegram to the Government of India, draft of which was enclosed, for Sir E. Grey's concurrence, in your letter under reply, should be so far modified as to embody the above declaration of the United States Government.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[34611] No. 97.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 15.)

Sir, *India Office, September 14, 1909.*

IN reply to your letter dated the 8th September, 1909, I am directed to say that Viscount Morley concurs in the terms of the note which Secretary Sir E. Grey proposes to hand to the German chargé d'affaires regarding the situation at Abu Musa.

Copy of a letter from the political resident in the Persian Gulf to the Government of India, dated the 22nd August last, is enclosed for Sir E. Grey's information.*

I am, &c.
COLIN G. CAMPBELL.

[34620] No. 98.

Mr. Dunlop to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Port Said, September 15, 1909.*

YESTERDAY the "Sham," a Turkish transport with 1,400 Turkish troops on board, left for Hodeida.

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* Not printed.

[34629] No. 99.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 324.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September* 15, 1909.

LYNCH concession.

With reference to my telegram No. 320, a definitive offer has been made to the following effect:—

Fifty per cent. of the shares are to be English and fifty per cent. Governmental; there will be eight administrators, four English and four Ottoman; the President, who has a casting vote, will always be an Englishman; the President of the General Assembly will also be an Englishman, and have a casting vote; thus the control will be left in the hands of the English for a period of seventy-five years.

I consider that Lynch ought certainly to accept this offer.

The Ministers tell me that they would be able to give their signatures to this concession without submitting it to Parliament, and, in view of other offers of a more favourable nature, this is an important advantage.

I am told that a similar offer has been made by Rothschilds, who expressed their willingness to hand over the control to the Turks.

[34629] No. 100.

Foreign Office to Colonel Picot.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1909.

WITH reference to my letter of the 11th instant on the subject of the Tigris-Euphrates Navigation, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople stating that the Porte has now definitely offered the concession on the basis of the shares being equally divided between the Turkish Government and the British interests. Of the administrators, four would be British and four Turkish, the president, with the casting vote, being always British, so that control of the business for seventy-five years would be British. The president of the general assembly would have a casting vote, and would also be an Englishman. The Ministers have stated that they could sign a concession in this sense without submitting it to Parliament—a matter of importance, in view of other offers that have been made, notably, one from the Rothschild interests in similar terms, but leaving control in Turkish hands.

I am directed by Sir Edward Grey to express to you his earnest hope that your firm may see their way to accepting these terms.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[34394] No. 101.

Foreign Office to Colonel Picot.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 16, 1909.

WITH reference to Mr. Mallet's letter of the 11th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the council of Ministers failed to reach any decision on Sunday, the 12th instant, with regard to the concession for the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates. As the newly appointed Minister of Public Works is not yet familiar with the question, it will be considered by a committee of three Ministers who will discuss outstanding difficulties with Mr. Whittall. Sir G. Lowther has urged the Grand Vizier to settle the matter without delay. Meanwhile all the ministers are reported to have declared themselves in favour of granting the concession, and Mr. Whittall appears to be sanguine of obtaining a favourable decision.

I am, &c.
F. A. CAMPBELL.

[35177] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 671.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 18, 1909.

EUPHRATES navigation.

See my telegram No. 670 of the 17th September.

Under Turkish scheme, effective control over navigation of Euphrates by Great Britain can only be secured, in opinion of Lynch, in one manner. He has telegraphed his views on this to Colonel Picot.

These views have not been communicated to me, but the moment appears to him somewhat critical, and he hopes much that His Majesty's Government will lend him their support.

You will doubtless learn his views from Colonel Picot. If no serious reason against them occurs to you, you should give your support so far as you properly can.

[34932] No. 103.

Foreign Office to Mr. Lynch.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 18, 1909.

WITH reference to your letter to Mr. Maxwell of yesterday's date regarding the concession for navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, I am directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that a telegram was last night dispatched to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, informing him that the terms offered by the Porte require some consideration, and instructing him to endeavour to have the offer kept open for some days longer.

Sir Edward Grey must leave it to you to conduct the details of the negotiation, and he presumes that you have already telegraphed to Colonel Picot your objections to the present proposal, and the modifications you desire to see introduced.

In view of the fact that other competitors are applying for the concession, Sir E. Grey trusts that you will be able shortly to come to an arrangement with the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
CHARLES HARDINGE.

[34994] No. 104.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 728.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 8, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 714 of the 6th instant I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the Acting British Vice-Consul at Adana, reporting on the constitution of the Ottoman Adana Relief Fund Commission the attitude of the new vali and other local matters.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 104.

Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, September* 1, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the telegram of the 31st August in which your Excellency sanctions my sitting on the vali's financial commission, on condition that it also includes one or more foreigners.

As I had the honour to report in my last despatch the commission as at present projected is to include the vali, the Director of the Ottoman Bank and myself; possibly one other Turk will be added later.

Mr. Grabowski, Director of the Adana branch of the Ottoman Bank, is a Pole

and a French subject, and, possessing as he does a sound business capacity united with a tactful address and a sincere desire to forward the interests of the relief organization, is, in my opinion, a most suitable person to act as counterpoise against possible abuses coming from Turkish quarters. As a matter of fact I fancy that in the present case he will prove useful rather as financial adviser to them as a check on the vali, who, though fired with a genuine reforming zeal, has not, I should judge, much more than the average Turk's share of business instinct.

I have noted most carefully your Excellency's further instructions in this matter and will do my best to fulfil them.

As at present arranged no cheques for sums required by the various relief committees are to be signed except by consent of the financial commission, so that the chances of abuse in the distribution of the money should be comparatively small.

Unless your Excellency instructs me to the contrary, I shall understand that my membership of the commission is duly sanctioned.

With regard to your Excellency's second telegram of the 31st August, inquiring the result of the trials of the late vali and ferik, I telegraphed this morning that no result is yet known. I questioned Ismail Fazil Pasha on this subject just before his departure, but he was not inclined to be communicative, so I did not press the matter. I imagine that the sentences are already passed and are merely awaiting confirmation from Constantinople. I will, of course, report to your Excellency as soon as I learn the result.

There is no further news of our refugees to report.

The new vali's energy continues unabated, and there are rumours of considerable discontent on the part of the "konak personnel," who find their graceful daily dalliance abruptly converted into an honest day's work. The various new committees and sub-committees are now pretty well made up and are getting to work. The big refugee camp outside the town, originally pitched by Commander Carver, of His Majesty's ship "Swiftsure," is at last beginning to melt away. Its inmates being discharged into newly-repaired houses.

The vali one evening addressed for several hours a meeting of the heads of the Armenian and Syrian Churches held in Mr. Chambers' house. He spoke tactfully, but frankly on matters concerning them, and succeeded in leaving a happy impression on all his hearers. This invaluable knack of inspiring confidence and good temper in all classes, should prove an important means to the success of his Excellency's reforming efforts.

The vali announces his intention of suppressing as soon as possible the various officious and unofficial Armenian sources of rumour and so-called "reports" in Adana. This is a most welcome measure, as absurdly inaccurate reports and newspaper paragraphs, of which I gave your Excellency an example in my despatch of the 18th August, emanate apparently from Adana, and have the most harmful results.

Ismail Fazil Pasha left Adana overland for Constantinople on the 27th August. I bade him a formal farewell at the station.

An Italian gendarmerie officer has arrived here, and Ottoman officers with rank and file of the same force are expected very shortly.

Notices were posted up in Mersina inciting to boycott, but no disturbances have ensued. Greek vessels have been avoiding the port.

Hussein Daim Bey, whom I mentioned in my despatch of the 25th August, left Adana for Constantinople by order of the new vali on the 30th August. He came to bid me good-bye, and informed me that this sudden dislocation of his affairs meant a loss to him of from £ T. 300 to £ T. 400. He is, he says, to receive a new position as Alai Bey, in the island of Prinkipo.

The vali convened a general meeting yesterday of the members of the various relief committees to discuss the disposition of the second sum of £ T. 100,000 voted by the Chamber as loans to small shopkeepers, merchants, farmers, &c. A telegram was sent to Constantinople asking if this was to be without interest and limit of time. The meeting was of opinion that it ought to be without interest for at least two or three years. A commission of seven was appointed to consider and report as to the best way to administer this fund, and decide the proportion to be observed in apportioning to the different trades.

I have, &c.
R. E. W. CHAFY.

[34995] No. 105.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 730.)

Sir, *Therapia, September 11, 1909.*

YOUR despatch No. 249 of the 18th ultimo covered a telegram from the Viceroy of India regarding a rumour which prevailed that Mokha was to be made over as a coaling station to Germany.

In consequence of reports which have reached me to the effect that negotiations had been entered upon between Turkey and Germany with a view to the acquisition by the latter of a port in Syria or elsewhere in the Mediterranean as a coaling station, I asked the Grand Vizier on the 6th instant whether these reports had any foundation. His Highness stated categorically that there was no truth whatever in such a request having been made, and that there had been no proposal, hint, or suggestion put forward, either directly or indirectly, through the German Embassy here, or through the Turkish Embassy in Berlin.

Since then the Grand Vizier, while expressing some curiosity as to whence the report had come, added that a similar report concerning Mokha was evidently devoid of all foundation.

His Highness added that the French had recently given indications of wishing to revive the question of Sheikh Said, namely, the obtaining of a coaling station close to Bab-el-Mandeb, and I reminded him that Sheikh Said was in very close proximity to the terminal point of the Aden Hinterland boundary, and recommended his Highness to study the correspondence setting forth the final decisions of the boundary commission.

From the latter, as you will remember, it appears that the point called Sheikh Said is included in the territory which the Porte undertook not to alienate to any third Power.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[34998] No. 106.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 733.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 12, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, on the subject of excesses committed in the Mollky district owing to the refusal of Armenians to pay tribute to the Kurdish chiefs, and of abuses in connection with the farming of tithes.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 106.

Consul Shipley to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, August 27, 1909.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from Mr. Safrastian, on the subject of certain excesses which have occurred in the district of Mollky, to the south of Bitlis, due primarily, it would appear, to the refusal of the Armenians to continue the payment of "hadir" (tribute), up to the present exacted from them by the neighbouring Kurdish chiefs.

The question of this payment by Armenians of "hadir" to the Kurds would seem to be one of the difficulties in the way of arriving at a *modus vivendi* between the two races, for the latter, by long usage, would appear to have come to look upon this particular source of income as a prescriptive right, though the fact that those Kurds who were examined before the Sassoun Commission in 1895 professed one and all to be ignorant of what was meant by the term, would seem to imply that it rests on no very definite legal basis.

As far as I myself was able to discover it—the "hadir"—would appear to have

been nothing more than a tribute paid by the Armenians to certain powerful Kurdish tribes to ensure protection for themselves and their belongings, and, if this be so, the Armenians may very well consider that the necessity for payment ceases when such protection is no longer required. The subject, however, is one which will no doubt be fully gone into by the commission which, I understand, is to enquire into Anatolian affairs generally, but, in the meantime, your Excellency will not fail to note that the mere fact that the Armenians now consider themselves at liberty to resist further payment on this account, affords no small proof of the improvement in their condition as compared with what it was only a year and a-half ago.

The concluding part of Mr. Safrastian's despatch is occupied with the abuses which are still being committed in the matter of the farming out of the tithes, and it will be noted that the failure of the Government to ensure freedom of competition in this connection, not only to the Armenians but to the Kurds themselves, has already in the case of one village alone caused an appreciable loss to the Imperial treasury.

I have, &c.

H. S. SHIPLEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 106.

Mr. Safrastian to Consul Shipley.

Sir, *Bitlis, August* 17, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the state prevailing at present in the districts of Modky and Khuyt of this vilayet.

For the last three weeks, Musa Bey (Hadji) of Khevner is behaving himself criminally in his dealings with the Armenians of the above-mentioned districts. It is an unmistakable fact that since the happy days of the restoration of the Turkish constitution, Armenians have refused and are refusing to pay anything to such Kurdish chiefs in the way of "hafir" tribute (indirect tax). Musa Bey in Khuyt and Modky chiefs in their mountains persuaded the Armenians, their former slaves, to continue to pay their ordinary contributions for the maintenance of their families, otherwise threatening them with intrigues and murders. The Armenians refused again definitely and informed the local authorities of the fact.

A week ago, a Modky Kurd was wounded in an Armenian's house at Kenzu, the centre of the Caza of Modky, where he had gone as a guest to an Armenian. Four Armenians of the village were consequently arrested. In the course of the next night five Armenian houses and some stables were fired in Kenzu, several stacks of corn and hay were burnt and many corn and millet fields were destroyed. The next morning frightened villagers poured into the town stating that they are menaced by their neighbour Kurds with a massacre. They seem to be almost certain that Musa Bey of Khevner is solely responsible for these troubles.

Salim Pasha, the new acting vali, who arrived here from Urfa on the 4th instant, and who is recommended by the Armenian bishop at Urfa as a good and constitutional governor, sent some fifty gendarmes to Modky to undertake an enquiry. The villagers returned home after being assured that nothing more will happen to them.

Though I have heard nothing more as regards the doings of the gendarmerie major in Modky, but it is to be hoped that the acting vali will put the matters right. With the exception of these events at Modky, complete security and peace continue to prevail all over this vilayet.

Farming out of the Tithes.—As in all previous years, the farming out of the tithes of Armenian villages has been a permanent source of injustice and oppression to Armenians in the hands of Kurdish tithe-farmers, it seems to have been partly the same this year, too. Local Government officials of high standing, who are at the same time of very great influence here, are either directly in partnership with the Kurdish tithe-farmers, or they are somehow taking their share from such unlawfully won gains.

Such corrupt and influential officials as Hadji Nedjmeddine Effendi, "Nufus Naziri" Sadullah Effendi, and the ordinary brigand Yusuf Pasha, &c., all of them being the reactionary leaders here at the same time, are exercising their power in behalf of Kurdish farmers, and therefore to the prejudice of Armenian peasants. Nobody dares to approach to the tithes of villages which are in the zone of influence of the above Kurds; they are farming their own villages at inconceivably lower prices. For an instance, for the tithes of a Kurdish village bought by Hadji Nedjmeddine Effendi for

£ T. 20 for years past, other Kurds were ready this year to offer at least £ T. 100, but they were afraid to bid more at the auction. Thus from a single village the Treasury loses £ T. 80.

As to the tithes of Armenian villages, they are apparently being sold at auction; the notorious Kurdish farmers raise the bid much more than they are really worth. This year the Armenian peasants were even not present during the sale at auction of their tithes, so the cunning Kurds managed to get the documents of decision and begin the work of farming in Armenian villages. It was then in many cases that the latter were aware of the intrigue. They poured into the town and began telegraphing to the Parliament and to the Armenian patriarchate.

In my humble opinion, a vali, endowed even with the best good-will and justice in the world, could hardly do any better among such corrupt and dishonest officials. Salim Pasha, however, is trying to cause justice to be done to the grieved Armenian villagers.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

[34999] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 734.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 13, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of an article from the "Yeni Gazeta" of the 6th September, describing the rise of a mahdi, Seïd Muhammed-bin-Idris, and his political intrigues in the Jeziré-ul-Arab.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 107.

Extract from the "Yeni Gazeta" of September 6, 1909.

A Political Intrigue in the Jezirè-el-Arab: How a great rôle was played with success.

(Translation.)

IT was five or six months ago that a fresh personage appeared on the scene—Seïd Muhammed-bin-Idris, of Sabia. This name is not only used in the popular dialect, but is beginning to be used in official reports.

Who is he? What is he doing? What is his object?

This person was well educated in Egypt. After getting a good idea of the general state of affairs, he laid claim to being a "seïd," a "sherif," and even a "mahdi," and returned to his native place, Sabia, and settled there. He gave wise advice to the people; he more or less performed miracles; he attracted more and more the attention of these ignorant tribes.

He never took a half-penny for himself from anyone. It was for the love of God alone that he preached devotion, and spread abroad the tenets of the Sheriat. At first he said he had no personal motives. His only motive was to reform the people, who showed such degeneracy in their morals, and to preach obedience not only to the Sheri, but to Sovereign, to the Government, and its officers. One after another the people of this district were won over to him; but after the number of his partisans had increased he changed the tone of his utterances. "My duty," he said, "is to improve the lot of the servants of God. Therefore, those who follow me, who obey my orders, must make a pact, an alliance, in my presence." The people of the neighbourhood crowded to his side. They began to give him alms. A space of time passed thus, and then he heightened still more the tone of his utterances. "Those who follow me, who obey my commands, will make common cause with me; will love him that loves me; will hate him that hates me; will be at peace with him that is at peace with me; and will make war on him that makes war with me." The tribes visited him in hundreds, and made compacts with him. Of course, Seïd-bin-Idris, having attained such a position, changed his tune again. In the districts which had fallen under his influence proclamations after this manner were read: "I am one who

prays to God! In the name of God I invite the people to do right, to obey the Sheriat, and to pray. Hear me! Know that the infidels, and especially the Christians, are about to make an attack upon your country from the sea. Fight them to your last breath, with your bodies and with your arms. Whatever comes will come from the sea. The moment they come they will seize and eat your cocks and your hens and your dogs. Do not give them the chance. Destroy at once every cock and hen and dog in your villages; let not one remain."

This proclamation appears rather strange, does it not? But do not wonder at it; the artful demands of the miracle-monger were but a ruse to deceive the ignorant. The cleverness of the plan lies in its very simplicity. There was a hint of miraculous power which strengthened the confidence of the ignorant. But the real importance lies in the words: "They will come from the sea," and "fight against those that fight against me."

So step by step the seïd increased his prestige, till in a month or two he had a following of some 40,000 souls. Then he took another step forward and issued his final proclamation:—

"People of Islam! As an official sent from God I address you. Obey the laws of good doing and devotion! Submit yourselves to the 'one who prays to God!' If one rises up to fight him do you wage holy war on his behalf! You know that a certain enemy is about to attack you: that is, the Christians. They will come from the sea, and they will come in the form of Ottoman soldiers! Be ready to wage a holy war against them: each one of you has an arm, let there be enough arms in your magazine. I have an abundance of arms: I will help you!"

From this proclamation his secret purpose becomes clear. What a fine gradation there is in his proclamations! In the first he says: "Obey God and the Sheriat!" In the second: "See that the Sheriat is upheld." In the third: "Fight with those who fight me." And in the last he shows whom it is they will have to fight: "Christians in the guise of Ottoman soldiers!"

The seïd is calm and quiet; all the time he keeps putting forward the necessity of obeying the Sultan and the Government, and thereby he avoids attracting the attention of the authorities. As "one who prays to God" and "a worker of miracles," he shows himself to none by day. Those who come to him to make a pact are received at night. Generally he has a representative: as a rule, his private official (his cadi) gives his orders. But his miracles are shown, especially to people coming into his presence at night. They enter a dark room; there is no lamp; the light of his presence is light enough, for he shines with a wonderful brilliance; there is a light in his eyes which acts as a guide. That is one miracle! Those who wish to make a pact with him enter the room; the officials pass a rope round their necks, the rope being held by the seïd. Then the terms of the pact are read over and repeated; but as they repeat the words a trembling comes over them, a frightful vibration—they think they are in an earthquake—and only with difficulty can they repeat the words of the pact. Miracle number two! And no small one either! Yet an electric lamp and an electric coil are all that is necessary for both miracles!

Yet a third miracle: The Imam Seïd Yahia-bin-Hamid-ud-Din deputed two men to kill the seïd, and sent them to Sabia. But the seïd sent out several men to seize them and bring them before him. He said to them: "I know your purpose in coming and who sent you; but rest assured you will not attain your object: and now I trust you." He kept them for several days as his guests, and then sent them back. This story spread quickly among the tribes, and the seïd's reputation grew yet more.

This all shows the man's intelligence and his ability to use every little incident to increase his own influence. He was particularly adroit at spreading news, and news spreads very quickly in these parts. He also had a great faculty for discerning the truth of news which arrived—a faculty which the tribes do not possess, and the lack of which is one of the chief causes of their being so constantly led away by pretenders.

If you were to try and make these people believe the mathematical truth that 2 and 2 make 4, you would absolutely fail to make them understand it, because you are not endowed with the necessary qualifications. But Seïd Idris is always successful; he uses strange and wonderful means that would never occur to you; he knows the way that goes straight to their hearts.

Let us leave the mental state of the people, we can pardon them, for man will do anything through ignorance; but it is essential that we should look carefully at the result of it. Looking through the history of the Yemen we find that these "political intrigues" have always the "Sheriat" behind them, have always "a religious colouring." That is

the essential of success. The cry of a holy war for religion's sake stirs them to shed the last drop of their blood, and leads to terrible disasters. The tragedy of the suppression of the Wahabees by Mehemet Ali is not yet forgotten.

Owing to the rapid spread of news, troubles which at first are insignificant become most serious, and disorders which might at first have been crushed by one battalion finally require a hundred battalions and batteries of artillery to quell them. This is the case with Seïd Idris. Who knows what a terrible disaster he may bring down on our heads before long?

Who is responsible for this?

The seïd cannot be called responsible. He is but a rebel, who makes use of his own intelligence, and takes advantage of our position and the condition of the tribes to enlarge his own power. We cannot make the local Government responsible: they will always be able to uphold their claim. Since the beginning they have reported every action of Seïd Idris.

It is obvious that into this story we must weave the name of Abdul Hamid. What is more likely than that one of his emissaries, who fled from Turkey, found the seïd in Egypt and filled his pockets with gold? For although the seïd never took anything from anyone, yet he has magazines and stores of arms. It is quite in accordance with Abdul Hamid's policy that he should try and raise up difficulties for the constitutional Government and thus get his revenge. He hoped to show the Arabs that his deposition was unlawful, and that obedience to the present Government was unnecessary. Moreover, the inability of the Government to quell the rebellion might lead to international complications.

One point more: Is it possible that Seïd Idris is in league with the Imam of the Zeïdis, Yahia-bin-Hamid-ud-Din? It is well known that the inhabitants of the mountainous part of the Yemen are of the Zeïdi persuasion, while the districts of Tehama and Asir are inhabited by Shaafis. There is a religious antagonism between the two. Moreover, the inhabitants of the cool, mountainous parts have nothing in common with those of the sunburnt, waterless plains. So that there is no reason why Seïd Idris and Seïd Yahia should not be friends, because they know that neither could take the other's place.

So it is quite likely that when the trouble prepared by Seïd Idris bursts out it will spread like wildfire to Tehama. The Ottoman troops would have to fight under every disadvantage: in one part they will have to contend with the difficulties of mountainous country, in another with the waterless regions of the desert.

We have, more or less, brought these tribes to obedience, but if we now allow this poison to spread, if we let this evil get greater, then such a fire will break out that no firemen of ours will be able to extinguish it.

[35003] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 20.)

(No. 738.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 14, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 220 of the 1st July last, I have the honour to report that I have received a telegram from the acting British vice-consul at Adana, informing me that the three refugees from the consulate were acquitted and released on the 10th instant.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[35005] No. 109.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received September* 20.)

(No. 740.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 14, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on the present state of the Hauran.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 109.

Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Damascus, August* 31, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Hauran district remains fairly quiet, orderly, and secure, Druzes and Moslem peasants being busy collecting their crops while the three months' truce (reported No. 26 of the 1st May) recently renewed between the former and Bussorah Moslems runs for two months; but the Hauran deputy, Saaduddin Effendi Khalil Mikdad, recently returned from Constantinople and has aroused some little turmoil by causelessly insisting on the need of more troops being dispatched to that neighbourhood. This gentleman is of the Mikdad family of Bussorah Eski Sham, against whom the Druzes entertain a special hostility of long standing, so that personal feelings may have inspired his present course of action.

The two battalions now in Hauran Sanjak and its immediate vicinity are sufficient to maintain order, even if any attempt were made to disturb the peace, which, however, is quite unlikely. The conduct of the Druzes in general has of late been exemplary.

I have, &c.

G. P. DEVEY.

[35008] No. 110.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 743.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 14, 1909.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 277 of the 7th instant inquiring as to the concession applied for by Mr. Glasgow, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the preliminary contract made between him and the Turkish Minister of Public Works.

You will perceive that Mr. Glasgow proves not to be a representative of the Standard Oil Company, but of the J. G. White Construction Company, described as of New York and London. This has given colour to the report which appears to have been spread mainly by Mr. Glasgow himself that he represented a large amount of British capital. The American chargé d'affaires, who has supported him very warmly, stated that no doubt, as so large a sum of money would be necessary for the enterprise, a considerable portion of it—several millions—would be raised in England, and then in fact he would be representing large British interests.

It is next to be noticed that the proposed railway is apparently to start at Sivas, and go thence to Diarbekir, Van, Mossul, and Kerkouk, and finally to Youmourtalik, which is on the Gulf of Payas, near Mersina. It will not, therefore, encroach upon the reserved Russian sphere of the Black Sea basin, but it does not explain how it is proposed to get to Sivas in order to commence from that town. But the intention is expressed of endeavouring to invade the German preserve on the sea between Tripoli and Mersina.

Articles 2 and 3 give the concessionnaires a period of sixteen months within which to make surveys of the line and to decide whether or not they will take up the concession, and article 5 holds the Turkish Government from granting any concession or right to search for petroleum in the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, and Mossul—a prohibition which appears definitely to postpone Mr. D'Arcy's negotiations for the Mesopotamian oil-fields until the end of the sixteen months allowed.

There are other proposals now being put forward, in addition to that which is being put forward by Mr. Beckett, to whom I referred in my despatch No. 674 of the 17th August, for the construction of railways in Anatolia, notably one which is being pressed by a Mr. Chester, who represents an American syndicate; and another by Colonel Schaeffer, on behalf of some Belgian capitalists.

I shall have the honour to report on these schemes as soon as I can obtain reliable information concerning them.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Preliminary Contract.

ENTRE Son Excellence Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Sénateur, Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux Publics, agissant au nom du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, d'une part; et M. le Dr. Bruce M. Glasgow, agissant en vertu d'une procuration portant la date du 25 juin, 1909, ci-annexée,* au nom du syndicat J. G. White and Co., de New-York et de Londres, d'autre part, il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit:—

Article 1. Le syndicat J. G. White and Co. s'engage envers le Gouvernement ottoman, qui accepte sous réserve de l'approbation des présentes par une loi, à faire à ses frais, risques, et périls—

1. Les études de reconnaissance des chemins de fer suivants, à savoir:

(*a.*) De Siwas à Van, en passant par Kharpout, Arghana, et Diarbekir, Bitlis et la rive nord ou la rive sud du lac de Van.

(*b.*) D'un point à déterminer de la ligne de Siwas à Diarbekir à Youmourtalik par la vallée du Djihan.

(*c.*) D'un point à déterminer de la ligne de Diarbekir à Van, à Mossoul, Kerkouk, et Souleïmanié.

2. L'étude géologique des régions traversées par les chemins de fer ci-dessus, ainsi que la recherche des principales mines et minières se trouvant dans une zone de 20 kilom. à droite et à gauche de l'axe présumé des dites lignes.

Art. 2. Le Gouvernement accorde au syndicat un délai de seize mois, à compter à partir de la date de la promulgation de la loi approuvant les présentes, pour l'exécution des études spécifiées à l'article 1er.

Art. 3. Pendant le délai de seize mois dont il vient d'être parlé, le syndicat aura le droit d'opter pour la construction et l'exploitation, aux clauses et conditions de la conventions et du cahier des charges ci-annexés,* des chemins de fer énumérés à l'article 1er de la présente, ainsi que de l'exploitation des mines et minières se trouvant dans la zone de 20 kilom. à droite et à gauche de l'axe des chemins de fer en question.

Si le syndicat n'a pas, dans le délai ci-dessus, notifié au Ministère son intention de faire usage de ce droit d'option, le présent contrat sera de plein droit nul et non avenu, sans qu'il y ait lieu à indemnité de part et d'autre.

Le cautionnement prévu à l'article 6 du présent contrat sera dans ce cas restitué au syndicat. Mais les études faites par le syndicat deviendront, sans aucun paiement, propriété de l'État.

Il est en outre expressément entendu que le syndicat n'aura aucun droit sur les mines et minières qu'il aurait découvertes.

Art. 4. Si au contraire le syndicat lève l'option, il devra en temps porter à £T. 30,000 le cautionnement prévu à l'article 6 de la présente.

Art. 5. Le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à n'accorder pendant les seize mois dont il est parlé à l'article 2 aucune concession de mine ni aucun permis de recherche dans la zone de 20 kilom. à droite et à gauche des chemins de fer, énumérés à l'article 1er. Cette interdiction s'applique en outre aux terrains pétrolifères se trouvant dans les vilayets de Van, Bitlis, et Mossoul, qui seront compris dans la zone des lignes à construire sous réserve des droits déjà accordés au Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

Pendant cette même période le Gouvernement n'affermera pas non plus à des tiers les mines exploitées par l'État se trouvant dans la zone susmentionnée, et en particulier la mine de cuivre d'Arghana.

Art. 6. Pour l'exécution des engagements qu'il contracte par la présente, le syndicat a déposé un cautionnement de £T. 5,000 en titres au Crédit Lyonnais, qui a pris l'engagement de parfaire la différence en cas de baisse du prix des dits titres.

Art. 7. Le cas de force majeure excepté, si le syndicat ne présente pas les dossiers prévus à l'article 1er; ou s'il n'exécutait les engagements découlant du présent contrat; ou si, ayant déclaré vouloir lever l'option dont il est parlé à l'article 2, il ne porterait pas le cautionnement à £T. 30,000; s'il ne se conformait pas aux clauses et

* Not printed.

conditions de la convention et du cahier des charges, le présent contrat deviendrait caduc et le cautionnement serait confisqué par le Gouvernement ottoman.

Art. 8. Tous différends qui surviendraient entre le Gouvernement et le syndicat du chef de l'interprétation de ce contrat préliminaire seront tranchés par le Conseil d'Etat.

Art. 9. Le Gouvernement aura le droit de faire accompagner les agents du syndicat par un nombre de fonctionnaires de l'Etat qui surveilleront les opérations du syndicat.

Art. 10. Dans le cas où la Sublime Porte n'approuverait pas le présent contrat, ou s'il n'est pas ratifié par le Parlement, le syndicat J. C. White and Co. ne pourra prétendre à aucune indemnité à quelque titre que ce soit.

Art. 11. Le présent contrat n'entrera en vigueur qu'après son approbation par une loi.

[35013] No. 111.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 748.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 15, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Kharput, reporting on the present situation in the vilayet of Diarbekir.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 111.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Kharput, September* 2, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that Mr. Mugerditchian reports from Diarbekir as follows:—

"The vali left Diarbekir on the 24th ultimo for Mediat, where a great deal of unrest has manifested itself of late.

"The tribes in that district have made many attacks upon the gendarmes, and within the last week killed three and wounded two more.

"The general condition of Diarbekir is good, though the order abolishing the post of moavin has made a bad impression among the Christian population."

I have, &c.

E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[35014] No. 112.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 749.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 15, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting vice-consul at Kharput, reporting a conversation which he held with the vali on the subjects of the pacification of the Dersim district and the construction of a road from Mezereh to Erzinjian, viâ Khozat.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 112.

Acting Vice-Consul Rawlins to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Kharput, September* 2, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mehmed Ali (my despatch No. 40 of the 5th August) arrived at Mezereh on Sunday, the 29th ultimo.

On Tuesday, the 31st ultimo, I paid a visit to his Excellency in the Konak, and enjoyed a prolonged conversation with him.

Mehmed Ali is a young-looking, energetic man who speaks French fluently and a little English. He is most cordial, and his active and intelligent manner impressed me favourably.

Upon my enquiring as to whether he had heard any news from the Dersim district, his Excellency was kind enough to read me out a long telegram which he had just received from the Mushir Ibrahim Pasha.

The mushir stated that all the important chieftains had surrendered to him and had given up their arms and ammunition. Secondly, that he had been able to enforce the payment of the taxes, and that complete tranquillity reigned throughout the whole Dersim, except that the tribes around Kizil Kilise were giving trouble, and had refused to surrender their arms or pay taxes. The mushir continued that he was leaving for the Kizil Kilise district in order to punish the tribesmen and enforce their obedience.

The vali then told me of a new undertaking, namely, the making of a waggon road from Mezereh to Erzinjian, viâ Khozat. The road from Mezereh to Khozat is at present impossible for wheeled traffic, and the road beyond Khozat is even worse.

I was further informed that £ T. 20,000 had been sanctioned by the Central Government for this purpose, and that a first monthly payment of £ T. 2,000 had already been received. Work was to be begun at once at Khozat, whither his Excellency intended going shortly in order to superintend the arrangements.

Further details were that 3,000 workmen were to be employed daily at a payment of 3 piastres per man per day, and that a chief engineer, a sub-engineer, and several assistants were to arrive this week from Constantinople and would at once set to work on the making of the road.

As to how far the Dersim is really "pacified" it is difficult to know for certain, as that district has become famous for "paper reforms." From many sources, however, I hear that the chieftains and tribesmen are really anxious to settle down quietly, as they have suffered much from the various campaigns undertaken against them, and it is more than probable that the making of this new Erzinjian-Khozat-Mezereh road will have a quieting effect, as the whole Dersim district will then become much more easy of access.

It is also generally admitted that, if the Government will deal fairly with the Dersimlis, the latter will readily become tractable and peaceable subjects of the Empire.

That the vali should himself be going to Khozat is, in my humble opinion, a good step, as he will then be able to gain an insight into one of the most important and least known districts of his vilayet.

I have, &c.

E. C. DONALDSON RAWLINS.

[35165] No. 113.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received September 20.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September* 18, 1909.

IN reply to your letter of the 18th ultimo, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that they have no information respecting the report that Mokha is to be made over to Germany as a coaling station, and it is possible that the intended visit of the German war-ship "Cormoran" gave rise to the rumour. Some years ago Germany attempted to obtain a concession for a coaling station in the Farisan Islands, and more recently it has been rumoured that Kamaran Island was to be conceded for this purpose.

I am to add that Mokha is not considered to be suitably situated for a coaling station. The roadstead is an open one, exposed to all winds except from the eastward, and coaling would be much hindered during strong southerly winds which prevail in the winter. The anchorage for vessels of 21-feet draught is over a mile from the shore and town; deep draught vessels could only anchor over 2 to 2½ miles from the shore fully exposed to the heavy sea, and numerous shoal patches exist in the approach, rendering care necessary.

Kamaran is a much better locality, affording a capacious anchorage in from 5 to 15 fathoms.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

[35048] No. 114.

Consul Dunlop to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Port Said, September 20, 1909.*

DISTURBANCES at Hodeida.

"Marmara," Turkish transport, with 900 Turkish troops on board, has left for Hodeida.

[35207] No. 115.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)

(No. 329.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 21, 1909.*

LYNCH concession.

With reference to your telegram No. 671, I have arranged the question of the final effective control with the Grand Vizier and with the Ministers of Finance and Public Works. The sole remaining difficulty is that relating to the proposal to limit the concession to a period of seventy-five years. The Government, which is being violently assailed by the partisans of other concessionnaires for granting so generous a concession, is afraid that the omission of this proviso may bring about its downfall, but the matter is still being deliberated on.

[33134] No. 116.

Memorandum communicated to German Chargé d'Affaires, September 21, 1909.

SIR EDWARD GREY presents his compliments to the German chargé d'affaires and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note communicated by him on the 14th ultimo, taking act of the assurance offered by His Majesty's Government that, pending a definite settlement of the question of the working of the mines of red oxide on Abu Musa Island, they will preserve the *status quo* there and stating that, pending that settlement, Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. and those associated with them will extract no more of the mineral from the mines but will limit themselves to removing the remainder and that already extracted while reserving all claims to compensation on account of the suspension of their work.

On the 13th ultimo, the day before this note was received, Herr von Kühlmann, in the course of a conversation at the Foreign Office, stated that the German Government would be unable to come to a decision on this question until they had examined the correspondence regarding the ownership of the island.

Sir E. Grey ventures to point out that the undertaking given to Count Metternich in his note of the 28th July last was given on the understanding that the reply of the Germans might be shortly expected, in accordance with a verbal statement made by Herr von Kühlmann on the 16th June, and that the declaration made by him on the 13th ultimo introduces a new element into the situation, since, if the *status quo* were indefinitely prolonged it is evident that British interests would be placed at a manifest disadvantage, for whereas His Majesty's Government would have no right to touch any of the oxide in the island during the whole of that time. Messrs. Wönckhaus would be able, whenever it suited them, to remove portions of that already mined on their account.

In view of this consideration and of the fact that, since the date of Sir E. Grey's memorandum of the 28th July, 1908, more than a year has elapsed during which it has been open to the German Government to examine these papers, Sir E. Grey feels it his duty to state that His Majesty's Government could not consent to prolong the present situation indefinitely unless the German Government, on their part, are willing to give an undertaking that Messrs. Wönckhaus will not only refrain from extracting more oxide from Abu Musa, but also from exercising their right to remove from the island that which has been already mined pending a settlement of the whole question.

Foreign Office, September 21, 1909.

[32540] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 290.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 21, 1909.*

YOUR Excellency will have received direct from Mr. R. Graham a copy of his despatch to me No. 99, Confidential, of the 21st ultimo, respecting communications between the Turkish Government and the Nationalist party in Egypt. This matter formed the subject of your despatch No. 506 of the 29th June.

It appears to me that, if His Majesty's Government allow this incident to pass unnoticed, the Porte may gain the impression either that Great Britain is indifferent to it or that she is so anxious to retain the goodwill of Turkey that she dares not protest against such a proceeding.

It is impossible to forget that the sympathy and friendliness which His Majesty's Government have so liberally displayed towards the new régime in Turkey have as yet evoked nothing in return but platonic protestations of gratitude and affection, while the prospects of obtaining in favour of British subjects the important concessions which they are seeking remain problematical.

It is, moreover, in the power of the Porte to cause to His Majesty's Government the most serious embarrassments in Egypt, and I am accordingly of opinion that the time has now come to speak out clearly as much for the purpose of showing to Turkey that Great Britain cannot safely be treated with such lack of consideration as of preventing the former from committing herself too deeply to the Egyptian Nationalist party.

I therefore request your Excellency to take an early opportunity of informing the Grand Vizier that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the action of the Sultan in receiving the Nationalist deputation and His Highness's own in sending a sympathetic message to the party which it represented and which is constantly attacking both the Khedive and the Government of Egypt was unfriendly to the Khedive and may be embarrassing to His Highness. The attitude of His Majesty's Government towards Turkey, which has been characterised by a desire to make things smooth for the new régime, may be affected if there be any intervention of a nature to reopen the Egyptian question, and they therefore trust that categorical instructions may be sent to the High Commissioner to refrain from any such action.

Your Excellency should convey this warning to the Grand Vizier in a friendly manner, explaining at the same time that it is given with the object of avoiding any incidents of a nature to inflame public opinion here and to create a breach between the two Governments which His Majesty's Government would deeply deplore.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35322] No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 294.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, September 21, 1909.*

THE Turkish Ambassador called here on the 17th instant and informed Sir Charles Hardinge that, according to a telegram from Rifaat Pasha, another English company had entered into competition with Messrs. Lynch for the Tigris and Euphrates Navigation Concession. The telegram stated that the company was not known to His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, and expressed a desire for information with regard to it. The Ambassador added that the rival company had offered 30,000*l.* more than Messrs. Lynch for the concession.

Tewfik Pasha was informed by Sir Charles Hardinge that no information had reached this department about any rival company; that His Majesty's Government were supporting Messrs. Lynch's claim, and that they hoped that the concession would be granted to that firm.

I have to inform your Excellency that were such an offer made by a respectable British firm, such as the British India Navigation Company, His Majesty's Government could not object if the Turkish Government were to grant the concession to them.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32316] No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 297.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 21, 1909.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 293 of the 21st September, enclosing a letter from Mr. R. L. Harmsworth, M.P., in regard to the concession for exploiting the oil-fields in Mesopotamia, I have to inform you that in the course of a few days I will address to you a further despatch as to the attitude to be adopted towards Mr. Harmsworth and other competitors for this concession.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[35207] No. 120.

Foreign Office to Mr. Lynch.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 22, 1909.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform you that, according to a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, the difficulty with regard to the effective financial control of the concession for the navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers has been arranged. Sir G. Lowther states that the only outstanding difficulty is the limitation of the concession to 75 years. This matter is still under discussion, but the Turkish Government appear to fear that their own position may be imperilled if they omit this proviso, as they are being severely attacked by supporters of other competitors for the concession on account of the liberality of the terms granted.

I am, &c.
E. A. CAMPBELL.

[35522] No. 121.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 332.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September* 23, 1909.

LYNCH concession.

With reference to my telegram No. 329 of the 20th instant, the suggestion made by the Government regarding the preferential right after seventy-five years is that the new Turkish company should be permitted to continue its existence, but that it should have neither preference nor monopoly. With regard to various companies, such as the Régie, which began life under the former régime, the Government considers it necessary to deal with these as with the Mahsoussek concession, which is now being granted, that is, to insert a clause for the repurchase of these concessions, it having been found impossible to obtain by competition better terms than those formerly agreed to. I objected to this arrangement, pointing out, among other things, that if the Persian transit trade were to fall into less careful hands than those of the Lynch Company, which at present administered it safely, the trade in question might suffer. In order to overcome this objection the Government proposes that a clause should be inserted whereby, after a period of perhaps twenty-five years, the company's exclusive rights, but not the company itself, could be bought out, and an indemnity paid whose amount should be fixed by arbitration, and further undertakes that no other monopoly shall be granted, while the river will be open to all Ottoman subjects as well as the Turkish company. The Government declares that if the above clause be inserted no further difficulties will be raised, and the convention can be concluded immediately, as it will be unnecessary to bring it before Parliament, but that without it it will be impossible to cope with Sassoon and other Arab deputies, who are certain to oppose the concession of exclusive rights to a company under foreign management.

The terms put forward by Sassoon and others are more favourable than those of the Lynch group, and their opposition is genuine. Without venturing an opinion on the matter from a business point of view, it seems probable that at the end of the

suggested period of twenty-five years the new company will have had time to consolidate its position, and the value of its properties will have become sufficient to render it unlikely that a fresh company could find the capital required to compete with it.

If Lynch agrees to the clause in question, I myself think that the affair will at once be concluded, as the Turkish Government is earnestly in favour of this scheme, whereby the two companies will be amalgamated.

[35842] No. 122.

Mr. Bryce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 211.)

Sir, *North-East Harbour, Maine, September* 11, 1909.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 109 of to-day's date I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the Acting Secretary of State regarding the opening of a medical dispensary at Mutra by Dr. Thoms without the sanction of the Sultan of Muscat.

I have, &c.
JAMES BRYCE.

Inclosure in No. 122.

Mr. Adee to Mr. Bryce.

Department of State, Washington, September 8, 1909.

My dear Mr. Ambassador,

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your personal note of the 27th July last, wherein you advise the department that the Sultan of Muscat has protested to the Government of India against the opening, without his sanction, of a medical dispensary at Mutra by the American-Arabian Mission at that place, and wherein you request the good offices of the department, looking to the suppression of the dispensary and the recall of Dr. J. Thoms, of the mission in question.

In reply, I beg to inform you that this matter has had attention for several months. The vice-consul at Muscat has been instructed to urge for Dr. Thoms the enjoyment of the most-favoured-treaty rights on the same footing as missionaries and professional men of other nationalities may be ascertained to enjoy in Mutra. The newly-appointed consul to Muscat goes out with instructions to settle the matter, if possible, with due regard to our treaty rights and to the enjoyment of equal opportunity. Until the new consul can carry out his instructions, and report the situation clearly, this department is not in a position to make a decision, either adverse to or in favour of Dr. Thoms' claim.

When the consul shall have reported the facts and the result of his action under instructions, the department will be happy to give the matter definitive consideration.

I am, &c.
ALVEY A. ADEE.

[35805] No. 123.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 767.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 16, 1909.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 728 of the 9th instant, and previous correspondence on the subject of affairs at Adana, I have the honour to forward to you herewith copy of a despatch which has recently reached me from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Adana. You will notice that the information contained therein falls under four principal headings:—

1. Sentence of capital punishment to be carried out on certain Turks and Armenians;
2. The fate of the men who had taken refuge in the consulate;
3. The punishment of the vali and the military commandant; and
4. The punishment of minor offenders.

I had the honour to inform you in my despatch No. 738 of the 14th instant that the refugees had been acquitted and released.

With regard to the punishment of the vali and the commandant, Mr. Chafy, in the telegram to which he refers, had reported that, though the court-martial was preserving secrecy as to their decision, he had heard that the former had been condemned to loss of his civil rights for six years, and the latter to the loss of his civil rights, withdrawal to the retired list, and several months' imprisonment; and, further, that the notorious Baghdadi has been sentenced to two years' exile to the Hedjaz and the editor of the "Ittihad" to a similar period of exile at Sinope. He has subsequently confirmed the statement as to the punishment of the vali.

With regard to the condemnation to death of various Turks and Armenians, a very considerable sensation was aroused here by a statement on the subject in the press. The number of Armenians to be hung was given variously from four to nine. I telegraphed to Mr. Chafy to ascertain what the facts were, and he informed me that none had been condemned by the Adana court-martial under the presidency of Kenan Pasha, but that they might have been condemned by the court sitting at Erzin, or else three Armenians of Hajin who had killed a Circassian gendarme, and an Armenian of Deurt Yol who had killed a compatriot. He believed it to be true that about forty Moslems had been sentenced to death.

The sensation was greatly increased by the action of Mgr. Tourian, the Armenian Patriarch, who sent in his resignation to the Grand Vizier on the 7th instant. His Beatitude took up the line that, as Government had officially admitted the innocence of the Armenians as to the accusation of having caused the massacres, the presumption was that any Armenians who had killed Moslems had done so in self-defence, and that consequently it was not equitable to condemn them to death; that it would be juster and more politic to severely punish the ex-vali, &c., who were responsible for the disorders, and pardon even individual Moslems who had taken part in the massacres; and that the sentences decreed against the ex-vali, &c., were quite inadequate. The gravity of the situation was increased by the intention expressed by the Armenian National Council to follow the example of their chief, and negotiations were opened between the Porte—represented by the Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey, and the Minister of Justice, Nejmeddin Bey—and Mgr. Tourian, with a view to arriving at a compromise which should satisfy the demands of the latter. Talaat Bey's attitude was at the outset unconciliatory, and he told a press representative that the sentences passed by the courts-martial would all be carried out with impartiality on Christians and Moslems alike; but a day or two later it was announced that the death sentences on twenty-nine of the Armenians had been commuted to penal servitude for life.

The Grand Vizier, to whom I mentioned the matter, said that it was not possible to interfere with the sentences which had been passed by the courts, though both he and Talaat Bey thought those passed upon the vali and commandant were quite insufficient.

At the present moment the situation is unchanged. The patriarch declares that it will not be sufficient if the condemned Armenians are pardoned, but those responsible for the massacres must absolutely be severely punished and made an example of. Failing this, he will not withdraw his resignation. His synod proposed to hand in their resignation, but were dissuaded by the lay members of the council, pending a conclusion of the negotiations with the Porte.

Meanwhile Mr. Chafy telegraphs that it has been decided that no capital punishment shall be inflicted during the month of Ramazan, which commenced the day before yesterday.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 123.

Acting Vice-Consul Chafy to Sir G. Lowther.

No. 4.)
Sir, *Adana, September* 8, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a translation of a copy of the worn declaration sent by the Armenian Arslanian to Kenan Pasha's court-martial, and referred to in my despatch of the 25th August.

The entire document is probably a piece of imaginative writing, but is interesting

as throwing a sidelight on to the workings of the machinery of justice here. I gathered from Kenan Pasha that he has taken no serious notice of the document.

A statement appearing in several newspapers to the effect that forty Turks and four Armenians have been condemned to death in the vilayet of Adana gave rise to no little apprehension on the part of our three remaining refugees and their friends and adherents. I received several appeals to take steps on their behalf, both indirectly through letters from the prisoners themselves and directly from members of the patriarchal delegation. I replied decisively that I had good reason to believe that there was no chance of the men receiving the death sentence, and that the newspaper paragraphs, even if accurate, could not therefore refer to them.

I shared in a laugh with Kenan Pasha yesterday over these unfounded apprehensions. I deliberately refrained from enquiring the fate of the three refugees as a mark of my complete confidence in his good faith; but, as a matter of fact, Kenan Pasha assured me that the newspapers do not refer to them, and that, if four Armenians are condemned to death in the vilayet, it is by some court-martial other than that over which he presides. He thought the figure forty referred to as the number of Mussulmans condemned throughout the whole vilayet might be about correct.

He said the result of the trial of the refugees is likely to be made known in a few days.

From various indications, and from a remark of Kenan Pasha's that he hopes that the beginning of the month of Ramazan will find him in Constantinople, I judge that the court-martial here will shortly rise.

It appears that Ismail Fazil's court gave their solemn word not to make premature disclosure of its results, which explains their reticence when questioned on the subject.

But there is no doubt that the walls of courts-martial are endowed with ears, and I fancy that the unofficial information which I had the honour of telegraphing to your Excellency on the 5th September, though possibly erroneous in detail, is not far wide of the truth in main outline. I fancy the result will shortly be officially published.

I have the honour to report the following decisions of the courts-martial here and at Erzin:—

For failure to perform their duty in preventing the pillaging of the Government arms depôt at Tarsus during the massacres a major, a kul aghasi, a captain, a regimental clerk, and a musketry instructor have received sentences varying from one to three months' imprisonment.

Seventy-eight civilians are condemned to six months' imprisonment each for stealing Government arms.

A person, described as an Afghan, is condemned to one year's imprisonment for the same offence.

Two gendarmes (privates) of Erzin are sentenced to six months' imprisonment each and dismissal from the force for aiding and abetting the escape of guilty Mussulmans.

Major Raghib Bey, of the Arab battalion stationed at Adana, and a kul aghasi of the reservists of Kara Issarlou receive three months each for failing to protect arms belonging to the Government.

A captain is sentenced to two months' imprisonment for the same offence.

The said Major Raghib was guilty of conduct of a far more serious nature than that for which he is condemned, and his punishment appears highly inadequate.

Mr. Chambers, of the American Mission, is to-day giving evidence before the court-martial with regard to the murder of the preacher Hovagim.

I have, &c.
R. E. W. CHAFY.

No. 124.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 769.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 22, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Major Doughty-Wylie, vice-consul at Adana, reporting on certain sentences pronounced by the court-martial.

The circumstances reported show very conclusively the inadvisability of abandoning the Capitulations at present, and in this connection I would refer you to my despatch No. 736 of the 13th September, 1909.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Inclosure in No. 124.

Vice-Consul Doughty-Wylie to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Adana, August* 10, 1909.

I HAVE the honour to report that certain sentences of exile which have been pronounced by the court-martial under Kenan Pasha have come to my knowledge.

Hussein Dayim Bey has been sentenced to three years. This man was originally an alai bey, afterwards an exile and, I believe, a "journaldji" in Adana. But during these massacres he has from the first worked to help the Christians. He saved many lives to my personal knowledge, and nearly all the houses in his quarter. He did this, I believe, by telling the mukhtar of the quarter that I would shoot him if anything occurred. After the massacres I employed Hussein Dayim Bey in the relief camps, and he was finally placed by the Government in charge of the Yeni Mahalla camps, and is now in charge of the tents which are still in use. He is also a member of our international relief committee, and has proved himself an extremely useful and intelligent man. He attributes his banishment to the accusations of Bishop Musnech, who, not being present at the massacres, accused those whom he thought likely to have influenced the crowd. All the Christian communities are petitioning in his favour. He has been officially thanked by the late M. Roqueferrier, French consul-general at Aleppo, and by the Italian officers.

The second is Khudri Bey, brother of Soubi Pasha, lately chief of police in Adana. Khudri Bey did his best to warn the Armenians, he repeatedly begged for support for the police, and was nearly killed on the first day while trying to arrest a Turk who had fired revolver shots in the Armenian quarter. His and his brother's house was burnt during the massacres, the cry against them being that they were sympathisers with the Christians. They are of the principal family of Adana, which has for long been at enmity with Bagdadi and Ihsan Fikri of the "Ittidal." After the massacres Khudri Bey was made president of the municipality, as a man in whom everybody had confidence, while his brother was chosen by the Christians as their president on the Ottoman commission of relief.

Both these men, if exiled, would be a real loss to Adana under present conditions, and their departure a blow to those who are trying to show that it is in the long run a good thing to save life and property, even in the face of danger and difficulty. There are very few men who made such an effort, and if they are punished it will not encourage the others.

The third man for whom I should like to put in some personal plea is Ahmed Bey, late alai bey, who rode round the town with me on the second day. He is a brave, ignorant, and fanatical old soldier, and a hater of Armenians. But on the day when he came with me there were no other superior officers who cared to maintain the credit of the Turkish army. He might be forgiven for that alone.

I have, &c.
C. H. M. DOUGHTY-WYLIE.

[35961] No. 125.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 22nd September, relative to the American hospital at Mutra.

India Office, September 25, 1909.

Inclosure in No. 125.

Viscount Morley to Government of India.

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September* 22, 1909.

IN continuation of their despatch of the 6th July, enclosed with secretary's letter of the 9th idem, Foreign Office repeated your telegram of the 17th August regarding Muscat to Washington. Following telegram, dated the 12th September, received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington :—

"Reply received to-day from United States Government. Matter has been for several months under their consideration, and United States vice-consul had received instructions that Mr. Thoms' claim should be urged by him on the same footing as that enjoyed in Mutra by other missionaries. United States Government cannot decide on Thoms' claim until new consul, who is going out, has fulfilled his instructions and reported on situation. New consul's instructions are to settle the matter with a due regard to America's treaty rights and enjoyment of equal opportunity."

"Equal opportunity" is interpreted by the Foreign Office as meaning that American missionaries and those of other nationalities are to have equal opportunity.

If a reasonable settlement is proposed by American consul its acceptance should be urged upon Sultan by Resident, Persian Gulf. In event of settlement being unacceptable, facts must be reported by Resident, who should bear in mind that he himself has no *locus standi*, and that question of interference must be delicate. Until the facts are known it is impossible to promise the Sultan any support. Major Cox will, of course, advise Sultan to act reasonably, and will observe friendly attitude to consul.

[36008] No. 126.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 3 4.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September* 27, 1909.

OCCUPATION of Zaliknunieh.

Your despatch No. 263 of the 21st August.

I am told by Rifaat Pasha that a report has been received from the Vali of Bussorah stating that all the gendarmes who were sent to Zaliknunieh last March were sent back to Ojeir early in June.

[36079] No. 127.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 28.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of Viscount Morley, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 26th August, relative to British jurisdiction over foreigners in Bahrein.

India Office, September 27, 1909.

Inclosure 1 in No. 127.

Government of India to Major Cox.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Simla, June* 15, 1909.

WITH reference to the correspondence ending with your telegram dated the 5th January, 1908, I am directed to forward herewith a copy of correspondence with His Majesty's Secretary of State for India regarding the proposed order in council

conferring on the political agent at Bahrein jurisdiction over British subjects and foreigners at Bahrein.*

2. I am to request that, as directed by the Secretary of State, the political agent may be instructed to approach the sheikh with the object of obtaining from him, as a necessary preliminary to the issue of the order in council, a request that the British Government will relieve him of the responsibility of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners in the island, and that the result may be reported to this department at an early date.

I have, &c.
J. B. WOOD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 127.

Major Cox to Government of India.

Sir, *Bushire, July* 31, 1909.

IN reply to Foreign Department letter dated the 15th June, 1909, I have the honour to submit a copy, with translation, of the letter furnished to the political agent, Bahrein, by Sheikh Esa, asking Government to relieve him of responsibility of exercising jurisdiction over foreigners.

2. The text of the letter down to the words "foreigners only are concerned," is practically what was recommended to him by the political agent. The reservation contained in the remaining words is an addition of the sheikh's own.

But as its effect is simply that such cases will be disposed of by the Joint Court and gives foreigners the same treatment that British subjects now receive, there seems no need for exception to be taken to it, and I trust the letter as now received will be considered to suffice.

If at any time the procedure in regard to British subjects is modified, by the same analogy foreigners would be covered by such modification.

3. The sheikh's indirect allusion to the Joint Court, however, makes it advisable for us to consider carefully, in bringing out the order in council, the effect which the grant to the political agent of regular civil powers will have upon the working of the machinery at present employed for the disposal of civil claims in Bahrein, and the extent to which those powers, if granted, need be published for the present.

It would, however, be more convenient to go into this question with others when considering in detail the terms of the order in council, when its issue is finally decided upon.

I have, &c.
P. Z. COX, *Major*,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Inclosure 3 in No. 127.

Sheikh Esa-bin-Ali Al Khalifa to Captain C. F. Mackenzie.

(Translation.)
(After compliments.) *July* 16, 1909 (*Jemadi* II, 28, 1327).

IT is not hidden from you that I have had considerable trouble in many cases [that arose] in my territory in which foreigners were involved. For this reason I wish that I may not be held responsible in these cases, and I would be grateful to the British Government if they remove this trouble and responsibility from me. I mean that it [the British Government] should exercise authority in all cases in which the foreigners only are concerned, but not in other cases; and in cases that occur between foreigners and my subjects it is necessary that you and I should settle them jointly.

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* To His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 188, Secret, November 14, 1908; from ditto, No. 11, Secret, May 21, 1909.

[36164]

No. 128.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(*Received September* 29.)

Sir, *Admiralty, September* 28, 1909.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter of proceedings, dated the 25th August, from the officer commanding His Majesty's ship "Hussar" relative to affairs in the Levant.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Inclosure in No. 128.

Lieutenant-Commander Cumberlege to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

Sir, *"Hussar," at Alexandretta, August* 25, 1909.

IN accordance with your orders, I have the honour to report that I relieved "Barham" on the 14th August at Port Saïd, completed with coal, and proceeded to Alexandretta on the 16th August, arriving there on the 18th August, and relieved "Medea," which sailed same day.

2. I shall cruise to Beirout to-morrow, visiting some of the villages on the way, remain there a few days, and be back here by the 1st.

3. During my stay here I have visited several villages, and I find that at present there is no probability of trouble, partly owing to the harvesting operations, and also, it seems to me, that the present Government has nothing to gain and everything to lose by permitting a massacre. There is evidently sufficient troops to prevent any private enterprise that might be organised by the local population.

4. On the other hand the Armenians of the village of Dort Yol are very uneasy. This was the village that successfully withstood the onslaught of the Kurds some few months ago. It lies some 40 miles away by road from here, and I visited it the day before yesterday. They have quite made up their minds that the Government are contemplating their extermination, and I think there is quite the possibility of them (the villagers) doing something unlawful, which might bring about general trouble in that district.

5. The situation is thus, as a matter of interest: The villagers, having most successfully beaten off the Kurds, inflicting considerable loss, have gained a widespread reputation among the Armenians, consequently all the outlying Armenians have left their villages and concentrated on Dort Yol. The ordinary population may be reckoned as 5,000 souls, there being 1,000 houses. This population, according to the headmen, has almost doubled (this is probably an exaggeration); from other sources of information I gather the increase has amounted to not more than 3,000. This is serious, however, in view of the fact that the silk industry having been destroyed at the time of the massacres and the orange crop not having been purchased by the dealers from Smyrna and Constantinople, meaning that the villages have no ready money to pay for their winter provisions, and the outlying gardens and crops having been destroyed and not replanted, there will be a lot of distress in the winter. The Turkish authorities ten days ago arrested eleven of the headmen of the village, and have imprisoned them, and are trying them for the murder of two Armenian youths, said to have been shot by order of the headmen for acting as spies; whether they did or not, I do not know. It appears that a commissioner from Constantinople some time ago came down and tried them before and they were liberated, and now that they have been again arrested means that the villagers look upon it as the beginning or excuse for fresh persecutions. It is said that they are being daily bastinadoed to make them own up to shooting the boys. The probability is that the Turks want to wring a confession out of them and then let them go, and thus cry quits over the whole matter. However, the Armenians naturally have no faith in the Turks, and see in everything the Turks do a fresh effort on their part at massacre. The walls are patrolled night and day, yet a house-to-house search for arms by the Turkish authorities did not reveal a single weapon. They are, however, very well armed, and I believe they received lately 1,000*l.* from the Armenian society or committee wherewith to buy rifles. Greek Gras rifles are being smuggled in from the coast. All this information is at present merely a matter of interest, perhaps; but it is as well to know it, as showing the general

local feeling, and as giving one the possibility of anticipating events. The village lies one hour-and-a-quarter's march from the sea.

6. There is in any case no doubt of the necessity of the presence of a ship on the coast.

7. The health of my ship's company remains at present excellent, notwithstanding the damp heat. I propose on my return on the 1st September here to visit some places seven hours off with the consul, and spend about a week here, then coast north and coal at Smyrna, and give leave there, returning by the coast again.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE CUMBERLEGE, *Lieutenant-Commander and Senior Officer on the Levant.*

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